

RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

Vol. XIX

Autumn Number, 1950

No. 4

EDITORIAL BOARD

NOLAN B. HARMON, *Editor-in-Chief*

ERMINIE HUNTRESS LANTERO, *Assistant Editor*

JOHN BAILLIE	CLARENCE T. CRAIG	KENNETH S. LATOURETTE
ROBBINS W. BARSTOW	LYNN HAROLD HOUGH	G. ASHTON OLDHAM
SAMUEL McCREA CAVERT	JOHN KNOX	HOWARD C. ROBBINS
GERALD R. CRAGG		PAUL E. SCHERER

ADVISORY COUNCIL

Joseph Haroutunian	Harold C. Phillips	D. Elton Trueblood
Paul Bentley Kern	Richard Campbell Raines	Leslie D. Weatherhead
Earl Bowman Marlatt	Edward T. Ramsdell	Theodore O. Wedel
W. E. McCulloch	Carl C. Rasmussen	Luther A. Weigle
Robert Hastings Nichols		R. Frederick West

CONTENTS

	PAGE
From "The Church's Witness to God's Design".....	Pierre Maury 482
One Place to Hide.....	Richard M. Fagley 483
"My Ten Best Books".....	Twenty-five Ministers 495
The New Being.....	Paul Tillich 511
Three Hours Against Eternity.....	Edgar N. Jackson 518
Protestants, Catholics, and Papists.....	George P. Howard 530
The Immutable Values of a Universal Faith.....	Elmer Berger 536
Ecclesiastical Sculpture.....	Alec Miller 545
Individual Planning and Economic Freedom.....	Harvey Seifert 555
An Approach to Preaching Through Classical Rhetoric.....	Thomas H. Marsh 567
Ecumenical Prospects in the Local Church.....	Winston L. King 578
An Experiment in the Recall of Religious Material.....	George K. Morlan 589
Alfred E. Garvie: Theological Exponent of the Nineteenth Century	J. J. Bunting, Jr. 595
A Review of the Quarter's Fiction.....	John C. Schroeder 608
Book Reviews	614
Index	637

Copyright, 1950, by Pierce and Smith. All rights reserved—no part of this magazine may be produced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

Printed in the United States of America

Published by

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS

150 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK

From "The Church's Witness to God's Design"

THE CHURCH must learn once again to speak of free pardon. For it is futile, nay harmful, for the Church to speak of sin against God unless it also speaks of the forgiveness of this sin. . . .

Thus, as in all great epochs of its history, the Church fulfils her responsibility only by proclaiming before all else Christ Jesus and Him crucified. This is the Church's responsibility; it is also her only chance of making herself heard and believed. For outside the Church, who proclaims to modern man, tormented by his guilty conscience, God's offer of forgiveness? Who else offers this forgiveness in its reality, as the end of the guilt from which modern man is trying in vain to struggle free, as the opportunity to begin life completely afresh and to have real peace within? Who else offers this deliverance either to individuals or to nations? The world's crown of sorrows lies in the fact that no word is heard of God's forgiveness—nor of man's forgiveness of man. Hence the violence and despair which overwhelm men's lives and bedevil their relations. Hence also the impossibility of any real justice. For justice can never be restored if it is conceived as nothing more than a perpetual balancing of accounts.

—Pierre Maury in Vol. II of *Man's Disorder and God's Design*.
Harper & Brothers, 1949, pp. 107f. Used by permission.

RELIGION IN LIFE is published quarterly by Abingdon-Cokesbury Press at 75 cents per copy. Subscription price, \$2.00 per year, \$5.00 for three years in the United States and possessions and Mexico; Canada, postage 18 cents per year additional; other foreign postage, 30 cents per year additional. For the convenience of readers in Great Britain, subscriptions will be received by the Epworth Press, 25-35 City Road, London, E. C. 1, at the rate of nine shillings and sixpence per year.

Publication office, 810 Broadway, Nashville 2, Tennessee. Editorial office, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York. Entered as Second Class Matter, August 26, 1942, at the post office in Nashville, Tennessee, under Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized March 16, 1923.

T
the
a tu
ated
has
scale
attack
kind
at lo
pace

or t
in a
pow
It is
toda
may
of w

impl
fecti
if th
is th
The
of th
fram
that
can c

Justic

One Place to Hide

The Atomic Crisis and Christian Faith

RICHARD M. FAGLEY

THE FIVE YEARS that have passed since the first atomic bomb melted the sands of New Mexico and ushered in this Atomic Age have witnessed a tumultuous course of events. Historical developments have been accelerated beyond any previous peace-time experience. The war-time coalition has not only fallen apart but its members are engaged in a new and large-scale race in armaments. Indeed as this is written, a perilous military attack has been launched on the Republic of Korea. One fourth of mankind has achieved national independence. Another fourth has come under at least the temporary sway of Communist regimes. On every hand the pace of events outstrips our common understanding of their significance.

The technological forces which enter so largely into the speeding up or telescoping of historical process find their climax and principal symbol in atomic energy. The chain reaction epitomizes the increase in physical power which enlarges the sphere of interdependence and common destiny. It is the chief factor in the new insecurity which confronts every people today. Consequently, a review and analysis of elements in the atomic crisis may offer us a clue to a better understanding of the deeper social crisis of which this is a part.

Dr. Bradley in his compelling book, *No Place to Hide*, lays bare the implications of atomic warfare for our urban civilization. There is no effective defense against the possible incineration of a great metropolis. And if this is true of the type of bomb used at Bikini, how much more compelling is the argument when the prospective hydrogen bomb is taken into account. The underlying thesis of this present review of our situation is that none of the proposed solutions for the atomic crisis, within the commonly accepted framework of secularism, offers any real promise of a way out. It is held that only within the framework of religious faith, the individual and society can escape from an intolerable sense of insecurity, and find solid ground for reasonable hope of modifying the insecurity itself. In a Christian

REV. RICHARD M. FAGLEY is Co-Secretary of the Department of International Justice and Goodwill, The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

strategy there is a place for the spirit of man to find refuge, to secure a home no storm can destroy, and to move without fear or false illusions in a realistic search for means of protecting mankind from the perils of atomic warfare.

I believe that the experience of the past five years supports the general conclusion that there is no way out of the crisis, apart from a God-centered strategy. Let us look briefly at that experience.

THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS

The first phase of this atomic crisis has been marked by extended international discussions to secure the effective outlawry of the new weapons of mass destruction. The course of these negotiations and the issues revealed by their failure can help us to understand the tragic dilemma which the world now confronts. The guarded character of the initial discussions on atomic matters among the Big Three furnished a mood which persisted in subsequent negotiations. Full candor was never present—except perhaps in the invectives which became more frequent as time went on.

Much has been said about the merits and demerits of the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposals presented to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission in June, 1946. In general, British Minister of State Hector McNeil's characterization of the plan, as one of the most generous proposals in international history, appears justifiable, particularly in view of the fact that the history of nations is not replete with generous proposals. The plan pledged the United States to turn over, by agreed stages, its two-billion-dollar atomic establishment to an international atomic authority in return for a similar commitment by nations possessing nonexistent or embryonic atomic establishments. It provided for an international inspection system, with international ownership and management of essential aspects of atomic development to facilitate inspection, and with safeguards written into the treaty to keep inspection within necessary bounds.

The best testimony to the technical adequacy of the plan has been the way the great majority of states in the United Nations, after months and years of critical appraisal, came to endorse the basic principles. In the process, the plan was refined and improved. The French, for example, added the idea that the treaty should include equitable national quotas of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, making the power of the international agency less arbitrary. The British added the proposal to restrict the production of nuclear fuels to the amount actually required for constructive purposes, thus reducing the risk that such fuels would be diverted into

bombs. Despite these improvements in detail, the essentials of the plan have stood up remarkably well.

Two weaknesses in the American proposals have become more evident with the passing of time. Mr. Baruch laid great stress on vetoless sanctions in his presentation to the Atomic Energy Commission, and it has long seemed clear that this is a secondary matter. The proposed authority would be principally an instrument to warn the world community of an attempted or threatened violation of the atomic agreement. No veto would prevent those endangered by a major violation from taking such measures in collective self-defense as proved possible. Elimination of the unanimity rule might facilitate collective self-defense action, but would not affect it fundamentally.

Another weakness in the plan was the emphasis on stages of transition between national and international control. This seemed to assure an American monopoly lasting over a considerable period of time, during which there would be a gradual transition to international control, the completion of each stage being a precondition for the next stage. While the details of this part of the plan were not discussed in the Commission, being reserved for consideration after agreement on the plan's essentials, the transition by stages did constitute one of the Soviet Union's main criticisms of the majority plan. The Soviet delegates charged that the other states were being asked to place unlimited confidence in American good will, while the United States would preserve the advantage of her head start in atomic development throughout a transitional period of undetermined length. The vagueness of the majority plan in this respect certainly lent itself to such criticism.

Now that the Soviet Union has its own atomic establishment, much earlier than anticipated by military intelligence if not by the scientists, the criticism of the proposed transition by stages is coming from the majority side. Chester Barnard, president of the Rockefeller Foundation and one of those who worked with Lilienthal on the original proposals, has suggested that a new examination be made of the transitional stages, to see whether a plan better adapted to the current facts cannot be devised. The desirability of bringing all atomic establishments under effective international control with a minimum of delay is clear.

An even briefer word might be said of the Soviet counter-proposals. These would provide for national ownership and management of atomic installations, and for limited and periodic international inspection. The crux of the matter was the stubborn insistence by the Soviet delegates on limiting

inspection to periodic visits to declared facilities, except when special investigations elsewhere were warranted. They explained neither how undeclared facilities would be detected in the first place, nor how periodic inspections would be able to detect the diversion of nuclear fuels from declared facilities. The Soviet counter-proposals rested almost exclusively upon confidence in the good faith of nations, since the inspection procedures would provide no trustworthy means of verification. From the vehement Soviet attacks upon the good faith of the non-Soviet states, one is forced to conclude that the Soviet leaders themselves did not regard the counter-proposals as a plan to be taken seriously.

In fact, the pattern of the negotiations over the three-year period was rather strange. The give-and-take of traditional diplomacy was lacking, as far as the major contestants were concerned. Intimate committee meetings would be treated as though they were world forums. Weeks or months would be consumed in trying to get some clarification of terms from Moscow. A reading of the record indicates how the majority and minority groups were increasingly going through unreal motions of negotiation, without coming to grips with the real issues dividing the powers. At the 1948 meeting of the General Assembly, the majority of delegates on the Commission recommended discussions on a higher level in the hope of breaking through the stalemate. At the 1949 meeting of the Assembly, the majority stated that further negotiation at the Commission level, without a new basis for agreement, would only injure the prospects for agreement by hardening the positions put forward. Shortly thereafter even the motions of negotiation were broken off by the Soviet representatives over the issue of Chinese representation. This at least was the nominal issue. A more significant factor may well have been the successful development of atomic installations in the Soviet Union.

THE CAUSES OF FAILURE

There is no sign, as hoped by some, that an end of the United States' monopoly and restoration of greater strategic balance between the Soviet and Western worlds would create the basis for "real" negotiations. The trend has been precisely the opposite—from unreal negotiations to none. The Federal Council's foreboding at the close of the war appears to be justified. "Unless it (a single world control)," said the Federal Council, "can be achieved in the short period while the United States alone possesses atomic bombs, it may be difficult or impossible to achieve." No new factor has appeared which would require modification of that statement.

If we are forced to regard the negotiations for control as a failure, it is obviously not because of the complex technical problems which stand in the way. The scientists and the politicians agree that it is technically possible to set up an inspection and supervision agency to give complying states reasonable assurance against undetected violations. The real trouble lies in the political and moral obstacles to such a system, in the deeply rooted distrust which corrodes Soviet-Western relations. How can the majority trust in the good faith and compliance of the minority without unhindered means of verification? On the other hand, how can the minority, holding its doctrine of inevitable hostility and conflict between the two worlds, trust in the good faith and self-restraint of the majority not to misuse inspection and management to serve its own ends, unless the powers of the authority are greatly curtailed?

Here is the rock on which the negotiations foundered. A number of safeguards were written into the proposed treaty to define more specifically the powers of the agency. Mining and separating ores, for example, were eliminated from the agency's functions. The treaty rather than the agency would define national quotas for atomic energy. Warrants from appropriate courts would be required for inspections. Yet these limitations on the powers of the international authority, or any others, could not eliminate the possibility that the prerogatives delegated to the agency might be used in arbitrary fashion. No workable system can dispense with good faith as an essential ingredient.

Yet it is precisely the lack of good faith and good will which characterizes the ideological conflict and cold war of today. The Soviet leadership is committed to the dogma that war between the two worlds is inevitable, and many leaders of the West have fallen victim to a similar determinism. The tragedy is, as church leaders have pointed out, that the belief in the inevitability of war leads to policies and actions which tend to make it inevitable. Communist theory rules out, on *a priori* grounds, any confidence in the good faith of capitalist nations. And noncommunist governments, on the basis of postwar experience, have lost confidence in the honoring of Soviet pledges. The two worlds do not speak the same moral language.

THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ETHOS

Here is the root problem of an agreement on atomic weapons or of any broader settlement. It is the problem of finding and establishing a common foundation of moral principles. The need for an international ethos as the

groundwork for international life has been repeatedly emphasized in Christian pronouncements since the Oxford Conference pointed to this as the cardinal issue in the world of nations. Unless there are commonly accepted standards of conduct in international relations, then the structure of diplomacy, by which conflicts of interest can be adjusted peacefully, rests on shifting sands of expediency. Of course, expediency enters into the observance of agreements and treaties, as well as into their nonobservance. But if there is nothing more than that, if there is no underlying core of moral principles to which the nations jointly yield allegiance, then "agreements" exacerbate and do not settle conflicts, and peace becomes but a brief and troubled interlude between wars.

This does not mean that our pluralistic society is condemned by its variety, or that peace requires a rigid uniformity. Widely divergent systems, ideologies, and beliefs can coexist peacefully and indeed provide each other with a valuable competitive stimulus. Our Protestant, and our national, experience is testimony to that fact. Diversity can make for a creative, dynamic peace, provided there are some basic shared convictions which provide a framework for the peaceful adjustment of conflicts. There must be certain "rules of the game," certain mutually accepted "methods of tolerance," if conflicting beliefs are to live side by side. This is the main thesis of *Soviet-American Relations*, the statement issued by the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace in 1946, which stands up as the finest brief analysis of the subject yet published.

Some would argue hopefully that a common foundation of moral principles does exist between the Soviet and Western worlds. Both systems profess high ideals for social betterment, and the peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain share in a Christian heritage. Out of such influences an international ethos may eventually grow: ideals, even when used as a means to power, have a way of reasserting themselves; and a Christian heritage, despite strenuous efforts to undermine it, has a wonderfully durable quality. For the present, however, the West has to deal primarily with the Soviet regime, a small and closely knit hierarchy of determined men, committed by theory and past experience to totalitarian methods at home and abroad. This group, holding the dogma that war between the two worlds is inevitable, rejects norms of international fair dealings and relies on coercion, intimidation, and false propaganda shielded by secrecy. One does not have to be blind to the shortcomings of the Western governments to recognize in the doctrine of the Kremlin a special obstacle to a common international morality which could serve as the cornerstone of peace.

A SERIES OF DEAD-END STREETS

Without this cornerstone, none of the alternative approaches to the problem of bringing the atom under the sovereignty of mankind offers genuine hope for solution. The failure of the effort to establish an international atomic authority is essentially the failure of the various plans to achieve the same end.

The proposal of Senator Tydings to convene a world disarmament conference for the purpose of eliminating atomic armaments and curbing conventional armaments, corresponded with the aspirations of our churches. The growing burden of military expenditures is deepening the prevalent sense of insecurity, endangering social welfare legislation, and tending to prevent the type of positive peace program which can lessen the perils of war. Atomic weapons and conventional arms, moreover, are two complementary aspects of the total security problem. It is more logical to consider the various elements of military defense in their interrelationships. Molotov and other Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly urged disarmament.

All this is true. Yet the fact remains that the nub of the problem, in the present state of international distrust, is the issue of verification. And this question becomes far more complex in relation to all weapons than it is when atomic weapons are considered separately. An elaborate inspection system would be required to check on tractor and airplane factories, on chemical plants and steel mills, if the observance of a general disarmament agreement were to be verified. As the U.N. debates on the Soviet disarmament proposals made clear, the free societies will not enter into an agreement with the Soviet Union in this area, unless it includes a method for checking the performance against the promise. And, as the Soviet replies have made equally clear, the men of the Kremlin have no intention of permitting hostile inspectors to make such surveys on their side of the Iron Curtain. Mr. Baruch was correct in calling atomic disarmament the A of the alphabet. Without enough mutual trust to permit a solution to the relatively simple issue of atomic inspections, there is no prospect for a solution to the broader and more difficult problem.

Another proposal is that of Senator McMahon, looking toward an inclusive and expanded program of economic and social development, linked with a treaty for atomic disarmament. The constructive spirit and purpose of this proposal were praised in the Federal Council's recent statement on the hydrogen bomb. In Senator McMahon's proposal there is recognition of the need for a bold, imaginative approach, to break away from the downward spiral of fear in a plan of positive action. To make this possible, he

argues, the burden of armaments must be greatly reduced, and this requires an atomic treaty. Thus the question of good faith comes again to the fore.

The new element is the possible inducement to agreement offered by the prospect of American economic assistance. Five years ago, this might have been tempting to the war-devastated Soviet Union, although even then Stalin spoke of long-term credits primarily as a means of easing the expected postwar crisis in the United States. Today, with the Five-Year Plan evidently succeeding, the Soviet regime appears to be little concerned about assistance for its own sphere, and actively opposed to assistance outside that sphere.

Some advocate an even more ambitious approach, that the Soviet Union be asked to join in a limited world government, to which would be delegated sovereignty over armaments, among other things. The chief arguments, in addition to those concerned with the need for such a government, appear to be (1) that the Soviet response to such a proposal is unknown, since it has not been made officially; and (2) that if the response proved negative, the West would know where it stood. Unfortunately, we already know the answers to both questions. The Soviet spokesmen have not hidden their light under a bushel on the question of world government. Their denunciations of this "anti-Soviet plot" are well known. Under the circumstances, this attitude is understandable, for even a limited world government, as compared with less ambitious schemes, would heighten the problem of confidence many fold, by making the minority so much more dependent upon the good intentions of the majority.

A relatively modest proposal calls for a standstill agreement, under which dangerous atomic facilities would be placed under a U.N. seal during the period that a permanent agreement is being negotiated. This plan, supported by some of the Friends and others, does not, however, escape from the dilemma which plagues the other plans. The West would insist on a thorough preliminary survey of the Soviet Union, to make sure that the dangerous facilities and possible caches of bombs were included. And the Soviet Union would insist that any such survey would be aimed at uncovering all the military-economic secrets which constitute part of the Soviet security.

MORAL PLEDGES AND ATOMIC SANCTIONS

In another category are certain proposals which do not aim at eliminating atomic weapons, but rather at outlawing their initial use, or use for aggressive purposes. Walter Lippman some months ago suggested a treaty on the pattern of the poison-gas treaties of 1922 and 1925, and variant

plans of a similar nature were discussed informally at the last session of the U.N. General Assembly. These would avoid the problem of verification *versus* espionage, since no hindrance would be placed upon the manufacture or stockpiling of atomic weapons. The treaty would merely outlaw the use of these weapons of mass destruction except in case of atomic attack upon one's own country, or that country's allies, or a member of the United Nations. The suggestions differ in this regard.

The proposals agree on relying upon the threat of retaliation for their enforcement. It is argued that although poison gas was manufactured in great quantities during World War II, it was not used, and that this offers hope that an atomic treaty of the same type might be observed. (Of course, poison gas was used during World War II by the Nazis to kill millions of Jewish people.) The analogy between poison gas and atomic or hydrogen bombs seems strained. There appears to be doubt as to whether poison gas is an effective military weapon. There is no doubt about A-bombs, or H-bombs if they can be built. The threat of retaliation would be correspondingly greater, but the temptation to use a potentially decisive weapon would also be far greater.

Without a new birth of confidence in the honoring of agreements, the outlawry approach would do little to lessen our present insecurity. The threat of retaliation already exists as a deterrent. All members of the U.N. are bound by the Charter not to wage aggressive war. Some, indeed, would question the value of a new Kellogg-Briand Pact applied to atomic weapons as tending to weaken the broader obligation of the Charter. It seems clear that if the larger commitment were violated, little reliance could be placed on compliance with the more limited commitment. As the Calhoun Commission stated in its report, *Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith*:

We recognize the probable futility, in practice, of measures to outlaw atomic weapons while war itself continues. Use of the newer weapons might indeed be temporarily restrained, on the part of some belligerents by concern for humanity, on the part of others by fear of retaliation. But experience indicates that in a struggle for survival one side or the other will resort to whatever weapons promise victory, and its opponent will feel constrained to adopt counter-measures in kind. War itself must go.

THE ENDURING CRISIS

Step by step, we are reluctantly forced to conclude that, given the present suspicion, fear, and hostility, not to mention overt aggression, the probabilities are overwhelmingly against any genuine settlement of the atomic crisis, apart from a profound moral transformation in the hearts of

men and nations. This is not a new conclusion. It is a logical implication of what international and national bodies of Christians have been saying for several years about man's disobedience to God's righteous will. Of course, as church groups have also been saying, the nations need to explore earnestly every possible avenue to viable agreement to eliminate the present deadly competition in weapons of annihilation. It may be that in the search some unforeseen factor may emerge, some new birth of confidence may occur to offer a way out of the deadlock.

Nevertheless, it seems to me clear that Christian strategy must continue to reckon these secularist approaches to atomic control as offering but faint hope of reducing the tragic insecurity of our time. Rather, as the Soviet Union approaches equality in atomic armaments and as the prospective hydrogen bomb adds new dimensions to available destructive power, the prospects for reaching a settlement will become grimmer than ever. The crisis in which we are involved gives every sign of long duration, if the greater tragedy of war does not supervene. Mounting tensions, perilous alarms, manifestations of hysteria, and a tendency to sacrifice hard-won freedoms in the hope of gaining a little more security—these seem to be likely concomitants.

It is difficult to estimate the present effect of the new insecurity upon the minds and spirits of people. Superficially, at least, considerable adjustment has been made. Immediate problems of personal security tend to crowd the larger problem into the background. Yet the influence of that background upon attitudes and behavior may well be more pervasive now than we realize. In any case, it seems to me probable that our secularist society, lacking the inner strength of Christian faith, will become more and more psychologically and politically unstable as the crisis develops.

ELEMENTS OF CHRISTIAN STRATEGY

The churches of Christ were born for a time such as this. The gospel which we are privileged to proclaim has new and life-sustaining meaning for this troubled generation. As the hopes and illusions of a proud secularist society are broken down by fear and frustration, the followers of the Christ are given a new opportunity to bring home his message concerning repentance and regeneration. The crumbling and collapse of the half-gods can be made a step toward the worship of the living God.

To fulfill our Christian responsibility means, in the first instance, a repentant and renewed spirit in our churches. "All of us," says the British Council of Churches in its recent statement on the hydrogen bomb, "have

had our share in creating the appalling prospect which now faces mankind." Unless we in the churches can free ourselves from the secularist contamination of our Christianity, and humbly return to the true sources of spiritual health and strength, we shall fall far short of the high calling wherewith we are called. A penitent self-examination and reorientation to the full height and depth of the gospel is a first requirement for Christian strategy.

Another responsibility is to minister more adequately to the newly revealed spiritual needs of individuals who find no shelter in the ruins of a materialistic philosophy, no anchor in the stormy waters of the new insecurity. Here, again, the first duty must be to call men to repentance, for in this crisis, as the Federal Council has stated, "we cannot but discern God's judgment upon modern man, who had sought salvation by his own power and wisdom and believed that his conquest of nature would cure all his ills." But, along with this call to repentance, our churches need to make plain the secure refuge for the soul to be found in Christian faith and practice. To quote the British Council again, the churches have as their second and third tasks, "to assure men that God reigns supreme whatever wickedness is planned or wrought, and to witness in daily living to the peace given by God's spirit which nothing can remove or destroy." Unwavering faith in God's faithfulness and the quiet confidence which derives from such faith—these are a protection for the human spirit which the perils of atomic warfare cannot reach.

Our churches can and ought to serve within the community as lighthouses built upon a rock, sending a calm and reassuring message of faith to those tossed upon the dark waters of fear and hysteria. The atomic crisis means instability as well as insecurity, a readiness to be swayed by tides of emotion, a tendency to lose perspective. As these dangers grow, the greater the responsibility resting upon our churches to keep the people on a steady keel.

Our churches also have a message to give to the nation. The failure of efforts to secure international control does not end the moral responsibility of the United States in regard to atomic weapons. Nor does the threat of possible atomic attack eliminate moral considerations. God's judgment upon this nation and its future destiny will depend not so much upon what evils other nations may inflict upon us as upon the use that is made of the power given to us. Our national conduct will be judged not by the standards of other nations, but by the standards of our own heritage, and the righteous standards of God. The churches ought insistently to raise the question, "What must this nation do to be saved in the sight of God?"

Having as a people introduced the use of atomic weapons against the cities of an enemy, are we to acquiesce in the policy of making such weapons of mass destruction a part of the regular arsenal of war, to be used as strategic weapons against any future enemy? Most nonpacifist Christians presumably believe that this nation and the other free societies should not be left without the means of defense through the threat of retaliation, and they support the construction of A-bombs and if possible H-bombs. But this reluctant acceptance of these weapons as a means of discouraging others from using them is a far cry from the apparent integration of atomic warfare in the planning of military strategy. The searchlight of Christian ethics needs to be thrown on such half-concealed issues of national policy. In this connection, it is heartening that a Commission of Christian Scholars, under the chairmanship of Bishop Dun, is wrestling with the difficult moral issues posed by area bombing and the military use of weapons of mass destruction.

Finally in the ecumenical movement, our churches have a major contribution to make in regard to a positive program for peace. The Federal Council's recent statement summarized briefly the essentials of such a program:

The main hope of peace in this period lies in mustering the spiritual, moral, and material resources latent in our world and directing them towards positive goals of human welfare, thereby helping to build bridges of understanding and fellowship among the peoples, and serving to isolate the forces of tyranny and war. The pre-supposition of this strategy is faith, and not fear. The requirement of this strategy is reliance primarily on the constructive power of spiritually creative resources, rather than on the destructive power of military weapons.

In this direction lies the chief longer-range hope of preventing war, and thereby preventing atomic war. It is here, if anywhere, that the spiral of fear and distrust can be broken. It is here that a practical beginning toward the establishment of an international ethos can be made. But it is evident that the governments, preoccupied with security and related matters, are not likely unaided to give this positive strategy the leadership it requires. Consequently, it is the churches, particularly in the ecumenical relations, and joining with other nongovernmental organizations, which ought to provide the dynamic leadership in this effort. A vigorous program to point the way for the U.N.'s technical assistance program, and to support it, ought to be in the forefront of a Christian global strategy. Here is a challenge which merits a creative effort worthy of the great tradition in which we stand.

“My Ten Best Books”

BY TWENTY-FIVE MINISTERS

WHAT ARE THE BOOKS which have most deeply influenced modern ministers? For some months in our editorial sanctum the idea has been taking shape, to write to various prominent ministers throughout the country and ask for a list of approximately ten books which were found to be the most significant and helpful throughout the years. It was suspected in advance that a fairly large proportion of the men approached would find themselves unable to take the time to think out such a list and adorn it with appropriate comments; but we hoped for a reasonable number of replies.

Well, we have done it, and it appears from the replies that there is a wide individual variation in ability to recall such a select list of books which have had superlative influence on one's thinking. One respondent declined with apologies, saying that out of the two thousand books in his library it would take days to pick out ten. Others, on a reply sheet designed for ten, smuggled in about twenty-five. Still others apparently experienced joy rather than difficulty in selecting ten “giants,” or even fewer.

We are grateful, in any case, to those who were able and willing to formulate these lists and to give us many illuminating comments out of the richness of their thought and experience. The fact that the denominational and institutional distribution of those appearing here is uneven is, of course, accidental and not designed.

There is surprisingly little overlapping between the lists; they show a wide variety of interest and taste, and testify to the abundance of our literary and spiritual heritage. Since so few books are mentioned more than once, it seems worth while to emphasize these few, and to reflect on their apparently unusual degree of value. Leading them all is A. V. G. Allen's *The Life of Phillips Brooks*, mentioned by four; some of Brooks' own works are named also. Next we find Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, Henry Drummond's *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Fosdick's *The Meaning of Prayer*, T. R. Glover's *The Jesus of History*, and George Adam Smith's various books on the Hebrew prophets (none mentioned his *Jeremiah*, which was a separate book, but this was probably an

oversight). Each of these works appeared in three lists. Those listed twice include Dante, *The Divine Comedy*; Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*; Browning, *The Ring and the Book*; Toynbee, *A Study of History*; A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*; Henry Van Dyke, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*; Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*; Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*; Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*; Streeter's *Reality*; H. H. Farmer's *The World and God*; Carnegie Simpson, *The Fact of Christ*; P. T. Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*; Simkhovitch, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*; David Smith, *The Days of His Flesh*; W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and its Remaking*; and William Temple, *Nature, Man, and God*.

The Bible, as such, is not included in these lists, since it may be presumed that it has a central place for all preachers of the gospel. However, a few preferences for modern translations were expressed and are included.

We shall now allow our group of ministers to speak for themselves. Each of the listings was introduced by the statement: "The following books have had the greatest influence on my life and thought, or have given significant new insights."

N. B. H.
E. H. L.

GAIUS GLENN ATKINS

Long Beach, New York

1. In college: Thomas Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus* (stimulus). Sir Thomas More, *Utopia* (idealism). John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive* (mental discipline). John Fiske, *The Idea of God as Affected by Modern Knowledge* and *The Destiny of Man* (horizons).
2. In law school: Sir William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Law of England*, and George Tucker Bispham, *Principles of Equity* (justice).
3. Early formative period: Henry Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. Huxley, Tyndall, and Gladden, *Burning Questions* (given as lectures in college, these had a far-reaching influence; reconciliation of evolution and theism).
4. Early ministry: George Adam Smith, *The Book of Isaiah* and *The Book of the Twelve Prophets* (ground-breaking). A. V. G. Allen, *The Life of Phillips Brooks* (humanizing). *Life and Letters of T. H. Huxley*, by his son Leonard Huxley.
5. Matthew Arnold; John Ruskin; James Freeman Clarke, *Ten Great Religions*; Josiah Royce; William James; James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*.
6. Robert Browning, especially *The Ring and the Book* (life interpretation). Tennyson, *Idylls of the King* and *In Memoriam* (embattled faith). Dante, *The Divine Comedy* (*sub specie aeternitatis*).
7. Books on preaching by Faunce, Jefferson, Tucker, Henry Ward Beecher.
8. Jules Michelet, *History of France* (noble writing); Sir George O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution* (balance and urbanity); all of Francis Parkman; W. C. Ford, *History of the United States Since 1852* (mental space).

BERNARD IDDINGS BELL

Canon, The Cathedral of SS. Peter and Paul, Chicago, Illinois

1. G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*.
2. Canon B. H. Streeter, *Reality*.
3. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*.
4. Thomas à Kempis (?), *The Imitation of Christ*.
5. *The Poems of T. S. Eliot*, especially "The Wasteland" and "The Rock."
6. Vernon Staley, *The Catholic Religion*.
7. Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State*.
8. Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*.
9. Alfred Noyes, *The Unknown God*.
10. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*.

RAYMOND CALKINS

First Congregational Church, Cambridge, Massachusetts

1. Thomas Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*. Put a firm foundation under my feet: duty, not happiness, the true objective in living.
2. John Ruskin, *Unto This Last*. Taught me indelibly what culture owes to the underprivileged.
3. Horace Bushnell, *God in Christ. Nature and the Supernatural. Christian Nurture*. A rational and persuasive interpretation of the essence of the gospel.
4. A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*. An illuminating exposition of the development of the Christian idea.
5. Edmund Sears, *The Fourth Gospel, the Heart of Christ*. An incomparably beautiful exposition of the Fourth Gospel.
6. *Life and Letters of Frederick W. Robertson*, ed. by S. A. Brooke. A perpetual source of inspiration. Also *Life and Letters of Horace Bushnell*, ed. by M. C. Cheney. Phillip Brooks, *Life and Sermons*. Charles Kingsley, *Letters and Memories of His Life*, ed. by Mrs. Kingsley.
7. Borden Parker Bowne, *Studies in Christianity*. The sanest exposition I have known of fundamental Christian ideas.
8. J. R. Glover, *The Jesus of History*. Carnegie Simpson, *The Fact of Christ*. To me the most satisfactory interpretations of the life and work of Christ.
9. D. S. Cairns, *Christianity in the Modern World*. A beautiful exposition of the meaning of the Christian idea.
10. Paul Elmer More, *Christ the Word*. A convincing demonstration of the truth of the Incarnation.
11. George Matheson, *The Spiritual Development of St. Paul*. A too-little-known, profoundly suggestive treatment of the apostle's experience and message.

None of these are recent books. Many recent books have informed and instructed me; but the books which have really helped to form my fundamental convictions, to determine my attitude toward life and my comprehension of Christian truth, belong to the past, when I was in a formative stage in my development.

WILLIAM O. CARRINGTON

First A. M. E. Zion Church, Brooklyn, New York

1. Shakespeare, *Works*. My father, a humble artisan with a passion for reading, a remarkable memory, and some histrionic ability, captivated us by reciting long

passages from Shakespeare's plays. The first book I bought with money I had saved was Shakespeare.

2. Walter Scott, *Ivanhoe*. I had my introduction to Scott (as well as Dickens and others) in the same way, long before I had reached teen age.

3. Samuel Smiles, *Duty. Character. Self-Help*. I don't know whether these books are still read, but when I was a youngster they were given to me by a kind friend, and were influential in the development of my character.

4. William N. Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*. Clarified and influenced my theological thinking.

5. George Adam Smith, *The Book of Isaiah. The Book of the Twelve Prophets*. The great Hebrew prophets became alive for me as I studied these wonderful books.

6. David Smith, *The Days of His Flesh*. This proved to be one of the most illuminating and rewarding studies on the life of Christ.

7. William A. Quayle, *The Pastor-Preacher*. Forty years ago I first lit upon this book, and something of its spell is still upon me. I would advise my younger brethren who do not know of it to get it at any cost and read it.

GERALD R. CRAGG

Erskine and American United Church, Montreal, Canada

1. St. Augustine, *The City of God*. Introduction to the Christian philosophy of history, and to one of the great Christian personalities; requires the *Confessions* as its supplement.

2. Richard Baxter, *Gildas Salvianus, or the Reformed Pastor*. In its high idealism and its practical wisdom, this is the most searching book on the ministry that I know; it epitomizes much that I have learned from other men.

3. St. Francis de Sales, *Introduction to the Devout Life*. I would place this first among my devotional books; in its insight and sanity, a very profound and intensely practical work.

4. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*. An introduction to the study of doctrine great in itself and great in historical significance. An aid in the study of the Reformation period, an exercise in exact Christian thought; a book to which I owe much.

5. John Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress*. Vivid portrayal of abiding truths, perennial freshness; representative of the immense literature of Puritanism, which has become one of my chief intellectual interests.

6. John Oman, *Grace and Personality*. In my formative stage, this book disclosed to me the nature of Christian freedom by showing that moral independence was intimately related to religious dependence upon God.

7. Paul Sabatier, *The Life of St. Francis of Assisi*. An introduction to the history of medieval Christendom; my first contact with one whose power and winsomeness breathe in all the immense literature about him.

8. William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*. A type of theological thought which I have found intellectually satisfying, morally stimulating, and spiritually challenging.

9. J. McLeod Campbell, *The Nature of the Atonement*. No other book made the moral and spiritual nature of Christ's work for men so real to me. Many later books—Denney, Brunner, Moberley, Forsyth—have supplemented but not supplanted this book.

10. J. A. Symonds, *The Renaissance in Italy*. A book which stimulated two strong interests, the one in Italian art, the other in Renaissance thought and history.

FRANK B. FAGERBURG

First Baptist Church, Los Angeles, California

1. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*. Read in my boyhood, a marvelous story, captured my imagination and anchored my interest in good literature.
2. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*. Undergirded my faith in the unseen.
3. Douglas C. MacIntosh, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*. One of the clearest and most helpful statements of theological progress and answers.
4. William Lawrence, *The Life of Phillips Brooks*. Brought me close to a great Christian soul.
5. Harry E. Fosdick, *As I See Religion*. The best answer to humanism I have read.
6. Thornton Wilder, *Our Town*. A most forceful urge to appreciate life while I live it each day.

CHARLES W. GILKEY

South Yarmouth, Massachusetts. Formerly University of Chicago Divinity School

1. In my junior year in college, having to read and to write a paper on some modern biography, I chose Allen's *Life of Phillips Brooks*. I can see now that the reading of that book became a major factor in my later decision to enter the Christian ministry.
2. Because so much of my ministry has lain among perplexed seekers, I have been reading books on religious perplexities all my life. Among them all, at a critical time in my own thinking, William James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* first opened the way, not only to some understanding of the vitality of religion, but to faith in the Reality beyond and above ourselves, with which vital religion maintains personal relations.
3. The first book on religion that I read and then with equal profit read again, was Willard Sperry, *Disciplines of Liberty*. (I have read twice a few other books since.) The whole history of our storm-shaken generation has reinforced for me by its mounting evidence, the central insight of that book: that only those individuals, societies, and generations that are matured and disciplined into social responsibility, can hope to maintain their own freedom, or to transmit it to their successors.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH

New York City. Formerly Dean, Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey

1. Olin Alfred Curtis, *The Christian Faith*. A brilliant and powerful analysis of the definitive elements of the Christian religion.
2. Bishop Hans L. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*. Sets forth the organic quality of the faith and doctrines of Christianity.
3. George Adam Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*. A volume in which prophets come to life.
4. George Macdonald, *What's Mine's Mine*. A book to rouse any young man really to think about religion.

5. Paul Elmer More, *The Shelburne Essays*. Distinguished criticism by "the American Saint-Beuve."
6. Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*. Based on the contrast between the life of impulse and the life of loyalty.
7. *The Life of R. W. Dale*, by his son (A. W. W. Dale). A preacher who was a scholar, a theologian, a great social force, and a profound man of religion.
8. A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*. Christian thinking based on the Incarnation.
9. Robert Browning, *The Ring and the Book*. The meaning of life found in experience.
10. Francis S. Marvin, *The Living Past: a Sketch of Western Progress*. A study of history always alive in the present.

ALLAN A. HUNTER

Mt. Hollywood Congregational Church, Los Angeles, California

1. Moffatt's *New Testament*. Colloquially brings home the availability of the energy God poured through Jesus.
2. Kirby Page, *War: Its Causes, Consequences, and Cure*. Challenge to redirect one's personal life toward an informed dedication for world peace.
3. J. A. Thomson, *The Outline of Science* (four volumes), also *Science and Religion*. Opened up new vistas of the creative power of God in nature, which science attempts to describe, and religion impels us to contemplate and to answer with our whole being.
4. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*. With poetic expression and sufficient scholarship to make the study of "direct experience of God" pass muster in the scientific world; the vivid sense of transcendent power that is also immanent.
5. Philippe Vernier, *With the Master* (F.O.R. publication). The authentic, poetic, daring witness of a contemporary young saint who demonstrates that you can carry the cross into world affairs. (Works with "his miners" in the pits of Belgium, and like St. Francis "urges the hearts of men to spiritual joy.")
6. J. A. Hadfield, "The Psychology of Power" (chapter in *The Spirit*, edited by Canon Streeter). Threw a spotlight on the relationship of psychology and religion; the necessity of harmonizing all one's instincts and channeling them into the service of Christ.
7. V. G. Simkhovitch, *Toward the Understanding of Jesus*. Indicated the practicality of Jesus' political strategy, which was realistic and relevant to the Roman Empire and also applicable to our own power-politics situation today.
8. Mohandas Gandhi, *The Story of My Experiments With Truth* (also C. F. Andrews' three books utilizing this material). Some of the inmost problems of the soul struggling to love God and thus men, not individually alone but in terms of large groups relying on truth or love-force.
9. Fritz Kunkel, *Let's Be Normal, God Helps Those*, etc. These books turned a searchlight into the unconscious mind; indicated that through crisis the soul can grow.
10. H. H. Farmer, *The World and God. Towards Belief in God*. Comprehensive, critically aware of great currents of thought now and in the past, unflinching in determination to face the mysteries of suffering and evil and the light that shines through the cross.

11. Toyohiko Kagawa, *Love the Law of Life*. "The effort of the Cosmic Will to lift all and save all," followed through co-operatives, political pressure, and the leading of strikes in a Christian spirit.

12. Olive Schreiner, *Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland* (1897). A novel that inescapably brings home to the conscience the unpredictable energy of Jesus' spirit as applied to human beings who are victims of race discrimination.

C. OSCAR JOHNSON

Third Baptist Church, St. Louis, Missouri

1. John Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress*. Inspired me as a lad, and many times since, with the real adventure of living a Christian life. It has in it much stimulation for Christian thought and action.

2. Charles M. Sheldon, *In His Steps*. A great influence in my life as I have read it again and again. Most helpful for a young Christian and for those who seek to walk in the Christian way.

3. Lloyd Douglas, *The Robe*. This novel inspired me very much, and brings new life into the old story of the life of our Lord.

4. Edgar Y. Mullins, *Why is Christianity True?* This clear, forthright statement about our Christian position as contrasted with all other religions has been a source of power in my own life.

CLARENCE W. KEMPER

First Baptist Church, Boulder, Colorado

1. *Portraits and Principles of the World's Great Men and Women*, ed. by W. King. In adolescence I came upon this in my father's library. The compilation of stories of a galaxy of notable men and women in many fields of achievement. Literally wore it out as I dreamed with these personalities.

2. Henry Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. As I turned from adolescence into college years, it gave reality and substantial character to my religious convictions, at a time when religion had too much of the ethereal quality.

3. Phillips Brooks, *New Starts in Life and Other Sermons*. Twenty-two sermons by this master, read in theological seminary days. Have returned to it over and over for its common-sense appeal. The sermon, "The Little Sanctuaries of Life," has been a perennial inspiration.

4. Henry Van Dyke, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*. In my early parish ministry days this struck fire as a realistic portrayal of our generation and the Christian message.

5. Carnegie Simpson, *The Fact of Christ*. The reality and truthfulness of this has appealed greatly.

6. Charles E. Jefferson and Charles R. Brown meant so much to me as I came toward maturity in the parish ministry that I waited for each new book from them. Harry Emerson Fosdick likewise captured me, so that every book was an immediate "must."

7. Harris F. Rall, *Christianity*. Continues to be one of the best statements of the nature and truth of our faith.

RELIGION IN LIFE

BOYNTON MERRILL

First Congregational Church, Columbus, Ohio

1. Sir Henry Jones, *A Faith That Enquires*. One of the bravest, most "eager" books I have ever read. It declares that faith and reason are twin brothers meant to walk arm in arm. Religion has nothing to fear from the truth, which is, as Milton wrote, "mighty, next to Almighty God."

2. Miguel de Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*. The terrific, gravitational pull of earth and the equally terrific pull of heaven (the spiritual and the ideal), and the resultant "stretching" of the earth-bound but heaven-born soul—a wonderful study of this tension.

3. Gaius Glenn Atkins, *Pilgrims of the Lonely Road*. The most beautifully written study I know of a few of the pilgrims who have given us the greatest confessional literature.

4. St. Augustine, *Confessions*. A fountain at which I kneel often and from which I rise refreshed always.

5. Sylvester Home, *The Romance of Preaching*. The most enkindling, renewing book on Christian preaching I know. If ever one becomes weary and wonders if it is "worth while," here is a new birth of the motives which sent me into the parish ministry and the joys which have kept me there.

6. D. H. Hislop, *Our Heritage in Public Worship*. A thrilling study of Christian worship down the centuries. Most of us were "liturgically illiterate" when we left our seminaries; yet we were to conduct public worship all our lives! This is one of the best of a dozen books on worship which every minister should know thoroughly.

7. George A. Gordon, *Revelation and the Ideal*. The finest sermons I know, directed to mature, purposeful "youth." These sermons will force every preacher to keep his faith in youth strong and to strive to be fit to speak to youth helpfully.

MORGAN P. NOYES

Central Presbyterian Church, Montclair, New Jersey

1. Henry Drummond, *The Ideal Life*. I stumbled on this in my father's library when I was in my teens; knew nothing about Henry Drummond. It was the first religious book I ever read, and it captured me.

2. Harry E. Fosdick, *The Meaning of Prayer*. This book came into my hands when I was in a period of confusion and questioning, and was extremely helpful to me in making the spiritual life credible and persuasive.

3. Walter Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*. This book, by an author not now highly regarded, was one in which I took great delight as a young man, and it did a great deal for me in linking religion and culture.

4. A. V. G. Allen, *The Life of Phillips Brooks*. This did more than any other one book in making the Christian ministry appealing to me. I read it while in the seminary, and found refreshment in it when some of the seminary disciplines seemed remote from the romance of the gospel.

5. L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*. In the days when mechanistic philosophy was powerful, this was to me the most cogent statement of belief in a purposive universe.

6. Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*. The theory of the Single Tax never

seemed to me valid, but this as no other book laid upon my conscience the problem of the economically underprivileged.

7. Eugene W. Lyman, *The Meaning and Truth of Religion*. This was to me the most effective statement of a liberal theology. As far removed as the East is from the West, from what is often represented as "liberalism" by its critics.

8. H. H. Farmer, *The World and God*. The most satisfying exposition of theism which has come my way.

9. Evelyn Underhill, *Worship*. The most solid book on the central business of the church which I have read.

10. E. F. Scott, *The Kingdom and the Messiah*. This is not the greatest book in New Testament scholarship, but it was a crucial one for me, because it was the first to reveal the fascination of New Testament study, and it opened the door to many other illuminating and helpful books in this field.

G. BROMLEY OXNAM

Bishop, The Methodist Church, New York City

1. A. V. G. Allen, *The Life of Phillips Brooks*. Phillips Brooks was a personal revelation of his striking statement that preaching is truth through personality. In him the truth of the gospel lived. The first biography of a great preacher that I read with care.

2. *Toward Freedom—The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru*. One of the truly great biographies of our day; enables the Westerner to see the problems of the East through the cultivated mind of a great servant of humanity.

3. David E. Lilienthal, *TVA—Democracy on the March*. A revelation of what can be done when a great personality dedicates his talents to the realization of the moral ideal. David Lilienthal believes that, under God, scientific means can be used for the purpose of enthroning moral principle.

4. Upton Sinclair, *The Cry for Justice*. A collection of the messages of the great in literature whose hearts were wounded by injustice and whose souls cried out for brotherhood.

5. *The Collected Poems of John Masefield*. Verse full of beauty, acquainted with grief, dedicated to "the men hemmed in with the spears," at once a revelation of "the glory of the lighted mind" and "the glory of the lighted soul."

6. George Bernard Shaw, *Saint Joan*. Particularly the introduction, which is one of the outstanding considerations of the problem of intolerance.

7. *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, ed. by P. A. Schilpp. The most difficult reading I know, and the most rewarding.

ALBERT W. PALMER

President Emeritus, Chicago Theological Seminary, now at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles

1. Henry Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World, The Ascent of Man*. Helped me in college days to make a working adjustment between evolution and religion.

2. Omar Khayyam, Tennyson, Browning. Read in senior year in college, started me thinking about religion in terms of contemporary life and thought. When

I entered seminary, about all the theology I had came from Tennyson and Browning.

3. Henry Van Dyke, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*. George Albert Coe, *The Religion of a Mature Mind*. Books that steadied and reassured my faith in theological student days.

4. George Adam Smith, *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*. Introduced me to the Hebrew prophets and the illumination of the Old Testament made possible by modern biblical scholarship.

5. Charles F. Kent, *The Historical Bible* (five volumes). The volume on "The Life and Teachings of Jesus" especially cleared up my whole approach to a better understanding of the Bible.

6. Mary Antin, *The Promised Land*. Revealed the soul of the immigrant to me.

7. Booker T. Washington, *Up From Slavery*. Made me a friend of the Negro.

8. Francis G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*. My introduction to the social gospel. It made Jesus more real and social problems of more vital concern.

9. Walter Rauschenbusch, *Prayers of the Social Awakening*. Fed my devotional life, aroused me to a new feeling for worship, and elevated my concern about social problems.

10. Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*. Awakened me to the folly and futility of war.

HAROLD COOKE PHILLIPS

First Baptist Church, Cleveland, Ohio

1. Canon B. H. Streeter, *Reality*. A book to be read and reread.

2. James H. Breasted, *The Dawn of Conscience*. An illuminating and informing study of religious origins.

3. John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God*. A clear and rewarding study of the basic assumption of our faith.

4. Irving Babbitt, *Rousseau and Romanticism*. A liberal education.

5. Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Meaning of Prayer*. I have found this more helpful than any other book on prayer that I have read.

6. William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*. A tremendous book!

7. Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*. The work of a literary artist.

8. John Baillie, *The Interpretation of Religion*. It is difficult to find a more adequate book of its type.

EDWARD H. PRUDEN

First Baptist Church, Washington, D. C.

1. Glenn Clark, *The Soul's Sincere Desire*. Opened up to me new possibilities in prayer, making me feel that I had ignored many sources of power that are available to me.

2. George F. Barbour, *The Life of Alexander Whyte*. Expanded my conception of the Christian ministry, and helped me to see that we can sometimes serve God and his people best by taking periods of retirement and storing up in our mind and spirit the best that other men have thought and written.

3. Mary G. Taylor, *Borden of Yale '09*. (William Borden.) Taught me what is meant by a complete commitment of one's life to Christ and his cause.

4. John Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress*. Impressed upon my mind the difficult nature of the Christian life, and warned me in advance of some of the problems I would inevitably encounter.

5. Ray Stannard Baker, *The Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson*. Gave me an insight into the life and times of one of history's greatest characters, and provided me with a more profound grasp of world issues in one of the most fateful hours of all time.

6. George W. McDaniel, biography by his wife. Showed to what extent a pastor must also address himself to social and civic problems. This minister was fearless in his fight against the wrong, but almost as tender as a woman in presenting the love of God.

7. E. Y. Mullins, *The Christian Religion in its Doctrinal Expression*. This book presented in outline the major tenets of our faith with a scholarly and devout approach. His illustrations are unforgettable.

8. Alexander MacLaren, *Expositions of Holy Scripture*. Here was a man who was so versatile that he could have held almost any chair in a university, bringing all of his vast knowledge and experience to bear on his interpretations of the Bible.

9. Honoré Willsie Morrow, *The Splendor of God*. Gave me a new conception of early missionary activity, and the perils those pioneers faced. A most inspiring novel, based on the life of Adoniram Judson.

10. *The Life of Robert E. Lee* (author forgotten). While I cannot recall the author, I can never forget the impression made upon my life. Here was a Christian statesman who inspired confidence.

PAUL E. SCHERER

Union Theological Seminary, New York City

1. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (two volumes). Profoundest study available of the false views man cherishes, and their contradiction and correction in the gospel.

2. Emil Brunner, *Man in Revolt*. Man as he is, and man as he is intended to be.

3. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*. The paradox of faith, centered in the story of Abraham—"a dialectical lyric."

4. Paul Minear, *Eyes of Faith*. Most valuable as an "exercise" in reorientation to biblical categories.

5. Donald M. Baillie, *God Was in Christ*. A fresh and convincing approach to the Christological problem.

6. Philip S. Watson, *Let God Be God*. An illuminating exposition of Luther's theology—relevant and stimulating.

7. P. T. Forsyth, *Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind*. An amazing insight, a quarter of a century ahead of time, into the problems of modern preaching.

8. C. H. Dodd, *The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments*. An inquiry as to the original content of the gospel.

9. P. I. Sorokin, *The Crisis of Our Age*. A penetrating analysis of the human situation in our time. So also W. Macneile Dixon, *The Human Situation*—fallacies and imperatives.

10. Joseph Haroutunian, *Piety Versus Moralism*. The disintegration of one into the other!

11. Erich Frank, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*. The truth which is beyond reason.

12. Jacob Burckhardt, *Force and Freedom*. An early analysis of our dilemma.

SAMUEL M. SHOEMAKER

Calvary Episcopal Church, New York City

1. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Invaluable influence in giving a young man an idea that a great psychologist recognized the reality of religious experience.

2. W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and its Remaking*. One of the finest statements of Christianity I have seen in our time. It was used by Archibald Bowman in a course on Christian ethics at Princeton about thirty years ago.

3. Miguel de Unamuno, *The Tragic Sense of Life*. A great book, whose pith is found in its closing sentence. "And may God deny you peace and give you glory."

4. William Temple, *Christ the Truth*. One of the finest brief statements of Christian theology that I know.

5. Peter Taylor Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*. A small book not much larger than a pamphlet, but full of profound theological insight and inspired statement.

6. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*.

7. B. H. Streeter and others, *The Spirit*. A very helpful book in understanding the meaning and work of the Holy Spirit, written from a somewhat critical and liberal point of view.

8. Alexander Whyte, *Bible Characters*. The finest I know on the characters in the Old and New Testaments which he treats.

JOSEPH R. SIZOO

President, New Brunswick Theological Seminary, New Brunswick, New Jersey

1. A. V. G. Allen, *The Life of Phillips Brooks*. I have long believed that every minister may well read that book each summer.

2. George Eliot, *Silas Marner*. To me one of the four great novels in English literature.

3. *The Collected Essays of John Burroughs*. I keep a volume by my bed constantly, and very often at night, before I turn off my light, I read one of them.

4. David Smith, *The Days of His Flesh*. Through the years, one of the most intriguing and helpful studies in the life of Jesus.

5. Carl Sandburg (and several other authors), *Abraham Lincoln*. Lincoln is one of the personalities who has crowded his way into my life. Outside biblical history, no character has so touched my life and affected the mainspring of my being.

6. R. F. Weymouth, *Translation of the New Testament and Psalms*. To me the most satisfying translation of the Bible; not so much translation as transliteration.

7. William Adams Brown, *Beliefs That Matter*. For years I have turned to it in my attempt to clarify to lay people the content and the convictions which undergird the Christian faith.

8. Alexander F. Kirkpatrick, *The Book of Psalms*. One of the most clarifying studies of the Book of Psalms that I have ever read.

9. Emil Brunner, *Christianity and Civilisation* (two volumes). Have read the second volume again and again; a thorough clarification of modern trends as they relate themselves to the Christian faith.

10. John Joseph Mangan, *The Life, Character, and Influence of Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam*. Erasmus shows the strength and weakness of modern in-

tellectualism in relation to Christianity; also clarifies the significance of Martin Luther, who stands at the opposite pole.

WILLARD L. SPERRY

Dean, Harvard University Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts

1. Evelyn Underhill, *Mysticism*. The best general introduction to this subject.
2. William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Canon Streeter said to me, not long before he died, that this was the most important book on religion published in this century. Ellery Sedgwick of *The Atlantic Monthly* said it was the most important book on *any* subject published in his lifetime.
3. Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*. He makes the dry bones of the apocalyptic-eschatological elements in the Gospels live with his own faith.
4. Albert Schweitzer, *Out of My Life and Thought*. On the whole, the most fascinating religious autobiography of our times.
5. George Tyrrell, any or all of his books. *Autobiography and Life*, ed. by Maude Petre; *Christianity at the Crossroads*; *Essays on Faith and Immortality*. I think I have learned more about the Christian religion from Tyrrell than from any other one writer of this century.
6. Phillips Brooks, *The Influence of Jesus*. Given me by my father nearly fifty years ago, it has outlasted and outlived all other such books.
7. James Bissett Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*. An invaluable compound of theology, philosophy, psychology, and sociology.
8. Canon Barnett: *His Life, Work, and Friends* (Samuel Barnett); by Henrietta O. Barnett (his wife). One of the best religious biographies of our day; devout, wise, and suggestive for all ministers and social workers.
9. Jonathan Edwards, *The Religious Affections*. A penetrating study of religious experience in the days before our modern psychology.
10. St. Augustine, *Confessions*. I would put next to the New Testament as a devotional classic.

FREDERICK K. STAMM

Plumsteadville, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Formerly First Congregational Church, Chicago, Illinois

1. Alexander Robertson, *The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus*. Set the religion of Jesus over against the religion of today and gave me insight into the inevitable struggle which resulted in his crucifixion. Recommended to me by John Kelman.
2. T. R. Glover, *The Jesus of History*. Here I found Jesus bent upon achieving the union of God and man. I saw the kind of sin from which men need to be saved—not the sins upon which the church has laid so much emphasis, but the sins that make countless thousands mourn.
3. Auguste Sabatier, *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*. The difference between the authority of doctrine and dogma set up by churchmen, and the authority of the spirit as revealed in Jesus of Nazareth.
4. Alfred Loisy, *My Duel With the Vatican*. The struggle of an honest theologian and historian, who was trying to let in the light of the gospel record upon the heart and mind of the common people.
5. Lyman Abbott, *What Christianity Means to Me*. I found for the first time

that the Rock upon which Jesus would build the church is not a Pope or a doctrine, but a redeemed man.

6. Walter Rauschenbusch, *The Social Principles of Jesus*. Vital connection between word and deed; religion must have something to do with the health of the community.

7. Mary Austin, *A Small Town Man*. Changed the usual pattern of thought, and showed me the creative personality who lived then, who lives now, and who is waiting for other creative personalities to complete his work.

8. William Burnet Wright, *Master and Men*. A little book, but mighty, and written by a man ahead of his time. Saved me from substituting Paul's letters for the Gospels.

9. Abraham Rihbany, *Wise Men From the East and From the West*. Puts Jesus in his Oriental setting.

10. Charles E. Jefferson, *The Building of the Church*. Read this early in my ministry; a liberal thinker who wanted to make the church a spiritual entity rather than a country club.

Also Middleton Murry, *Keats and Shakespeare*. George Adam Smith, Harnack, Bergson, Eucken. Josiah Strong on American and English poets. Christopher Morley, Shakespeare, Browning. George Eliot, Dickens, Stevenson.

RUSSELL HENRY STAFFORD

President, The Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Connecticut

1. Josiah Royce, *The World and the Individual* (two volumes). Without commitment to Royce's position, I am indebted first to the luster and lucidity of his style for lifelong pleasure in reading philosophy.

2. F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology* (two volumes). Sets a standard uniquely high in our time for the validation of the intellectual integrity of the historic Christian faith.

3. Count Hermann Keyserling, *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* (two volumes). Though personally a difficult man, he ranged the world with a great mind, sympathetically open, and affords a clearer survey of human culture without Western bias than I have found anywhere else.

4. James Bissett Pratt, *India and its Faiths*. A tremendous and urbane Christian scholar gives an objective and sympathetic introduction to many varieties of religion, without detriment to the supremacy of Christ.

5. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, *Martin Luther*. The only man of the Reformation I entirely admire is Erasmus; but through McGiffert's eyes I have caught something of engaging strength and impressive grandeur in the burly and impulsive key figure of that stormy period.

6. Henry Osborn Taylor, *The Medieval Mind* (two volumes). These majestic tomes opened my understanding to all the entrancing lights and stern shadows of the Middle Ages.

7. H. A. L. Fisher, *A History of Europe* (three volumes). Comprehensive scholarship, with a discriminating sociological realism and a style in the grand tradition; an over-all grasp of the great peoples from whom most Americans have come.

8. Lord Charnwood, *Abraham Lincoln*. In one short volume, this English admirer has got at the very heart and meaning of the greatest American of us all.

9. Thomas Mann, *Joseph and His Brethren* (four volumes). Mann's style is

always breathtaking for splendor and subtlety. In the Joseph series he has given me a sense of the depth of time and the essential contemporaneity of the oldest days with our own.

10. Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past* (sixteen volumes). Cuts through muddy matters with a shining blade; affords a God's-eye view of man, in all his foibles and foulness, yet never without glory; a view always honest, never deceived, always compassionate, never hating or despairing.

11. Jules Romains, *Men of Good Will* (twenty-seven volumes). Romains' great creation, a whole world, as disjointed as our own, yet with segments as surprisingly interpenetrating, awakes awareness of the limitless complexity and simultaneous disparities of the exciting human scene.

HENRY PITNEY VAN DUSEN

President, Union Theological Seminary, New York City

1. Bertrand Russell, *Why Men Fight*. Helped to form my philosophy of secular history: an inherent logic of advance has propelled mankind's dominant political structure from tyranny through absolute monarchy, then constitutional monarchy, then democracy, toward—socialism. From this tide of the past we can discern the true "Wave of the Future."

2. T. R. Glover, *The Jesus of History*. The first religious book to claim my interest or kindle my imagination. Painted a self-authenticating portrait which Schweitzer, Goguel, Guignebert, Dibelius, Bultmann and their ilk have never been able to erase, or even radically modify.

3. Henry Drummond, *The New Life*, etc. Helped to save Christian faith for intelligent minds, and to guide at least one young mind toward an intelligent Christian faith.

4. Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Meaning of Prayer* and *The Meaning of Faith*. Nothing he has written since surpasses these in intellectual and spiritual power. Nothing of the kind anyone else has written since equals them in intellectual and spiritual helpfulness.

5. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* and *Human Nature and its Remaking*. Hocking's greatest gifts to Christian faith, still unsurpassed in psychological insight, spiritual discernment, sustained majesty and elevation of diction. Overshadow today's psychology and pseudopsychology.

6. Robert Browning, *Collected Poems*. A summer holiday's companion, Browning captured my lifelong and unshaken devotion to the great Victorians.

7. Friedrich Von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses*. In my view, by all odds the profoundest, soundest, and greatest Christian theologian of the twentieth century. Canon Streeter once said to me, "Von Hügel saved British theology from the extravagances and excesses of Barth et al." I am devoutly grateful for a similar deliverance.

8. J. H. Oldham, *A Devotional Diary*. The most valuable devotional help I know. As rewarding on a fourth or fifth reading (or is it eighth or tenth?) as on the first.

9. William Temple, *Nature, Man and God*. Its largest significance for me lies in its interpretation of the history of Western thought in Lecture III, which instantly divides all readers into sheep or goats as they accept or reject it.

10. K. S. Latourette, *Anno Domini* and *The Unquenchable Light*. These two little books set forth a philosophy of Christian history which has influenced all my thinking and much of my speaking and writing since.

11. D. M. Bailie, *God Was in Christ*. One of the finest essays in Christian theology and by all odds the ablest and most satisfying interpretation of the central reality of Christian faith in this century.

—I am prompted to three reflections: (1) How vital may be the influence of slight and even ephemeral works if they embody some one great truth and if they strike the mind, especially the youthful mind, at the opportune moment.

(2) How noticeable is the absence from the above list of many of the foremost theologians of our day. Of course they have influenced me, but not decisively, and often more to reaction than to assent.

(3) How obvious it is that the maker of this list is an unreconstructed "liberal," as Professor Calhoun of Yale once described himself, "A liberal, bloody but unbowed."

THEODORE O. WEDEL

Warden, Washington Cathedral College of Preachers, Washington, D. C.

1. F. D. Maurice, *The Kingdom of Christ*. One of the few theological classics honored in Everyman's Library. I go back to this (particularly Part II) over and over for theological anchorage.

2. Pascal, *Thoughts*. Still the best apology for the Christian faith of modern centuries.

3. J. H. Shorthouse, *John Inglesant*. "The best religious novel in the English language," deservedly republished frequently. I have read it at least five times.

4. P. T. Forsyth, *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*. Many consider Forsyth the greatest theologian in the twentieth century in the English-speaking world. Deserves rediscovery.

5. Paul Elmer More, *The Greek Tradition*. Like many others, I largely owe to P. E. More my conversion from humanism to orthodox Christianity.

6. Friedrich Von Hügel, *The Mystical Element in Religion*. A Roman Catholic layman opens vistas into a world largely unknown to the Protestant mind, yet part of our common Christian inheritance.

7. A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*. A modern *summa theologica*, to which I often return for guidance.

8. S. Kierkegaard, *Christian Discourses*. Introduced me to a giant in the land of Christian thought.

9. William DeWitt Hyde, *The Five Great Philosophies of Life*. Read when I was a boy, this is still treasured on my shelves. Except for the last chapter, I still do not know of a better guide to ethics for the young.

10. Dante, *The Divine Comedy*. A classic has been defined as a book which would not be read if it were not studied in "class." But here is one astoundingly modern; a clue to much contemporary poetry (e.g., T. S. Eliot).

The New Being

PAUL J. TILLICH

IF I WERE ASKED to sum up the Christian message for our time in two words, I would say with Paul, it is the message of a "New Creation." Let me repeat one of his sentences (II Cor. 5:17) in the words of an exact translation: "If anyone is in union with Christ he is a new being; the old state of things has passed away; there is a new state of things." Christianity is the message of the New Creation, the New Being, the New Reality which has appeared with the appearance of Jesus who for this reason, and just for this reason, is called the Christ. For the Christ, the Messiah, the selected and anointed One, is he who brings the new state of things.

We all live in the old state of things, and the question asked of us is whether we *also* participate in the new state of things. We belong to the old creation, and the demand made upon us by Christianity is that we *also* participate in the new creation. We have known ourselves in our old being, and we have to ask ourselves whether we also have experienced something of a new being.

What is this new being? Paul answers first by saying what it is *not*. It is neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, he says (Gal. 6:5). For Paul and for the readers of his letter this meant something very definite. It meant that neither to be a Jew nor to be a pagan is ultimately important; that only one thing counts, namely, the union with him in whom the new reality is present. Circumcision or uncircumcision, what does that mean for *us*? Again it can mean something very definite, but at the same time something very universal. It means that no religion as such produces the new being. Circumcision is a religious rite, observed by the Jews; sacrifices are religious rites, observed by the pagans; baptism is a religious rite, observed by the Christians. All these rites do not matter, only a new creation. And since these rites stand, in the words of Paul, for the whole religion to which they belong, we can say: no religion matters, only a new state of things. Let us think about this striking assertion of

PAUL J. TILLICH, Ph.D., D.Theol., is Charles A. Briggs Graduate Professor of Philosophical Theology at Union Theological Seminary, New York City. The above article is based on a sermon given both at Union and in Philadelphia. Dr. Tillich tells us it "was rightly considered as the most concentrated form of my basic religious ideas."

Paul. What it first says is that Christianity is more than a religion; it is the message of a new creation. Christianity as a religion is not important. It is like circumcision or like uncircumcision: no more, no less!

Are we able even to imagine the consequences of the apostolic pronouncement for our situation? Christianity in the present world encounters several forms of circumcision and uncircumcision. Circumcision can stand today for everything called religion, uncircumcision for everything called secular but making half-religious claims. There are the great religions beside Christianity—Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and the remnants of classical Judaism; they have their myths and their rites—so to speak, their “circumcision”—which gives each of them their distinction. There are the secular movements: Fascism and Communism, Secular Humanism, and Ethical Idealism. They try to avoid myths and rites; they represent, so to speak, uncircumcision. Nevertheless, they also claim ultimate truth and demand complete devotion. How shall Christianity face them? Shall Christianity tell them: come to us, we are a better religion, our kind of circumcision or uncircumcision is higher than yours? Shall we praise Christianity, our way of life, the religious as well as the secular? Shall we make of the Christian message a success story, and tell them, like advertisers: try it with us, and you will see how important Christianity is for everybody? Some missionaries and some ministers and some Christian laymen use these methods. They show a total misunderstanding of Christianity.

The apostle who was a missionary and a minister and a layman all at once says something different. He says: no religion matters, neither ours nor yours. But I want to tell you that something has happened that matters, something that judges you and me, your religion and my religion. A new creation has occurred, a new being has appeared; and we are all asked to participate in it. And so we should say to the pagans and Jews wherever we meet them: don't compare your religion and our religion, your rites and our rites, your prophets and our prophets, your priests and our priests, the pious amongst you and the pious amongst us. All this is of no avail! And above all don't think that we want to convert you to English or American Christianity, or to the religion of the Western World. We do not want to convert you to us, not even to the best of us. This would be of no avail. We only want to show you something we have seen and to tell you something we have heard: that in the midst of the old creation there is a new creation, and that this new creation is manifest in Jesus who is called the Christ.

And when we meet Fascists and Communists, scientific humanists and ethical idealists, we should say to them: don't boast too much that you have no rites and myths, that you are free from superstitions, that you are perfectly reasonable, uncircumcised in every sense. In the first place, you also have your rites and myths, your bits of circumcision; they are even very important to you. But even if you were completely free from them, you have no reason to point to your *uncircumcision*. It is of no avail. Don't think that we want to convert you away from your secular state to a religious state, that we want to make you religious and members of a very high religion—the Christian—and of a very great denomination within it, namely, our own. This would be of no avail. We want only to communicate to you an experience we have had, that here and there in the world and now and then in ourselves is a new creation, usually hidden, but sometimes manifest, and certainly manifest in Jesus who is called the Christ.

This is the way we should speak to all those outside the Christian realm, whether they are religious or secular. And we should not be worried too much about the Christian religion, about the state of the churches, about membership and doctrines, about institutions and ministers, about sermons and sacraments. This is circumcision; and the lack of it, the secularization which today is spreading all over the world, is uncircumcision. Both are nothing, of no importance, if the ultimate question is asked—the question of a new reality. *This* question, however, is of infinite importance. About it we should worry more than anything else between heaven and earth. The new creation, this is our ultimate concern; this should be our infinite passion—the infinite passion of every human being. This matters; this alone matters ultimately. In comparison with it everything else, even religion or nonreligion, even Christianity or non-Christianity, matters very little—and ultimately nothing.

And now let me boast for a moment about the fact that we are Christians and let us become fools by boasting, as Paul called himself when he started boasting. It is the greatness of Christianity that it can see how small it is. The importance of being a Christian is that we can stand the insight that it is of no importance. It is the spiritual power of religion that he who is religious can fearlessly look at the vanity of religion. It is the maturest fruit of Christian understanding to understand that Christianity, as such, is of no avail. This is boasting, not personal boasting, but boasting about Christianity. As boasting it is foolishness. But as boasting about the fact that there is nothing to boast about, it is wisdom and maturity.

Having as having not, this is the right attitude toward everything great and wonderful in life—even religion and Christianity. But it is not the right attitude toward the new creation. Toward it the right attitude is, longing for it passionately, infinitely.

And now we ask again: what is this new being? The new being is not something that simply replaces the old. It is a renewal of the old which has been corrupted, distorted, split, almost destroyed—but not wholly destroyed. Salvation does not destroy creation; it transforms the old creation into a new one. Therefore we can speak of the new in terms of a *re*-newal, threefold—*re*-conciliation, *re*-union, *re*-surrection.

I

In II Cor. 5, Paul combines new creation with reconciliation. The message of reconciliation is: *be* reconciled to God. Cease to be hostile to him, for he is never hostile to you. The message of reconciliation is not that God needs to be reconciled. How could he be? Since he is the source and power of reconciliation, who could reconcile him? Pagans and Jews and Christians, all of us have tried and are trying to reconcile him by rites and sacraments, by prayers and services, by moral behavior and works of charity. But if we try this, if we try to give something to him, to show good deeds which may appease him, we fail. It is never enough; we never can satisfy him because there is an infinite demand upon us. And since we cannot appease him, we grow hostile toward him.

Have you ever noticed how much hostility against God dwells in the depth of the good and honest people, in those who excel in works of charity, in piety and religious zeal? This cannot be otherwise; for one is hostile, consciously or unconsciously, toward those by whom one feels rejected. Everybody is in this predicament, whether he calls that which rejects him "God," or "nature," or "destiny," or "social conditions." Everybody carries a hostility toward the existence into which he has been thrown, toward the hidden powers which determine his life and that of the universe, toward that which makes him guilty and threatens him with destruction because he has become guilty. We all feel rejected and hostile toward what has rejected us. We all try to appease it, and, in failing, we become more hostile. This happens often unnoticed by ourselves. But there are two symptoms which we hardly can avoid noticing: the hostility against ourselves and the hostility against others. One speaks so often of pride and arrogance and self-certainty and complacency in people. But

this is in most cases the superficial level of their being. Below this, on a deeper level, there is self-rejection, disgust, and even hate of oneself.

Be reconciled to God. That means, at the same time, be reconciled to ourselves. But we are not; we try to appease ourselves. We try to make ourselves more acceptable to our own judgment and, when we fail, we grow more hostile toward ourselves. And he who feels rejected by God and who rejects himself feels also rejected by the others. As he grows hostile toward destiny and hostile toward himself, he also grows hostile toward other men. If we often are horrified by the unconscious or conscious hostility people betray toward us or by our own hostility toward people whom we believe we love, let us not forget: they feel rejected by us; we feel rejected by them. They tried hard to make themselves acceptable to us, and they failed. We tried hard to make ourselves acceptable to them, and we failed. And their and our hostility grew.

Be reconciled to God. That means, at the same time, be reconciled with the others. But it does *not* mean, try to reconcile the others, as it does not mean, try to reconcile yourselves, try to reconcile God. You will fail. This is the message: a new reality has appeared in which you *are* reconciled. To enter the new being we do not need to show anything. We must only be open to be grasped by it, although we have nothing to show.

II

Being reconciled, that is the first mark of the new reality. And being reunited is its second mark. Reconciliation makes reunion possible. The new creation is the reality in which the separated is reunited. The new being is manifest in the Christ because in him the separation never overcame the unity between him and God, between him and mankind, between him and himself. This fact gives his picture in the Gospels the overwhelming and inexhaustible power. In him we look at a human life that maintained the union in spite of everything that drove him into separation. He represents and mediates the power of the new being because he represents and mediates the power of an undisrupted union. Where the new reality appears one feels united with God, the ground and meaning of one's existence. One has what has been called the love of one's destiny, and what, today, we might call the courage to take upon ourselves our own anxiety. Then one has the astonishing experience of feeling reunited with oneself. There is a center, a direction, a meaning for life.

All healing—bodily and mental—creates this reunion of oneself with oneself. Where there is real healing, *there* is the new being, the new crea-

tion. But real healing is not where only a part of body or mind is re-united with the whole, but where the whole itself, our whole being, our whole personality is united with itself. The new creation is healing creation because it creates reunion with oneself. And it creates reunion with the others.

Nothing is more distinctive of the old being than the separation of man from man. Nothing is more passionately demanded than social healing, than the new being within history. Religion and Christianity are under strong accusation that they have not brought reunion into human history. Who could deny the truth of this challenge? Nevertheless, mankind still lives; and it could not live any more if the power of separation had not permanently been conquered by the power of reunion, of healing, of the new creation. Where one is grasped by a human face as human, although one has to overcome personal distaste, or racial strangeness, or national conflicts, or the differences of sex, of age, of beauty, of strength, of knowledge, and all the other innumerable causes of separation —*there* new creation happens! Mankind lives because this happens again and again.

And if the church which is the assembly of God has an ultimate significance, this is its significance: that here the reunion of man to man is pronounced and confessed and realized, even if in fragments and weaknesses and distortions. The church is the place where the reunion of man with man is an actual event, though the Church of God is permanently betrayed by the Christian churches. But, although betrayed and expelled, the new creation saves and preserves that by which it is betrayed and expelled: churches, mankind, and history.

III

The church, like all its members, relapses from the new into the old being. Therefore, the third mark of the new creation is re-surrection. The word "resurrection" has for many people the connotation of dead bodies leaving their graves or other fanciful imagery. But resurrection means the victory of the new state of things, the new being born out of the death of the old. Resurrection is not an event that might happen in some remote future, but it is the power of the new being to create life out of death, here and now, today and tomorrow. Where there is a new being, *there* is resurrection—namely, the creation into eternity out of every moment of time. The old being has the mark of disintegration and death. The new being puts a new mark over the old one. Out of disintegration and death

something is born of eternal significance. That which is immersed in dissolution emerges in a new creation. Resurrection happens *now*, or it does not happen at all. It happens in us and around us, in soul and history, in nature and universe.

Reconciliation, reunion, resurrection, this is the new creation, the new being, the new state of things. Do we participate in it? The message of Christianity is not Christianity, but a new reality. A new state of things has appeared, it still appears; it is hidden and visible, it is there and it is here. Accept it, enter into it, let it grasp you.

Three Hours Against Eternity

EDGAR N. JACKSON

THE EVER-PRESENT WIND kept a film of sand sifting through the shell of a windowless and doorless building the Germans had left us. The grinding of footsteps in the long corridor gave ample notice of a visitor.

At the sound of steps I watched the opening where a door had once hung. Soon Captain Edwin Moore was framed in the doorway.

I had come to know Ed Moore well in the last few months. He was young, buoyant, and full of life. Though his behavior indicated good background and depths of personality, I had never been able to get him into serious conversation. He had a degree in science from a New York university, but preferred to talk about the girl he was going to marry as soon as he was home again.

One day we had borrowed a Jeep together and set off to explore the ruins of an ancient Roman city some sixty miles away. Though we had talked much and about a variety of subjects, he always steered away from religious matters. We were good friends in a man-to-man sort of way.

"Come in, Ed," I said. "What brings me this unexpected pleasure?"

Brushing aside my effort at a cordial greeting, he stepped forward with a look on his round face that I had not seen before. With frightening earnestness he blurted out, "Chaplain, tell me all you know about immortality, and tell me quick."

I shoved an ammunition box toward him with an invitation to sit down, but he was tense, and didn't seem to notice it. He stood there looking as if he had seen a ghost.

Most sensible men get frightened at some time or other during a war, and I had seen enough of them to feel sure Captain Moore was not a frightened man. He was not shaking, and seemed physically poised. It was that faraway look on his boyish and usually jovial young face that confused me as to what to say next.

EDGAR N. JACKSON, B.D., is Minister of the Newfield Methodist Church, Bridgeport, Connecticut. Though for obvious reasons names are changed, he recounts the substance of an actual interview with a young American officer. This account was presented at an Armistice Day Convocation at the University of Bridgeport.

"Ed, tell me what it's all about."

"Chaplain, I don't know if I can tell you. You know me. I'm not the kind to see visions. But this is the strangest and realest thing that ever happened to me." Then he paused.

"You can probably tell it better than you think." He seemed to relax a bit, and sat down on the box I had offered him before.

"When I try to tell it, it sounds foolish. But it was so real. I was walking with Joe Saunders from our quarters toward Operations. Suddenly something seemed to stop me. And in just a few seconds I saw what is going to happen to me. It seemed for a few seconds that there was no such thing as time, and I was just standing to one side watching what was happening to me. Chaplain, it looks like I am never going to get married."

Young men don't easily talk about death, and an ingenious device usually takes the place of the real words. Captain Moore's last sentence was his way of saying he was sure his number was coming up soon.

He went on. "I don't frighten easily, and I am not frightened now. But nothing like this has ever happened to me before. There was something about this premonition, I suppose you call it, that's got me. I can't ignore it. I want to know what it is all about. I guess if anyone can tell me, you can. I don't know much about immortality."

"I am sure you are not frightened, Ed. Your vision or premonition was a real experience. There is no doubt of that. While such things are not common, they are an important part of human experience. So far, in our knowledge of the human mind and soul, we don't know enough about such things to be able to set up any standard of judgment as to how valid they are. If it seemed real for you, and you are the one involved, we will have to accept it for what you thought it was."

"You don't want to ignore it. When something is as real as that, it can't be brushed aside. Perhaps it opened a door to your innermost soul. And, I am sure we know some things about immortality."

"Joe Saunders thought I was foolish to come over here. He said it was probably a dizzy spell or indigestion. But I don't have flight fatigue. I haven't had too many hours this past month. Really, there is nothing the matter with me, and Joe wouldn't understand some things anyway."

Captain Moore relaxed a bit more, and I continued. "When you came in you asked me to tell you all I knew about immortality, and tell you quickly. Then, a bit ago, you said you didn't know much about immortality. What has immortality to do with this?"

"It's a queer thing, Chaplain. In this vision the plane is in a heap on a mountain, and I am in a heap with it. Yet strangely I can see myself, and I just sort of walk away from the whole thing as much as to say, 'That's that.' What do I walk away to, and is there any sensible reason for thinking that something of me could walk away from a crash?"

"First, Ed, let me say I do definitely believe in the undying quality of the human spirit. I believe that there is life beyond death. It is one of the firmest convictions of my life. But, if we are going to approach this thing reasonably, we must start where you want to start. If you had a thoroughly satisfying belief yourself, you probably wouldn't be here now. Let us see what there is about the whole idea that is unsatisfactory to you."

"Frankly, Chaplain, when I was in college I used to argue against the idea. It didn't seem to make sense for a person to keep on living after he was dead. I majored in physics and chemistry, and knew what people were made of and how they worked physically. This immortality business was too far-fetched to interest me. And I felt sorry for the fellows who were so weak-minded as to believe in such things.

"But the last couple of years I have seen a lot. Many of my friends have had it. It doesn't make sense, either, that all the preparation and sacrifice and struggle for life should be ended like blowing out a candle. So my ideas have changed a little. But still it doesn't make much sense."

"Right there, Ed, you have put your finger on one of the more valid reasons for a belief in life after physical death. A God who made life with those qualities you have just mentioned, preparation, sacrifice, and struggle, would not be true to his own spiritual nature if he were to ignore the spiritual character of the creatures he had made. I recall an idea well stated in a lecture by Sir Henry Jones, the English philosopher. It went something like this, that God would not create spiritually sensitive individuals, let them struggle for a short space of time on earth trying to achieve character, and then leave them stranded in a universe that had no concern for those very qualities that make men spiritually akin to God."

"But, Chaplain, that brings up the idea of God. I have trouble making myself think of God. I suppose I believe something about God, but not much, and it doesn't seem to effect me very deeply one way or the other."

My young captain was so open and frank and earnest that I did not want to let this opportunity go by wasted. Time was a factor. He probably did not have much time.

"We have several ideas to explore. Belief in God and belief in the

enduring life of the soul go together. It would be impossible to have one without the other. How much time have we got?"

Captain Moore looked at his watch. "It is almost eleven hundred now, and I am scheduled for a take-off at fourteen hundred. I have to report in at Operations at thirteen hundred. The rest of the time is ours."

Less than three hours. I breathed a prayer for guidance.

"Let's look at this matter of belief in God. You are acquainted with the idea, but it doesn't mean much to you. What do you mean by that?"

"Nobody has ever seen God. You can't prove his existence scientifically. It doesn't seem reasonable to make such a fuss over something you can't be sure of. I would like to believe. It would make me feel better, but it has never seemed possible."

"Ed, you believe in me, don't you? You are sure I am here. You think I am real enough. There is no doubt about that."

"Sure, but that is an entirely different matter, Chaplain. I can see you and talk to you. I can know you. I don't see what you are driving at."

"Perhaps it is not as different as you think. What I am driving at is simply this. You have conditioned yourself to a process of making me real. You have failed to condition yourself to a similar process that could make God real."

"What do you mean?"

"Just this. You said you could see me. In your simple sentence you mentioned two highly developed methods of adjustment and response. First, there is the reality of me. That is a process manufactured by your senses. If you majored in physics you know that recent theories of atomic structure say that what we call matter is a structure of an infinite number of electrical charges, called electrons, protons, and neutrons. These electrical charges have none of the qualities we usually assign to matter, except possibly mass. So I am an amazing galaxy of minute universes of electrical energy held in a balance that defies description or understanding. We could possibly exchange the word electrical with spiritual and have as valid an expression of the type of energy I am. Is that reasonable so far?"

"O.K. Go ahead."

"You said you saw me. First, then, I would question the 'seeability' of me. Then I would interpret the seeing process. Your eye is a highly sensitive area of specialized skin tissue. You see an impression of me that is created by light rays of differing wave lengths that your eye is sensitive to. Through a long process, started with the first skin tissue sensitive to light many millions of years ago, and made individual in your

own eyes from babyhood, you have learned or conditioned yourself to see objects and other people. It is a learned process based on certain capacities that have been developed. Fish in caves have eyes, but cannot see, for they have never developed any responses to light. Follow me?"

"Yes. But that means that I, too, am primarily a spiritual being. The way you put that is all new stuff to me."

"Do you see the possibility of this for your idea of God? You said you had never seen God. You thought of me as an objective reality, but not God. You learned a specialized process, unconsciously to be sure, of seeing me and other people and things. You did it so easily and well that you never questioned it. The catch is, we do not learn to sense God's reality as unconsciously. There we have to cultivate attitudes and tendencies. St. Francis saw reality in the God of nature just as definitely as you see reality in me. Jesus saw God as a Spirit, and cultivated the reality of his personality through prayer, until he felt God was as real a personality as a father. It was a cultivated process of spiritual insight."

"Then this whole matter of knowing God is a matter of developing the capacity to see him. I never thought of that before."

"I wouldn't say the whole matter is as simple as that, but that is at least a big part of it. Your scientific training can work two ways. It can blind you to God by making you too conscious of material things, which are essentially impressions. Or it can make you aware of that tremendous intellect and spirit that has been able to create a universe of such magnitude and precision. An atom or the Milky Way can speak to you about the nature of God, if you are interested in listening. When you realize that you are essentially spiritual in nature, and that God is the great creative Spirit of the universe, then it is more logical to sense the importance of your relationship with him. In fact, it is more sensible to assign intelligence to a creative mind than it is to assign cosmos to chaos, which is what you do if you deny God."

We sat looking at each other for a few moments. A look of puzzled wonder played across his face. It was as if a great new idea were being born. With a half smile on his face, Captain Moore said, "Then it is sensible to believe in God. I never thought of that before. Really, I have always fought against such an idea."

I looked at my watch. "Let's get back to the original question. If you can believe in the spiritual reality of God and man, it is not difficult to believe in the spiritual reality of a life that does not end. Let's

face some of your objections. Why is it hard for you to accept such a belief?"

"Well, I suppose I never felt it was for me. I always thought it was for sissies, preachers, and old folks. Sissies because they were scared, preachers because it was their business, and old folks because they had to."

We both laughed and Captain Moore continued.

"It always seemed to me a bit selfish to crave unending life. If the organism lived normally and well, it was just natural for it to run down and wear out, and it seemed only selfishness to want it to keep on going."

"Can't you see, Ed, that that is a scientific objection raised on the basis of biology? It thinks of the human being as a physical organism. If a man is nothing more than that, then you can be satisfied with such an idea. I don't think that all of the higher and more desirable elements in life can be interpreted by biology alone. I think that man is infinitely more than the sum total of his organs. No interpretation of his life is adequate that limits him to organic functions. We know that the body wears out, but the body is a residence for the soul. That soul can never be limited to the body or destroyed with it."

"There you go again, Chaplain, always pulling in ideas that are hard for me to accept. This matter of the soul, for instance. What is it, where is it, and how does it get there, and how does it function? Is it a religious supposition, or is there any reasonable basis for accepting it?"

"All right, Ed. Those are all fair questions. Suppose I try to answer it this way. As far back as there is any record, men have thought they had souls. They felt that there was something about them that was more than their bodies. Sometimes it involved dream theories. Early scientists tried to locate it in some special gland. It has been only in recent years that science has any basis for feeling that a man's soul can be isolated and studied scientifically. And even there it is just a beginning.

"I remember reading a book by a psychologist at Duke University, I believe it was, who had carried on experiments for years with certain special powers of the human mind. The experiments were carefully supervised and carried on in laboratory surroundings. The experiments showed beyond reasonable doubt that there were powers of the mind working beyond the explanation of any physical laws governing such phenomena. These powers could work without regard to time or space. They were beyond the physical, chemical, or mechanical areas of experience. They were what men have always considered to be the area of the soul's existence. Of

course, psychology is just beginning in that direction, but at least it verifies centuries of religious thought and experience."

"I have read some of that stuff in magazines, too, but thought it was in the same class as ghost stories and spiritualism. Maybe you are right." Captain Moore did not seem too well convinced, but it was a deviation from our main thought, and I did not pursue it.

"What are some of your other objections?" I inquired.

"Well, I guess I never thought it was necessary. If a man lived a good life, and had a family, they would become part of him, and the community and his family would carry on his personality, at least in part."

"Don't you see, Ed, that this is another objection based on the fractional view of life? Your other objection was based on the fractional view of biology. This one is based on a similar fractional view of sociology. Such an idea would be good enough for a Nazi or Communist, where society or the state is an end in itself. But our Christian doctrine holds that though men make up society, there is innate in every man something that is more than any social composite of men. Man's nature lives within a state, but is never completely fulfilled by the state. In some instances the state may take away a man's physical life as punishment, but his soul is never entirely within the compass of social laws or controls. It is true, a community can carry on a man's ideas and make his contributions last, but it would be a fractional view of man to see him as living only for the community or the family."

"All right, Chaplain. You seem to be able to answer my objections with words. But, still, I am not satisfied. I want to believe this idea because I feel it is terribly important to me. But it doesn't come easily. If you could just tell it to me in terms and ideas I understand. I think I believe in a soul and God, but I'd hate to have to depend on what I have now. Where can I get some of your certainty?"

"Ed, I know what you mean. Some of these ideas can't be put simply. Perhaps the reason you find it hard to think in such terms is because you have not been doing much of it. You have done a lot of work in science and so you can think in scientific terms more easily. But there are some ideas science cannot handle. And there are some insights we get in spite of science rather than because of it. I know, because I trained for engineering in college before I decided to become a minister. But sometimes scientific ideas can sort of bring us to the door, which we have to walk through by faith.

"Take the second law of thermodynamics, for instance. It doesn't

say anything about religion or immortality, but it does open a door. I don't remember the exact wording, but the law is that nothing material is ever destroyed, for it merely changes from one state to another. Burn a piece of coal and you have so much smoke, so much ash, and so much energy in the form of heat. Quite a change has taken place, but nothing is lost in the process, and theoretically it could be reassembled into the original piece of coal.

"This is the door it opens. If nothing material can be destroyed, but merely changes its form, how would it be reasonable to think that a God wise enough to make such a creation as we see, would single out the soul of man as the one thing in all creation to be completely destroyed. For me that is the ultimate of senselessness. The soul of man gives meaning to all the rest, and if anything deserves to escape destruction and endure, it would be that soul. Does that make sense?"

"Yes. That is something I can follow easily. I wish all you said registered like that."

"That is the tough part of it. I have great respect for science and the scientific method, but I also recognize its limitations. Science can define and describe, but religion invests life with meaning. I am glad we don't have to choose one or the other, for it can be a both-and proposition. But if I had to choose, I would rather have the meaning to go on.

"There are some places where we cannot get much help from the sort of mental processes your scientific training has given you. There is the matter of emotion. Some psychologists can make a nice behavioristic pattern for human life, but emotion always causes them some trouble, for it never quite seems to fit in their schemes. And some intense forms of emotion can create conditions and attitudes that are beyond the power of scientific measurement to touch. Perhaps emotion is as valid a source of insight as exact measurement. When Emerson lost his child, he looked at its lifeless form and was moved to say, 'What is excellent, as God lives, is permanent. Hearts are dust; heart's love remains. Heart's love will meet thee again.' Who is there to say that that rich emotion of the bereaved father does not see closer to the heart of the realism of life than the mind that is so disciplined by exact measurements that it never gets far beyond them?"

"Would you go so far as to say, Chaplain, that the capacity to believe in immortality is largely an attitude of mind, or a conditioning of thinking?"

"Yes, Ed. That comes close to it. It is almost an axiom in psychology that perception is a habit. An orchestra conductor can hear an off note when no one else would notice it. A bank teller will feel a counter-

feit as it passes through his fingers when others would never perceive it. It is a matter of conditioning, of training. Religious insights are a product of training, and cultivation of attitudes. We believe that life is immortal, death is a horizon, and a horizon is nothing but the limits of our sight."

"I like that idea, Chaplain. It makes sense, too."

"Personally, I get satisfaction out of thinking in terms of ethical judgments in this matter of enduring spiritual life. I know you have high standards of conduct, and I have always admired you for it. So I think you will readily see what I mean when I say that for me the central question is not whether or not life is eternal. I assume that. But whether we can make our lives worthy of immortality, that is even more important."

"What do you mean by that? Is this the heaven and hell business? I can't see that. What do morals have to do with immortality?"

For a while I didn't know how to answer that; I did not want to get off the main thought, for time was passing rapidly. Finally I said, "Today we practice what I think is a rather wise agnosticism about the minute details of the spiritual existence. To do more would be conjecture. We must leave that in the hands of a God wise enough to provide for our needs. And morals do have something to do with immortality in this sense. Life is not breath, mere persistence. As I see it, the nub of the problem is not a quantitative extension in time, but a qualitative extension in value. Not how much, but how good. Too often we think of immortality as living after death. We need to think of it as the act of living a good life here and now. Its quality alone determines whether it is worthy of surviving that incident we call death.

"The best evidence of this is in the lives of moral men. The morally defeated seek no future. The morally victorious fear neither present nor future. You remember reading about Col. T. E. Lawrence of Arabia. A few years ago we were shocked to hear of his death in a motorcycle accident. Few realized that here was a tragic example of life that had lost value through moral defeat. As a young officer, Lawrence had given his talent and courage to his government, and it used him to betray his friends. His sensitive ethical character was so deeply injured by this fraud and injustice that he committed spiritual suicide, changed his name, renounced his rank, his royal decorations and his former life, and became a mechanic. Life lost meaning when his sensitive ethical nature was stunned.

"On the other hand, the words of Socrates, on trial for his life, breathe a rich sense of the qualitative judgment of the morally healthy soul. 'No evil can come to a good man in life or in death.' He disdained an effort

to escape execution, for the mere quantity of life made little appeal to him.

"So it would seem that the burden of proof falls on us. If we think death is an enemy we defeat it by making life good, not in terms of a Methuselah, who just lived a long time, but of a Jesus of Nazareth, who lived life full of confidence in its spiritual quality. He had sublime confidence in the life of quality and felt that God's Spirit was undergirding his belief always.

"That sounded like a sermon, didn't it? But I wanted you to get that idea, for it has always been helpful to me in my thinking.

"It's nearly twelve-thirty," I said, glancing at my watch. "Don't you want to eat before you report in at Operations?"

Captain Moore and I walked along the airdrome toward the place where we would eat. Out on the field the mechanics were at their familiar tasks of readying the planes for flight. Some of the motors were roaring as they received their final tuning for the long haul. I broke in on the captain's quiet watching.

"Did it ever occur to you how much care and planning and adjustment and tuning it takes to get a plane into the air? Sometimes it takes that same kind of patient care and planning and adjustment and tuning for us to be able to take off in our thinking, so that we can gain the objectives of spiritual insight and understanding."

The captain made no answer, but looked at me thoughtfully as we walked.

After we had gotten our trays, we sat across from each other, looking more than talking to each other.

"There may be some other questions or problems that concern you, Ed. Don't hesitate to speak of anything. I'll help if I can."

Again he looked at me for quite a while, and then said, "I keep thinking of Alice. We have planned so much. If there is anything to this premonition, I wonder what it would do to her. I think I understand more of this business of the spiritual nature of life than I did. But I don't think she knows it, at least not the way you put it. Just in case, would you try to tell her the things you have told me?"

After I had done my best to reassure him, we went on together to the Operations building.

After some time he had his orders, and was free to talk for a while. "Chaplain, I wish we had more time for talks like this. The more you talk about such things the more you want to talk. Each door you open gives some more things to see and talk about and ask questions about."

"Yes, Ed. Life is a lot like a ship at sea. It is aware of two realities. One is the ship and the water and all that makes up the physical environment. The other is the reality of the compass and the sextant—the sensitivity to unseen forces that guide the seen—those far-off and stable facts that are important for us because they are there when we need them. Sometimes we can go quite a while without seeing a compass, but when we are lost it is good to know that the unseen reality is dependable."

Captain Moore thought a long while, looking far off.

Then he turned toward me and said directly: "We have shared ideas on this whole subject. Now tell me what you know about death and the spiritual life personally."

"I told you, Ed, that I believe, but I didn't tell you why. I don't like to seem sentimental. But you asked me, so I will tell you. There was a time when I felt as you did. It was foolishness, or, at best, not meant for me. Then I had a chance to know how quickly an accident can strike. My boy, a lad who would have been eleven now, opened the door that I had chosen to ignore, and walked into the unknown. For the first time in my life I began doing some careful thinking about life, its spiritual nature and its spiritual meaning. The love I felt within became stronger than the doubts my scientific training had helped to shape for me. With the aid of that love I began reorganizing my own thinking. Now I see the importance of the spiritual, and the value of life. My thinking became furnished with a set of values not only responsive to the solid earth, but also subject to the pull of the compass and the guidance of the stars. Only when I had gone through such an experience did I begin to know that prayer was my spiritual compass and that God was truly my Creator, without whose companionship I should never be able to be truly at home in the universe. My close contact with death has filled me with a deeper sense of life's meaning, has assured me that faith is stronger than fear, has helped me to grow up spiritually, and has not only made me at home in the universe, but also has made it a more meaningful and spacious universe to be at home in."

"Thanks, Chaplain. That's what I wanted to hear. I knew there must be some such experience as that in back of the rest of what you said. I would have felt I had missed something without this last. Well, it looks as if I will have to go now."

Others of the crew were walking toward the plane. I walked along with them, and stood close by as they climbed aboard.

As Captain Moore climbed up, he turned and said to me, "I am quite

sure I believe in God, and I think I believe in immortality. Time will tell."

Soon the motors roared, and they were gone.

Captain Moore's premonition had stirred my feelings. Throughout the afternoon I could think of little else. Was it a true insight, or a bursting through of uncontrolled anxiety? Several times during the afternoon and evening I checked in at Communications for any word of his flight.

At nine-thirty that evening Communications received word that Captain Moore's plane was down in the mountains of Sicily. My first question was about the crew.

"Yes, Chaplain, the entire crew—the entire crew."

The Mediterranean night was deeply blue-black. The distant stars seemed clear and near.

Nearer than the stars was the feeling that I had been living close to a mystery of insight, sacrifice, and spiritual force, that sometimes even in life gives men power over time and space through visions and dreams, as a promise of that conquest of time and space that should endure. For what is immortality but that ability to live beyond the requirements of time and space?

Had his questions been answered?

Had the doors been opened that he so desperately wanted opened?

Had I, with God's help, used the three hours he had given me to help make eternity real?

"Time (and eternity) will tell."

Protestants, Catholics, and Papists

GEORGE P. HOWARD

DON QUIXOTE, on one occasion, turned to Sancho, his faithful armor-bearer, and said: "Sancho, we have come up against the Church." Latin countries and their governments know what it is to "come up against the Church."

The average American Roman Catholic would probably be angered at reading in Count Kalergi-Coudenove's *Crusade for Pan-Europe*, page 173, this statement: "Catholicism is the fascist form of Christianity. The Catholic hierarchy rests fully and securely on the leadership principle with an infallible Pope in supreme command for a life-time." But Count Kalergi-Coudenove is himself a Roman Catholic.

In the organization and development of the Roman Catholic Church we see the influence of Roman thought. That Church is a faithful copy of the Roman Empire. The parish follows the model of the Roman municipality; the diocese is equivalent to the Roman province; the metropolitan divisions correspond to the prefectures, and at the top of the pyramid is the Bishop of Rome and the Papacy. We see here reproduced in the realm of religion the universal and absolute monarchy which the Caesars created in the realm of politics. Monastic asceticism, the celibacy, the multiplication of pious works in order to gain merit, were ideas imported from the Orient. The Church conquered the world. But the world had its revenge within the Church.

Wherein lies the irreconcilable difference between Romanism and Protestantism? It is in the doctrine of the church. Roman Catholic catechisms very clearly teach that the central dogma of Romanism is its conception of the church, its infallibility, its continuity, its divine origin and its supernatural powers.

We Protestants say that we are part of the Church of Christ because we belong to Christ. Roman Catholics say that no one can have communion with Christ, no one can belong to Christ, unless he belongs to the Church.

GEORGE P. HOWARD, D.D., has given forty years of missionary service in the southern republics, resides in Buenos Aires, and works under the Committee on Co-operation in Latin America as evangelist to the students and educated classes. The present article was given as an address in Spanish at a recent annual meeting of the Federation of Protestant Churches in Argentina.

Hence in the Church of Rome faith in the Church and submission to her come first, and they constitute what is essential and necessary. One becomes a Roman Catholic by the implicit acceptance of the sovereign authority of the Church; one ceases to be a Roman Catholic when he refuses to submit to that authority. Protestants say that Christianity has a church. Roman Catholics say that their church *is* Christianity.

As early as the second century, under the unconscious influence of pagan customs and traditions, there arose a tendency to objectify and materialize religion. With it came the desire to show in some external and visible way the principle of Christianity. The idea of the Kingdom of God took form in a visible institution; the immanent work and influence of the Holy Spirit came under the control of the clergy. It was inevitable that this process should eventually lead to an assumption of exclusive possession of the means of salvation and grace. And so the Church became the magic dispenser of Divine favors. Her mission was that of saving sinners, and to do that she thought it necessary to offer God, as priests in primitive religions had done, some acceptable sacrifice which would secure forgiveness for the sins of the world.

Thus was it that the Church transformed the commemoration of the death of Christ into a renewal and repetition of the sacrifice made on Calvary. The Holy Communion became the Mass; the communion table, symbol of brotherly love and solidarity, was changed into an altar; the presbyter became a priest, and the bread of communion was transmuted into a Divine victim. The dogma of transubstantiation was the logical consequence of the materializing of Christianity; the visible church had to be followed by a God who becomes visible, and this materialization of the Deity appears in the Host.

The supreme law, therefore, of the Roman Catholic Church, and the ultimate expression of piety is submission and obedience to the authority of the Church. Her dogmas might seem irrational; her commandments arbitrary; nevertheless, reason, conscience, and liberty must yield to the voice of the Church. It was no surprise, therefore, when the Vatican Council of 1870 formulated the dogma of Papal infallibility.¹

While logically all this makes for absolutism and intolerance, behind these steel-clad dogmas of the Roman Catholic institution there are many pious souls. Within Romanism there has always been a latent strain of Protestantism: that is to say, a spirit that was unwilling to yield entirely

¹ Auguste Sabatier, in his *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion Based on Psychology and History*, gives an excellent account of this process. I gladly acknowledge the influence of his thinking.

to the oppression of an external and tyrannical authority. The Roman Church has always had its St. Francis and its stirrings after Bible truth.

This sense of autonomy, this larger enfranchisement of man's spirit, this feeling of adulthood, characteristic of Protestantism at its best, is the legitimate and inevitable fruit of Christianity. It is the golden thread that appears, throughout the ages, woven into the texture of organized Christianity. It represents the struggle of the spirit against the letter; it is the effort of the soul to master the body; it is the spontaneous, creative spirit breaking the old molds and flowing into newer and finer forms; it is regulation by rules converted into inspiration by enlightened conscience. It is the struggle between the apostolic spirit, democratic and simple, and the monarchical and sacerdotal concept of authority.

In the Roman Church the sacerdotal has prevailed. In Protestantism the inwardness of religion is emphasized. Grace works from within. No attempt is made to impose goodness from without. Spirituality is not gauged by the number or fervor of pious works wrought, but rather by the sincerity, goodness, and elevation of the life of the spirit. Man's personality cannot always be kept in spiritual tutelage. He must become master of himself. If he has really found Christ, he will have found himself. He will rejoice confidently in the love of the Father. He will experience a filial sense of God's presence. He will not feel the need of a host of mediators to win his Father's favor. His personality will broaden and develop freely. In Christianity men should come of age.

The Protestant way of life has a threefold foundation: first, faith in the capacities of the common man; second, faith in the self-evidencing power of truth; and, third, faith "that this seemingly apathetic universe . . . is on the side of the nation and the society which tries to embody human brotherhood."

To what extent has Romanism had faith in the capacities of the common man? To get an adequate answer you must trace the development of society over two or three centuries in countries where Romanism and Protestantism, respectively, have had a relatively free hand. Compare Spain, Italy, South America, and Quebec with Great Britain, Scandinavia, and North America, apart from Quebec and Mexico. In these Roman Catholic countries the Church undoubtedly inspires, guides, rules, and shelters the common man. Under this spiritual tutelage man may be far happier than the free man adrift and often rudderless. But we would certainly not say that the spiritual and intellectual capacities of the common man were recognized and developed. On the contrary, the common man was so sheltered that he has been kept back and kept down.

Protestantism believes in the common man because Protestantism is biblical religion. And that cornerstone of democracy—confidence in the potentialities of the common man—comes out of the Bible.

Back in 1942, a conference of philosophers, scientists, and theologians that met in New York City said that one of the big questions involved in the world crisis was that of a pluralistic *versus* a monolithic civilization. They explained that democracy is a pluralistic civilization. Autocracy is monolithic, that is, it is made of a single unyielding hardness. Democracy postulates the belief that all men are born free and equal. Therefore it has confidence in the potentialities resident in men. It is not dismayed when these potentialities manifest themselves in a great variety of ways. Its concern is to see that as these different gifts and skills develop, they shall not hurt the gifts and abilities possessed by others.

Autocracy must place limits to the development of human potentialities. It cannot grant free speech, since that may endanger its authority. It cannot permit all forms of worship, for that also might endanger its absolute authority. In order to survive, autocracy must insist on one pattern of life; it must set arbitrary limits to the free development of men's powers.

Protestantism has ever struggled to avoid this tendency to limit man's possibilities. It sees in Christ's attitude toward men a generous confidence in spite of the infinite variety with which they express their personalities. It believes that dissidence and heterodoxy will die their own death, unless they come inspired by God. Every effort to eliminate them by force or violence simply foments their existence. It believes that true Christianity gives us grace to learn how to live with differences. It does not believe, of course, that all forms of association or modes of life are equally acceptable. It uses Christ's stern measure to determine whether a thing is good; it asks, does this belief, this tendency guarantee that whatever qualities and faculties are resident in people will be given a chance to develop? Given this test, Protestantism is not worried over the infinite variety of ways in which men express themselves. The grandeur of life has revealed itself to men in so many different ways that they have expressed their high meanings through a diversity of symbols. Being a spiritual democracy, Protestantism claims that a majority must never tolerate: *it must respect.*

Protestantism claims the right to launch out in search of new frontiers for the religious spirit. It claims the right to disagree. It believes it has the right to go beyond the narrow limits set by men and search for the boundaries that God has traced. Protestantism finds in Christ these ever-expanding frontiers. Its aim is to fulfill in its people St. Paul's injunction: "Let this mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus."

We must challenge the mischievous modern idea that Protestantism is a vague elastic or comprehensive term embracing all forms of Christian belief and disbelief provided only they are opposed to Rome.

Protestantism is not a dogma that opposes another dogma, a church that is in competition with a rival church, a purified Catholicism which opposes traditional Catholicism. It is something more than an improved set of doctrines: it is a new mode of life, a new form of piety, a different spirit, actively creating a new world and establishing a new regime for the life of mankind. It expresses itself through a rich variety of formulas and ceremonies; it avoids a barren uniformity of organization. No ecclesiastical "corral" can contain it. It accompanies man in all his spiritual peregrinations, and nothing human is foreign to it.

The "Protest" put forth by the Reformers at the Diet of Spires in 1529 was not a negative repudiation of false doctrines, but a *positive* appeal to Holy Scripture "as the only truth, as the sure rule of all doctrine which can never fail or deceive us." A Protestant, as the Latin derivation implies, is one who witnesses *for* truth rather than one who merely "protests" against error. The German Protestants, like the Early Fathers, appealed to Scriptures as the sole ultimate rule of faith for the Catholic Church. The English Reformers made the same appeal to the supreme authority of Holy Scripture. They welcomed the title "Protestant." "Call me Protestant who listeth," said Bishop Ridley, "I care not for it. My protestation shall be this, that my mind is and ever shall be to set forth sincerely and true the sense and meaning of God's most holy word and not to decline from the same."

One of the chief reasons for Luther's repudiation of Rome was that the papal champions defined catholicity in terms too narrow for him, excluding some whom he regarded as catholic Christians.

The adherents of Luther were first dubbed Protestants because in 1529 they protested against the action of their opponents which involved the violation of a mutual agreement made in 1526. The agreement in question was that a *council* should be called to settle the reformation controversy before suppressive measures should be undertaken. What they demanded and insisted upon was a *council*. The protesters of 1529 were conciliarists—advocates of church government by councils. Such a council had been promised in 1526. *The Protestants were conciliarists who were seeking to bring to bear on the controverted questions of the day the corporate judgment of the church.*

But if "Protestant" is a term to be cherished and understood, it is

incorrect historically and misleading to oppose the terms "Protestant" and "Catholic." Protestant is not antithetical to Catholic. The opposite of Protestant is not Catholic, but Papist or Roman. Protestantism—truly inclusive of a rich variety of interpretations of the fundamental truths of Christianity and ever willing to acknowledge and honor, even in Romanism, all valid Christian truth—is real Catholicism. Catholicity implies the desire for fellowship with all Christians. "Catholic" was the title used in the Primitive Church to comprehend the Universal Christian Society. The constant struggle in the early church was to preserve the early Apostolic, Scriptural, and *Catholic* faith against incipient heresy. *Thus to discard or disown the title "Catholic" or to surrender it to the Roman Church is, in effect, to deny that we belong to the early Apostolic Catholic Society*, which confessed the "one Lord, one faith and one baptism" which was then the only test of membership in the Universal Fellowship of believers.

Bishop Latimer said: "It is one thing to say Romish Church and another to say Catholic Church." Bishop Christopher Wordsworth, a high Anglican, in 1865, declared that "the Church of England became Protestant at the Reformation that it might become more truly and purely Catholic." Some thirty years later, Dean Hole, another high Anglican, exhorted American Episcopalians "to rejoice in the truth that the Church is Protestant because it is Catholic; that it is Protestant because it is Scriptural, and as such repels innovation."

Unfortunately, today, many ill-instructed Protestants regard the terms "Roman" and "Catholic" as synonymous. At the Westminster Disputation, 1559, Bishop Horn told the Romanists: "By the Catholic Church we understand not the Romish Church, but that which St. Augustine sought in the Holy Scriptures and which is governed and led by the Spirit of Christ." In 1625, another learned theologian in England, Dean Hole, made the same point: "We Protestants of Reformed Churches, who are the most conspicuous members of the holy Catholic Church . . . dare not vouchsafe to bestow the name Catholic upon any Papist, for their faith not purified from the additions of the second Nicene and Trent Councils can be no Catholic Faith."

On these grounds we claim the right to call ourselves the "Protestant Catholic Church."

The Immutable Values of a Universal Faith

ELMER BERGER

I

A RELIGION which limits its values to its own group, or which applies the moral law in one way to its own group and in another way to others, is a tribalism. A religion which is concerned only with the protection of its own group against the uncertainties common to all mankind is a paganism.

It took vision to see the potentialities of good in the universe. It took still more vision to believe that good could possibly come from men who were not of one's tribe. It took greatness of spirit to entertain hope for the good for one's tribe in the common good of all, and to believe that by the same set of universal, moral values common good could be attained.

Universal Judaism subscribes to a tradition that was born twenty-five centuries ago. It is about that span of years between us and the gaunt figure of Amos the prophet, who thundered to a complacent and inbred Israel of his day, "Are ye not as the children of the Ethiopians unto me, O children of Israel?" said the Lord."

With that startling question, universal Judaism was born. To a moral and universal God, the children of Israel were no more and no less than the children of Ethiopia. One moral law emanated from one universal God and applied alike to all the children of men.

This idea eventually revolutionized the history of mankind. But in his own day, Amos was reported to the King of Israel by the hireling priest at the national sanctuary at Beth-El as having "conspired against thee in the midst of the House of Israel; the land is not able to bear all his words." And this same hireling priest, whose name is practically unknown in history, told Amos, ". . . Flee thee away into the land of Judah, and there eat bread, and prophesy there; but prophesy not again any more at Beth-El, for it is the king's sanctuary and it is a royal house."

These words have a familiar ring. Nearly a century and a half after

RABBI ELMER BERGER, B.A., is national executive director of the American Council for Judaism—which affirms that "nationality and religion are separate and distinct; our nationality is American; our religion is Judaism; our homeland is the U. S. A. Author, *The Jewish Dilemma; The Case Against Zionist-Nationalism.*

Amos, Jeremiah spoke with equal candor to the population of the Kingdom of Judah and was called by another hireling of the nationalistic religion of that state a "troubler of Israel."

If we conceive the destiny of Jews to be linked with the destiny of men who are not Jews, and the moral responsibilities of Jews to be the same as the moral responsibilities of those who are not Jews, we may look to the rock whence we were hewn for validity: to Amos and Jeremiah and Isaiah. If a secular entity known as "the Jewish people" is less important to us than individual humans who are Jews, we can validate that concern by turning to Hosea.

This is not to say that the "Jewish" nationalists do not have their antecedents, too. They have the long history of the restrictive domination of the priesthood. They have the biblical theocracies of before and after Ezra. The fact is that throughout all the history of Judaism, segregation has warred with integration; priest with prophet; nation with faith.

II

At the annual meeting of the Central Conference of American Rabbis in 1948, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, former president of this body of Reform Rabbis, spoke on the question of the relationship of American Jews to the newly proclaimed State of Israel. Dr. Silver pointed out many things as continuing responsibilities of the Zionist movement. Toward the end of his remarks, he said:

. . . . A tendency might develop to think of Israel as an accomplished fact. There is the State, intended for the citizens who live there, and here are we and the rest of the Jews of the world. This, I am afraid, was never completely the philosophy of "Shivat Zion" and of Zionism. The challenge of Zionism was not only to the other man but to ourselves as well.

In Zionism there was always the concept of the "Kibbutz Galuyot," the in-gathering of the exiles. The greater the "Kibbutz Galuyot" is, and the more Jews that go there, the more fully and completely is the idea of Zionism realized. Frankly, I am thinking of Israel maximally and not minimally. There is a danger of reducing the concept of the State of Israel to the six or seven hundred thousand Jews who now live there and the few hundred thousand refugees who may want to go there.

I am thinking of a great Jewish Nation developing in Israel. My reading of Jewish history leads me to believe that world Jewry during the coming decades and generations of struggle before the world finally finds its economic equilibrium, will undergo many tribulations, that these will not be limited to Jews in any one area of the globe, and that therefore we ought to be thinking of Israel not as a little country intended for those who are there now and for the Jews presently displaced, but as an Israel intended for the Jewish people who may yet have to go there, or may wish to go there from many parts of the world, including this part of the world, to build there for themselves a great and secure Jewish Commonwealth.

In the summer of 1947, a convocation of Jewish educators, including the leading personalities in that field from the United States, met in Palestine. A resolution was passed which declared, "Jewish education is to be Zionist and Hebraic. . . . It is also to develop . . . the desire for Jewish living to the point of wishing full personal identification with the fullness of creative Jewish life in Palestine."

In February of 1949, Dr. Samuel Belkin, president of Yeshiva University in New York, is reported to have denounced "interfaith activity, which makes the synagogue its platform and its rabbi its ambassador." Dr. Belkin explained further, according to the reports, that "the tendency toward combined synagogue-church activity and the interchange of pulpits between ministers and rabbis must be curbed, for it presents a clear and open danger to American Jewry."

Less than two years later, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations published a children's service in which there is the prayer, ". . . Please help us to keep the peace, and keep *our* newly-acquired homeland in Israel. . . . We pray to thee, O Lord our God, for a homeland for our people. A place which Jewish wanderers from all parts of the world may call home. . . . Help us now to fulfill this wish as thou helped our fathers in ancient times."

In the same service there are other prayers, glorifying not moral values, not a universal God; not urging identification with either of these, but with "our people."

Following all these incidents, one of America's leading news commentators and analysts, and a woman of deep belief in the Judeo-Christian ethical system, wrote, "I have seen a number of statements, evaluating the effect of Zionism on Judaism as a religion. From these statements, it appears that it is doing precisely what Hitlerism did to Christianity in Germany; it is turning—or attempting to turn—a faith of universal and timeless wisdom and greatness into a nationalist and chauvinist credo."

The incidents to which I have referred are only a partial list. Many more could be added. Similarly, the comment of our American Christian friend could be duplicated many times.

We must disabuse ourselves of the comforting rationalization that it is possible that there is *no* relationship between all these things; that Dr. Silver is a Zionist extremist; that Dr. Belkin is a fanatic; that the Union of American Hebrew Congregations service is an accident; and that the liberal Christian commentator is, after all, an anti-Semite.

These incidents *are* related. They are multiplied every day in a

hundred ways and translated into life for American Jews through their organized activities. They all derive, in one way or another, from the separatistic, nationalistic tradition of Judaism. They are all motivated either by a lack of faith in the decency of humans other than Jews, or by the tribalistic fear that if human decencies are not stamped "Jewish" or "non-Jewish" some dire defections will come in the numbers of people who are Jews.

Basic to Dr. Silver's remarks is the whole mechanistic, fatalistic pessimism of "Jewish" nationalism. It never had anything to do with religion. It always argued, with Herzl, on the one hand, that anti-Semitism was an incurable disease, and on the other hand, that Jews were an unintegrable, indigestible, separatistic people. Economic equilibrium or instability were secondary factors. The one might ease the tensions between this separatistic group and those who were not Jews, and the other might increase them. But the segregation, the separateness, the antagonism, in mild or virulent form, was an inexorable and ineradicable characteristic of human beings. And the separateness of Jews, in the tribalism of "Jewish" nationalism, was glorified as a virtue. The separateness of those who were not Jews was condemned as a vice.

This is anything but universalism. This is the standard of the dubious ethics of tribalism.

Dr. Belkin's fears about the future of Judaism if there is official fraternization with Christians is the other side of this coin of separateness and exclusiveness. Dr. Silver's fears are secular and economic. Dr. Belkin's are probably spiritual. Both evidence little faith in the virility of Judaism as either a beneficent influence in the liberalizing of men or as a spiritual code that can retain the loyalties of those who profess faith in it if they are allowed freedom to know and understand the faith of other men. The equating of Jewish education with Zionism and Hebrew is a provincialism designed to speed the departure from universalism by reducing, in Judaism, the areas of common interest and language shared with other men.

None of these is a spiritual force within the terms of a universal and liberal faith. "Jewish" nationalism is as mechanistic as Marxism. The one is founded on the thesis of economic determinism. The other rests on the thesis of anti-Semitic determinism. Where that determinism does not exist, "Jewish" nationalists, like Marxists, are committed to create it by molding minds and creating conditions of separatism which support their thesis. All of this is a denial of the spirit of man as a spiritual entity who

should enjoy freedom of conscience to arrive at moral decisions for which he receives reward or punishment.

And it is all of a pattern that is shattering the *only* enduring qualities of the lives of Jews, *as Jews*. It is limiting Judaism to concern with and values for the secular separatism of a secular "Jewish people" attached politically and secularly to a sovereign, foreign state. If allowed to continue, this progression of historic forces will produce a nationalistic Judaism, which may or may not be tolerated in America. Many who are not Jews believe that a great and magnificent tradition which has been a cornerstone for the life of all Americans will be shrunk down to a set of separatistic and segregated values for a separate, indigestible and nationalized group of Jews. Nothing can prevent a widening chasm between those whose spirits are nurtured by this Judaism and Americans whose spirits are nurtured by other faiths.

III

Nationalism is narrower than universalism. Nationalism has more immediate appeal, and is more saturated with emotion. Nationalism feeds upon its own victories and is intensified by its own frustrations. For all these reasons, in any moment of history, it is a more compelling force than universalism.

"Jewish" nationalism is no exception. The emphasis in "Jewish" nationalism is on the mass, not the individual. It is forever striving for the rights of "the Jewish people." It is inconceivable to the "Jewish" nationalists that a Jew can find peace and security outside the secular organizations of their nationalized Jewry. To claim that one is a Jew by religion and to live that pattern—is decried as minimal Judaism.

The first casualty of the "Jewish" nationalistic assault on Judaism is respect for the dignity and sovereignty of the spirit of individual man. It is the tribe that is glorified. Whether one is a Jew or not, one must love all Jews, *as Jews*, and be a partisan of their nationalism, represented as the common aspiration of all, or be slandered as either a Christian or a Jewish anti-Semite. Hence the first reason for the widening of the chasm.

The second reason may be even more serious for both the people involved and for Judaism itself. For an alliance of nationalism with Judaism must inevitably lower the moral sights of Judaism. A universal code of morality and ethics stands independent and objectively critical of *any* nationalism. But to equate Zionism with Judaism would create—and already has created—a blind spot in Judaism toward the policies of this "Jewish" nationalism. I say this has already happened. The American

rabbinate is committed to free comment on social and economic problems. But the Jewish pulpits of America have been either singularly silent about or monotonously apologetic for "Jewish" nationalism.

Where were the rabbinical voices protesting against the intimidations practiced to compel political subservience to "Jewish" nationalism's fight for political control of all or part of Palestine? Where were the prophetic, religious voices to call attention to repeated "Jewish" nationalistic defiance of the United Nations? Where are the religious spirits demanding that "Jewish" nationalists bring to trial the murderers of Bernadotte? Where were the men, with Jeremiah's "burning fire within," to protest the widely reported compulsion used upon displaced persons so that they might give the Zionist-nationalist answer to the question of where they wished to resettle their lives? Where were the descendants of Isaiah who called to the moral conscience of the world the plight of 750,000 Arab refugees? And what kind of Judaism was it that replied to the need of these people that the non-Jewish world had paid too little attention to the Jewish victims of Nazism? This is the tribalism of "an eye for an eye." It is a world of thought apart from a Judaism that encourages "justice to flow like water and righteousness as a mighty stream."

The moral problems that have been eclipsed by the advanced stage of nationalistic myopia in Judaism may be extended. But these illustrations will serve my purpose. There is no rebuttal to the charge that nationalism already has dealt universal Judaism a staggering blow. The stature of Judaism in the world has suffered as a result. For a Judaism whose moral code operates on one level for Jews and on another level for those who are not, cannot command the respect of a Judaism in which the children of Israel are subject to the same moral laws as the "children of the Ethiopians."

It is no defense to say that this self-centered concern is the way of other people, too, or to excuse it because of the tragic exigencies of the moment. If Jews are a nation like other nations, then their struggle to survive must be in the moral jungle of power politics. How well they can survive as a small nation in that jungle will depend upon the moral codes of the rest of the world. But Judaism as the self-centered instrumentality of a "Jewish" nationalism cannot be expected to contribute much to the universal moral code that will enable all nations to survive. No more than Christianity can Judaism serve God and Caesar. Jews may beguile themselves for a time with the idea that *Jewish* Caesars are gods; that their Caesarism is infallible—beyond debate or criticism. But, in the end,

Judaism will fail to survive despite the mad pursuit of the immediacies of survival. For, as Jews, we shall have sacrificed our right to respect and equality in the moral codes of other men by building a moral code that makes of Jews an exception.

As to the exigencies of the last few years, as justification for the indulgence of "Jewish" nationalistic policies by the leaders of Judaism, Judah Leon Magnes declared:

You may say, it is because of our straitened position, from which there is no escape, that we have declared a kind of moratorium or, in today's terminology, a freezing of our morals. It is possible to freeze preserves, or to freeze money for a time, and after that to restore its values. But it is not within the power of man to freeze his morals. "One wrong begets another." "If a man commits a wrong and repeats it, it becomes a thing allowed." The attempt to freeze the moral senses results in their atrophy.

Judaism has always been such a healthy mixture of belief in the moral potentialities of man and the purposefulness of a universe designed by God. With Amos it rejected the tribal paganism limited to defending Jews against a universe of evil by some occult magic that was good only for Jews.

Read again the passionate denunciations of the nation and its nationalized priesthood in the prophecies of Amos, Hosea, and Jeremiah. Did not Hosea compare an Israel blinded by nationalism and nationalistic ethics to a harlot? Did not Amos say, "I hate, I despise your feasts and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies, yea though ye offer me burnt offerings and meal offerings, I will not accept them"? Did not Jeremiah stand at the very door of the national shrine in Jerusalem and thunder at those who came to worship formalistically, "Behold ye trust in lying words that cannot profit. Will ye steal, murder and commit adultery and swear falsely unto Baal and walk after other gods whom ye have not known and come and stand before Me in this house . . . and say 'we are delivered,' that ye may do all these abominations." "Trust ye not in lying words, saying: 'The temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord . . . ?'"

These were "negations," bitter, searing, thunderous "negations" of a people that had forsaken a universal God for tribalism; of a people who thought their peoplehood more important than the moralities. But they were born of passionate conviction in the rightness of the universal. And from these negations, there has followed the negation of other tribalisms in the history of man; and from these negations, too, come the differentiation in religious thought between the essential and permanent ethical values and the passing and temporal formalities of worship.

Few listened to the men who followed Amos and shifted the foundations of human society from tribalisms to universal faiths. Jeremiah, who may have been the most impatient of the prophets, was moved to say to his people, bitterly, that they had eyes and saw not, and ears and heard not. But that they were defying the inescapable moralities of a universal faith he was certain, and he was equally certain that if they continued to defy these moralities, they would be destroyed. For they might listen or not, and see or not. The irrevocability of the functioning of the moral law transcended their seeing or hearing.

IV

I must say a word here, specifically, about Orthodox Judaism. Orthodoxy, in its *form* of worship, shows tendencies toward nationalism, which Reform does not reveal. In fact, Reform was born to create a Judaism, the outward forms of which would eliminate these national tendencies. But the ultimate universal spirit of Orthodoxy and of Reform are not much different. Worshipers in each may seek the ultimate goal by different paths. Orthodox Judaism may be a national *religion*. But it was—and, where free from "Jewish" secular nationalism, is—a *religion*. It is not a nationalism.

In its own religious way, Orthodoxy conceived of a return to Zion. But this Zion was never greater than God nor than the Godly reason for which the Orthodox Jew wished the return. The Orthodox national *religion* was *under* God—and a part of the Godly life.

To the Orthodox Jew, the separateness of the Jews has always been a means to an end, never an end in itself. "The end of Israel's separateness is the good of the world." The return to Zion was only "a preliminary to the Messianic age when *all* men shall flow unto Zion and seek God there." Reform Jews differ only in that they believe "the world may become full of the knowledge of God without any antecedent withdrawal of Israel from the world." These are the words of Israel Abrahams, one of the great scholars of Orthodoxy. In other words, Orthodox Judaism, too, holds with an ultimate universalism. That undoubtedly explained why the devout Orthodox Jew objected to secular "Jewish" nationalism as much as the Reform Jew. For if the return to Zion was left to the moral plan of God and his time schedule for the universe, Judaism would be in harmony with that plan. It would not be supporting a secular nationalism or be imposed upon by it to create a Zion where there existed exclusive privileges for Jews.

I do not hold with the theology of Orthodoxy, and some of my associ-

ates of the American Council for Judaism do not hold with the theology of Reform. But in our insistence upon the ultimate universals in both of our systems of worship we stand on common ground. There is little in either Orthodoxy, with its call for a religious return to Zion, or in Reform, with its religious call to Jews to accommodate their worship and faith to the countries in which they live, to support the secular "Jewish" nationalist, who lives in one country and intends to stay there, acts as if he were in a "Jewish" nation for all the "Jewish" people, including himself, and uses his Judaism, Orthodox or Reform, as a part of his "not-for-me-but-for-someone-else" "Jewish" nationalism.

V

The weight of nationalist propaganda has discouraged many. And yet, each time, like Jeremiah, we have returned to the struggle, because we could not help ourselves. Jeremiah, too, cried out to the Lord, "Thou hast enticed me, and I was enticed. I am become a laughing stock all the day. Everyone mocketh me." But when he had unburdened his soul of the weariness and frustration, he went on to say, "If I say, 'I will not make mention of Him (the Lord), nor speak any more His name, then there is in my heart as it were a burning fire shut up in my bones. I weary myself to hold it in but cannot.'" Listen again as that giant among the spirits of men continues, "For I have heard the whispering of many, terror on every side: 'Denounce and we will denounce him'; even all of my familiar friends; them that watch for my halting declare: 'Peradventure he will be enticed and we shall prevail against him and we shall take our revenge on him.'"

Only this goal makes sense for the survival of Jews and Judaism in a world where it is difficult to be a Jew—even now among Jews, as Dr. Magnes observed. Israel is a nation among many nations. But Jews are citizens of many nations. And Judaism is not the special prerogative of any one nation nor of any separatistic people. No one government calls Jews, *as Jews*, to national loyalties. But in the deathless heritage of a faith that together with—not apart from—Christianity has inspired the humanistic societies of many men, we acknowledge the summons, "I the Lord have called thee in righteousness and have taken hold of thy hand and kept thee for a covenant of the people and a light to the nations."

IN
man
was
so c
giou
use
who
then
alon
least
pow
met
thes
quer
sculp
whic
aspe
achie
his
artis
grea
art v
Egy
too,
say
gods
Egy
fifty
and
Stud
3

Ecclesiastical Sculpture

ALEC MILLER

IN A SENSE, ALL SCULPTURE, from its beginnings with primitive man till the Renaissance, was ecclesiastical sculpture; that is, its function was to provide the iconography of each successive religion, and the forms so created were used in association with religious observance and for religious ends. The use of art as a means of communication is older than the use of words, and some of primitive man's art is probably the work of men who had only a very narrow vocabulary of sounds with which to express themselves. Still, behind this work was a vague sense that man lived not alone by his own strength and knowledge, but by acting in harmony, or at least associated with, strange and dimly apprehended cosmic processes and powers.

Fire, heat, cold, lightning, thunder, wind, animals were forces he met and battled with constantly, and gradually he conceived the idea that these recurring and unnamable forces might be placated or their consequences averted. In this dim and obscure way the arts of painting and sculpture arose, inextricably tangled with magic, ritual, and something which must be called religion. Slowly, imperceptibly, these forces and aspects of nature grew to be dimly perceived as persons. In trying to achieve this harmony with the processes of nature and the animals on whom his existence depended, Art was born. It is significant that these earliest artists sought to represent the forms of the animals depicted with the greatest possible fidelity; for the idea behind all this magical and imitative art was that "like acts on like."

A new stage in the development of sculpture was marked by the ancient Egyptians, the first great national civilization to arise on this earth. They, too, personified the forces of nature; or rather it would be more true to say they half-personified them, for most of the Egyptian hierarchy of gods are only half human, being usually animal-headed. But it is to Egypt that we owe the greatest development of sculpture associated with

ALEC MILLER, now resident in Monterey, California, is a British sculptor of fifty years' standing, who has done ecclesiastical sculpture for many English cathedrals and churches. He has recently written a book, *Tradition in Sculpture*, published by Studio Publications, 381 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

religion, for it was there that the idea of making statues first took an immense hold on the human mind. A central tenet of Egyptian religion was that man had a double, or spirit, which was born with him and which survived what we call death if it had a habitation. To preserve the natural habitation—the body—they embalmed it, and thus delayed its dissolution; but decay being inevitable, they made statues as auxiliary bodies in which this spirit should live. These secondary bodies thus came to be made in materials which would not perish, such as stone, granite, diorite, and the art of portrait sculpture was born in fullness of power. There are, then, these two significant ideas to be kept in mind: that sculpture is part of a religious rite, and that resemblance to natural form and face was sought in order that the soul should recognize its dwelling place.

The next great step in the development of sculpture was to "think the gods into human shape," which was finally achieved by the Greeks, who transformed the Egyptian gods into a Pantheon of lovely figures, men and women of surpassing beauty fit to influence the destinies of man and worthy of his adoration. The close relation between thought and art is clearly seen in Greek life. The intellectual vitality of Greek life passed from their thought into every work of their hand and brain, and so transformed the world. When the transformation of "thinking the gods into human shape" was accomplished, it was the work of the Greek artist to give form to these thoughts; and this involved long, conscious, and original study, untrammeled by the authority of the past. It led the philosophers to the discovery of man, to map out his powers and potentialities, and to guess at his destiny. It led the artists to the discovery of the form of man in its most ideal aspect. Finally the labors of both together led to the dethronement of the too-humanized gods, and to the apotheosis of man.

The Greek genius shows in the creation of type forms. The Zeus of Phidias, that grand benignant type, had never before appeared in art. It has constantly reappeared in Christian art. Michelangelo's "God the Father" in the Sistine Chapel is a clear echo of the Phidian father of the gods. The athlete types, the Doryphorus and the Diadumenos, are just the embodiment of the qualities sought in Greek life: courage, temperance, and friendship.

As belief in the gods declined, so the representation of them in noble form declined. Gods engaged in amorous adventures, and only half believed in, could not be nobly represented. Lucian makes derisive play with them, and no sculptured representations could make them worthy of belief, far less of worship.

Here, then, I would urge, sculpture is petrified history. The soul

of the race and age is embodied in the statue; and when we can learn to reinterpret history through these vital works of art, then the past becomes not a dead thing, but the living roots of the present. This sense of continuity is our link with the central reality, call it Truth, Beauty, or God, as you will. That intellectualism which dictated the patient, loving search for the most ideal human form in which to personify the gods created Greek sculpture, but it also destroyed it; for gods realistically conceived and humanly represented could no longer be believed in, and as belief died the art also died. The boundaries of the intellectual empire were immensely extended by Socrates and the philosophers, and by Phidias and the artists; but no empire, either of fact or of spirit, can be held static, and Greece went down before a race far less spiritual, far less artistic, but with the genius for law and organization. The Hellenes civilized the world; the Romans organized it. Roman sculpture was almost wholly concerned with men rather than gods, and splendid as was their achievement and noble and august as were many of the sculptured figures, the Romans never achieved the creation of great type forms as did the Greeks. As Pliny observed about his countrymen, there was something "savagely utilitarian" about them. Yet from Roman art was to spring the most spiritual art in the world's history; for Christian art, beginning as the iconography of an obscure, hunted and proscribed religious sect, grew to power and majesty, and for five hundred years dominated the Western world and gave us a heritage of incomparable beauty.

In all human history there is no record so striking as that of the rise of Christianity and the phenomenal rapidity with which it spread its gospel throughout the civilized world. This new religion absorbed much from Greek and Roman thought. Plotinus had spiritualized the intellectual clarity of Socrates and Plato. Now, in turn, Christianity absorbed neo-Platonism; so also it absorbed ideas and symbols from ancient religion, and for a time it is hard to distinguish between an Apollo and a Good Shepherd, or an Orpheus and a David with his harp. In these first years of Christianity there could be no open representational art because of the proscription and the persecution by the Roman state. Hence, in its earliest stages, the truths of the religion were expressed in symbols and allusively.

But by the fourth century the Christian religion had so triumphed that the old religious beliefs were now called "paganism," the religion of the *pagani* or peasants, and Christianity became the official religion of the Roman state. The questioning skepticism of the Greeks, which dethroned their gods, was yet at best a deification of intelligence as the supreme cosmic

power, and some of this Greek spirit was absorbed by the Christians. St. Paul, on Mars' Hill, quoted a Greek author, and the language of Christian ritual was often Greek. Only gradually was the Roman language used, and the clothes of the Roman citizen became the vestments of the priests, as they remain to this day.

But the new religion borrowed little from Roman rationalism. Greek energies were spent on discovering the laws of nature and processes of thought. Roman energy was bent on shaping institutions, on codification and synthesis. So Roman sculpture excels in historical and commemorative portraiture and sometimes their unflinching realism becomes ennobled into a superb "style." The prayer of Socrates for congruity between the outward and the inward man, the doctrine that the soul that shall see most of truth is that of the poet, the artist, or the lover, had no place in the rational Roman mind. Lucretius' long poem, *De Rerum Natura*, is concerned in a detached and scientific way with the ceaseless flux and changes of nature, and it ignores the spiritual forces which were so clear to Socrates. Lucretius' view of nature was of a great encompassing entity, rather than the profounder Greek view of nature as a vast and significant background for the spiritual values of man and his indestructible soul.

This lack of spiritual purpose was fatal to the Roman Empire, and it is noteworthy that after Alaric's sack of Rome in 410 Augustine wrote his *De Civitate Dei* to remind all Christians that there was a heavenly city which could not be attacked, which had no frontiers, but embraced the faithful over all the world. Thus—for Augustine was steeped in Platonism—the City-state of Plato had taken on a wider and more spiritual application to conceptions of society. Theodosius, in the fourth century, proscribed all pagan arts and forbade Christians to study rhetoric or any of the arts; but this attempt at the extirpation of art was of course unsuccessful, artists then, as now, being incorrigible individualists. Three centuries later, the whole European world was rent by the controversy over the use of images, and this led to the scission between the churches of the east and west. The Byzantine Emperor Leo, known as the Iconoclast or Image Breaker, forbade all Christians to use images or religious pictures, but the Pope at Rome refused to acquiesce, and the churchmen were not unanimous on the matter. In A.D. 754, a special council deliberated at Constantinople for six months and unanimously agreed that "all visible symbols of Christ, except the Eucharist, were blasphemous and that image worship was not only a corruption of Christianity but a revival of paganism."

It would seem that a great many Christians had clung to the old idea

of images either representing or associated with the God and his saints; for it was a common gibe of the iconoclasts that Christianity had made more gods than it had destroyed. The quarrel dragged on for about 150 years with no finality and was certainly responsible for the destruction of a great number of statues and religious pictures. It sent sculptors and artists wandering across Europe seeking work in places remote from controversy, and it is probable that some of these craftsmen reached Britain and Ireland and influenced the development of art there. The crosses of Ruthwell and Bewcastle have figure sculpture on them singularly like Byzantine relief sculpture, and from the seventh to the twelfth centuries there was throughout Europe an almost complete absence of free standing sculptured images. Apparently there was less hostility to pictorial representation, and almost all the churches built during those 500 years were decorated not with sculpture but with figures in mosaic—a Roman art of using small glass tesserae set in plaster to depict the outlines of figures. The great figures of the saints and fathers of the church who look down on us today in Ravenna, Constantinople, and Monreale, are majestic, impressive, and virtually indestructible.

Those great angular forms of Athanasius, Ambrose, Augustine, and Chrysostom will forever symbolize the hieratic power of the church and commemorate the labors of those great men who built up the immaterial power which presently became the greatest organization in the Western world—the medieval Church. The outburst of Arab Mohammedan culture, which swept across southern Europe in the seventh and eighth centuries through Genoa, Provence, and Spain, has left a chain of churches almost indistinguishable from fortresses; and, of course, no sculptured representations were permitted, though Arabic scholars greatly influenced literature by their preservation of and commentaries on the writings of the Greek philosophers. So Aristotle and Plato were passed on to the eager and brilliant minds of the twelfth- and thirteenth-century scholars who sought to reconcile the wisdom of the ancient world with the teachings of the medieval Church. These were the precursors of the movement which culminated in the fifteenth century known as the Renaissance.

So, somewhat circuitously and sketchily, we come to the four centuries in which “ecclesiastical sculpture” was being produced in vast and almost unbelievable quantities throughout Europe. Everywhere churches were being built, and the sculptured figures were to be counted in thousands, or even hundreds of thousands. The sculpture produced in Europe from say 1150 to 1550 is sculpture wholly dedicated to the service of the church,

and in those centuries the church was overwhelmingly powerful. The actual building served as a museum, Town Hall, theater, law court and general meeting place for social life, as well as being the focal center of the religious observances of the faith. And the building and furnishing of the church involved vast numbers of craftsmen, lay and clerical. In France alone, in the century from 1170 to 1270, there were built eighty great cathedrals and about five hundred churches. The intellectual awakening of the twelfth century synchronized with the growing skill of builders and sculptors, and this period is closely connected with an awakening consciousness to the fact of beauty in nature. Celtic and Byzantine artists had deliberately turned natural forms into decorative patterns, but in the thirteenth century the sculptors turned with delight toward the representation of every aspect of natural beauty that could be fitly expressed in stone. The close and loving study of flower forms as seen in the vintage capital at Rheims, and in the wonderful chapter house at Southwell, was something quite new in art. Sculpture was, then, in the phrase of the contemporary Dante, "visible speech." Beauty was abroad everywhere. As with Greece, speculative thought of the philosophers had as a correlative the adventurous artists seeking new forms. So now Roger Bacon and Aquinas, in reshaping philosophic ideas, had as counterparts Cimabue, Giotto, Orcagna, and numberless medieval sculptors winning new worlds for art.

A church was a veritable encyclopedia of all knowledge, sacred and secular, natural and supernatural, and people saw this pictured story of colored saints, or listened to the newly composed *Dies Irae*, or the *Stabat Mater*, or watched in the church the mystery plays out of which was born the great gift of drama which culminated in Shakespeare. When, in that thirteenth century, the builders achieved the miracle of a stone-vaulted roof, it was as if they could say, now the edifice is complete, self-contained, supreme. But no equipoise can be maintained in a living organism. It is worth noting the changes which took place in the two most characteristic ecclesiastical subjects for sculptors: the Madonna, and the Christ crucified. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Madonna was usually shown as seated, crowned, and holding the Holy Child forward for the world's adoration. The mother was almost impersonal. The next century substituted a rather regal mother with a high crown and, more commonly, standing and holding the Holy Child on the left arm. This presently gave way to a very human mother holding a very playful baby, just the embodiment of happy human motherhood.

The early Christian church shrank from the representation of Christ

crucified. The doctrine of his sacrifice was symbolically expressed by a lamb at the intersection of the cross. In the seventh century, the Quinisext Council at Constantinople decreed that "The form of the Lamb Christ our Lord be set up in human shape instead of the Lamb formerly used." The early representations of this human Christ show him clothed generally to the feet, and standing in the attitude of a cross, the feet separate, no trace of agony, and sometimes crowned. The long drapery was gradually shortened, and by the end of the thirteenth century the crucifix figure had become almost stereotyped, with feet crossed, head drooping to right, loincloth and wounds indicated. Yet the changes were marked by protests, and a thirteenth-century bishop wrote with horror against "the heretics who in derision carve images of Our Lord with one foot laid over the other," and appealed to "the traditions of the sainted Fathers" against "these diversities and novelties."

Yet this "heretical" type has become the accepted orthodox figure. The loincloth gradually was reduced as sculptors got interested in human anatomy, and wished to show their knowledge, and in the sixteenth century both Cellini and Michelangelo made wholly nude figures of Christ.

The later Gothic sculptors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries carved the personages of sacred history in contemporary costumes, and thus, in a real sense, brought them down to earth. But this innovation led to a loss of the distinction between sacred and secular, and it is noteworthy that it corresponded to the breaking up of the unity of the church and the uniform scheme of society with a common creed, one ritual, and one church, which had characterized medieval life. At the time of the Renaissance and the Reformation, all the contracted circles within which the medieval world had moved were broken, and this disruption led to a new reorientation of life and thought.

In these four centuries of Gothic art, from the eleventh to the fifteenth, all the arts were used in conjunction with architecture and in the service of the Church. Hence Gothic craftsmanship is one of the great collectivist movements of history. Vast groups of men were making art history, working in a living tradition, with certain freedom of individual expression, yet merged in a general unity, which makes Gothic sculpture a strangely homogeneous style wherein two things stand out, the single soul with its individuality, and the unity and universality of belief within the Church which employed them. Continuous work kept the craft traditions alive, and it is significant that the collapse of this workman's art coincided with the challenge to the authority of the Church at the Reformation.

In Italy, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the rediscovery of the ancient world and the attempt to force architecture back to classical forms led to the strange anomaly that, while deriding the medieval worship of saints and relics, men could erect into an authoritative dogma the relics of long past pagan classicism. One result of this was to destroy the workman's tradition and to substitute for it a scholar's knowledge of the past. This, with the closing in northern Europe of many great religious houses and the consequent stopping of all ecclesiastical building and craftsmanship, broke finally and decisively the long tradition of design and workmanship on which Gothic art was based. Actually, the very word "Gothic" was then used contemptuously as meaning "barbarous."

That noble craft tradition has never been recovered. Its loss is part of the price paid for the widened intellectual freedom of the Renaissance. A new sense of life and power was abroad, and there was an increasing assertion of personal and individual liberty, as well as of group power and authority: in parliament, the trade guilds, and the universities, now no longer clerically controlled. The Reformers did not hate or wish to destroy art; the decay of medieval art was a part of the cycle of expanding life. Nor can the art be renewed by any return to the faith of the Middle Ages. Those strange contemporaries, Magellan, Luther, and Michelangelo, had circumscribed the physical and the intellectual world, and printing had given thought wings so that new knowledge and fertilizing ideas were spread abroad. The very word "Mediterranean" was now meaningless, and the voyages into strange seas of thought by philosophers and scientists revealed that the universe did not revolve around the earth. So that, though man was then realizing his own power and potentialities, he was humbled by the sense of his infinitesimal smallness in this new-found heliocentric universe.

From the Renaissance onward, art becomes more and more the product of individual artists, rather than the work of a co-operative group. A greater diversity appears in sculptured figures. The brooding titans of Michelangelo are unlike anything else in the world; and presently in the seventeenth century, with the ardor of the Jesuit revival and the Catholic reaction, the sculpture is charged with the same fervor and violence of gesture as is the rhetoric and denunciations of the leaders of the revival. In many of the Baroque churches, it seems as if the sculptured figures had come alive, and with fluttering draperies had momentarily settled in niches. The impression one gets is of a kind of ecstasy in which art, emotion, propaganda, and rhetoric are all seductively presented. How different is all this from

the awed reverence induced by Chartres, Amiens, or Lincoln and Westminster!

But each age must produce its own art. The attempts in past ages to return to ancient forms have resulted only in desiccated and insincere art, though it may have grace and even beauty. The sculpture of the Saitic revival in Egypt lacks the force and vitality of Old Kingdom sculpture. The Archaistic revival of ancient Greek forms produced nothing which can move us like the Apollo of Olympia, or the Cnidian Demeter. When medieval sculpture is actually copied into a modern church, no matter how faithfully, the result is only an echo. The eighteenth century tried to re-echo Roman Classicism, but Canova and Thorwaldsen's sculpture cannot touch the heart. Statues, whether ecclesiastical or secular, must have emotion charged into them by the artist before it can be reawakened in the spectator.

Today it would seem that almost all the traditions of past art have been repudiated and the result is, too often, a series of abstract symbols, arbitrarily chosen and arranged into a pattern. The artist, having made the picture or sculpture visually unintelligible, then tries to convey his meaning by resounding and descriptive titles. But it should be remembered that the forms, colors, sounds, and words used as the language of the arts do not come to us from a celestial vacuum, but are charged with meaning due to a long heritage of association; they are part of the blood stream of our culture, symbols of concentrated race experience, and to ignore this is to forego the power of communicability, that vital necessity of any great and moving art. For art must be something more than the adoption of this or that decorative style or formula. It is, and must always be, the giving of form to feeling; and the feeling must be true and from the heart.

To look with quiet understanding at the Demeter in the British Museum should give us a responsive feeling; one may well feel before her, as Meredith before his Mother Earth,

Into the breast that gives the rose
Shall I, with shuddering, fall?

The medieval poets were appropriately called "Trouveurs" or finders, and the artists also were seekers and finders. Every artist is on a voyage of discovery; to see and record new beauties in his work in life, and the ardors and endurances of the artistic life are precisely what makes it the best life to be lived. An esthete is "one who perceives." An artist perceives, then is able to give form or color to his perceptions, and thus to pass them on into the heritage of beauty in the visible world.

I have tried to trace the development of the sculptor's art through the ages as if it were, as indeed I believe it to be, a record and a revelation of the Holy Spirit working in the mind of man. Long ago a certain wise man wrote of the relation of the artist as man to God as Spirit:

God himself the Father and Fashioner of all that is, older than the Sun or the Sky, greater than time and eternity, is unnameable by any lawgiver, unutterable by any voice, not to be seen by any eye.

But we, being unable to apprehend his essence use the help of sounds and names and pictures, of beaten gold, and ivory and silver, yearning for the knowledge of him, and in our weakness naming all that is beautiful in the world after him, just as happens to earthly lovers. To them the most beautiful sight will be the actual lineaments of the beloved, but for remembrance's sake they will be happy in the sight of a lyre, a little spear, a chair, perhaps, or anything in the world that wakens the memory of the Beloved. Why should I further examine and pass judgment about images? Let men know what is divine; let them know, that is all. If a Greek is stirred to the remembrance of God by the art of Phidias, an Egyptian by paying worship to animals, another man by a river, or by fire, I have no anger for their divergencies; only let them know, let them love, let them remember.

These noble words of Maximus of Tyre are the key to the spiritual power behind all works of art, and the reason why they can move us today, after seventeen centuries, is that they are charged with the imperishable but ever-changing quality of Beauty.

Individual Freedom and Economic Planning

HARVEY SEIFERT

“PLANNED ECONOMIES,” says Stuart Chase, “are coming so fast you can hear the wind whistling around their edges.”¹ Even though the velocity of their approach may not be quite as cyclonic as this analogy suggests, nevertheless Chase’s popularization describes a widespread trend. The growth of government controls in our own country has been more than matched by the development of socialist institutions in other lands. In fact, one observer has referred to “our harassed State Department officials, who are trying to ride a capitalistic horse in a predominantly Socialist circus.”²

This prevailing trend toward comprehensive economic planning raises serious problems for those who are concerned with religious values, especially at the point of individual liberty. Our contemporary dilemma has frequently been phrased as involving a choice between freedom and security. Large sections of the world’s population have become convinced that it is impossible to relieve their intolerable burden of poverty and insecurity and at the same time to preserve traditional liberties. Facing the twin fears of “oppression and depression,” they have preferred to accept a measure, at least, of tyranny for the sake of a greater degree of justice or prosperity. Others of our contemporaries stoutly maintain that the surrender of liberty is too great a price to pay for such mundane blessings.

Is our plight accurately described by this dichotomy, or is it possible to gain “all this and heaven too,” preserving both liberty and security? If it should be true, as numerous social scientists feel that it is, that wisely chosen forms of economic planning can contribute toward the stabilization and progress of an economy, what is the relationship between such planning for security and the preservation of individual freedom?

¹ *The Road We Are Traveling*. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942, pp. 58-59.

² Horace Gray, quoted in Herbert Heaton and Alvin Johnson, “Socialism in Western Europe.” *Headline Series*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, September 20, 1948, p. 7.

HARVEY SEIFERT, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, the School of Religion, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California. He finds that it is not impossible, rather it is necessary, to provide both for freedom and for security.

I

Before facing these crucial questions more directly, further definition and analysis of the concepts of freedom and of planning are in order. Freedom has both a negative and a positive aspect. It involves both the absence of external restraint and the presence of opportunity. The fullest freedom requires both that individual choice be uncoerced and that the means be available for attaining one's chosen ends. One must both have the right to spend his money as he wishes, and he must have money to spend. While both these aspects are important, it is the negative form of freedom which is most seriously threatened by economic planning. What is the effect of such planning on the right of the individual to make choices which are uncoerced by external human restraint?

In this sense, freedom is a Christian criterion to be used in judging any social order. Moral autonomy requires that man be allowed to act in accord only with those principles which he has voluntarily accepted. As the Amsterdam Assembly put it, "Man is created and called to be a free being, responsible to God and his neighbour. Any tendencies in State and society depriving man of the possibility of acting responsibly are a denial of God's intention for man and His work of salvation."³

To be sure, this is not an unqualified right. The freedom of any individual may be limited by the similar right of others. Nor is liberty the only purpose of organized society. Rather, it is only one of a system of values to be realized through social organization. On occasion, freedom may need to be limited if other important ends are to be achieved. Yet any social system ought to grant the maximum amount of freedom consistent with the preservation of other values. While it does not necessarily follow that the government is best which governs least, it is proper to say that, all other things being equal, that social system is best which coerces the least.

To turn to the other basic concept involved in this discussion, planning may be defined as the conscious determination of economic policy by responsible public authority. Several implications of this definition may be noted. For one thing, planning is a systematic, deliberate process, involving the determination of objectives, the gathering of data, the discovery of alternative solutions, choice of a policy, and the detailed execution of the chosen alternative. In the second place, by requiring that planning be responsible, it is intended to confine discussion to democratic forms, in which the planners are through constitutional processes amenable to the

³ *Man's Disorder and God's Design*. Harper & Brothers, Volume III, p. 192.

people. Totalitarian plans, whether outlined by Communist or Fascist powers, are in sharp contrast at this point. Under totalitarian planning the goals set are those of the dictator party, and the administrators are effectively responsible to only a minority of the people. Whether or not planning can avoid totalitarianism and remain democratic will be discussed in greater detail later.

The requirement that planning be done by public authority, i.e., by bodies related to government, eliminates from the present discussion various proposals for self-planning by industry. The proposed definition would, however, still allow great differences in the degree or comprehensiveness of planning. Government action might be merely regulatory, defining the framework within which private economic enterprise is to operate, as for example, through tariffs, minimum wage laws, taxation policy, or the interest rate of a central bank. Or, planning at the other extreme might include direct co-ordinated management of socially owned productive enterprise. In other words, planning as here defined is not necessarily synonymous with socialism; considerable measures of it can be, and have been, adopted in a capitalist society. In either case, the issue with respect to freedom is similar: both forms of planning involve the encroachment of government policy, to a greater or lesser extent, on economic enterprise.

An evaluation of the consequences of planning to liberty becomes realistic only in comparison with the possible alternative procedures for realizing both freedom and efficiency in economic life. Social choices seldom allow us the simplicity of selection between perfection and perdition. The man of Christian insight is not surprised to find that all contemporary proposals fall short of the perfect will of God. The question is not whether democratic planning will guarantee unrestricted liberty, but rather whether it will allow more or less freedom than the available alternatives. Two such alternatives to planning must be considered. These two roads, worn smooth by the traffic of the centuries, are still the highways frequently recommended by those who would lead us to maximum liberty.

II

The first of these is the way of paternalistic domination. According to this theory, if control is placed in the hands of men of superior wisdom, their policy will coincide with the real interests of men more nearly than would their own imperfect decisions. Men are more free, it is said, if their decisions are made for them by leaders who know their subjects' desires better than these subjects do themselves.

This creed of benevolent despotism is part of the justification advanced by totalitarian planners for their procedures. Insofar as Fascist thinkers worked out a systematic political philosophy, this theory was included. The individual, under fascism, by losing himself in the totalitarian state, would come to the fullest self-realization, because the ends of the state, as defined by the party in power, were held to be identical with the "legitimate" wills of individuals, whether or not they recognized that fact. A similar element appears in Communist ideology as part of that strange reversal of the concept of liberty which enrages many Americans today. Lenin maintained that "proletarian democracy is a million times more democratic than the most democratic regime in a bourgeois republic."⁴ For the Communist, the dictatorship of the proletariat seems to allow more freedom than does capitalist democracy, not only because of the numerical superiority of the working class, but also because the vanguard of the proletariat, the revolutionary party, is thought to express the true interests of the toiling masses.

A similar logic characterizes the thinking of important groups which are more respectable in the eyes of the American people. For example, the element of authoritarian decision in the best interests of those being led enters into the Roman Catholic doctrine of freedom for truth, but suppression of error. Or, again, many an American industrialist, as he made his paternalistic and autocratic grants to his workers, has thought of himself as acting in their genuine best interests. Without recognizing the strange bedfellows with whom we thereby place ourselves, many among us would argue that basic economic policy ought to be determined by the experts, or by those who have a sizeable property stake in the present order. By assuming the responsibility of such decision, it is contended, these select few actually expand the area of effective freedom for the recipients of the benefits of their wisdom or concern.

While enough has been said to indicate that the attempt to realize liberty through paternalistic domination is still an exceedingly popular prescription, from a theoretical standpoint this ideology can be quickly dismissed. Any procedure which in the name of freedom denies the right of participation in decision is a contradiction in terms. To withhold part of a worker's wages for employer-sponsored bowling alleys and swimming pools may contribute to the health of workers, but not to their freedom of consumers' choice. Unilateral decision denies the autonomy of those

⁴ Nicolai Lenin, *The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade*. London: Modern Books, 1929, p. 36.

on whom it is imposed. This attempted short cut to freedom is a dead-end street. The crucial theoretical issue of our times is between planning and the next road to be described.

III

A second proposed path to freedom might be called anarchic individualism, or allowing every man to do that which is right in his own eyes without external social restraint. At first sight, it would appear to be obvious that such removal of coercion would guarantee maximum liberty. This extreme atomism commended itself to the political thinking of Godwin and Kropotkin. In international relations, the anarchist approach has been accepted as the doctrine of unrestricted national sovereignty. Its economic elaboration is to be found in the *laissez-faire* theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, or of their modern disciples, who may modify the theory in some details but nevertheless retain its essential features.

In its economic aspects, this theory asserts that as each man acts in accord with his own interests, the actions of all are transmuted "by an invisible hand" into the welfare of the whole. The multiplied choices of many men, so long as there is no interference from outside an autonomous economic order, effectively determine economic policy, producing a constant adjustment between supply and demand, consumption and investment, wages and employment. Every consumer is king, for the allocation of his purchasing power is the casting of a ballot which through the automatic operation of a free market effectively controls the production of goods in accordance with his wishes. Freedom, justice, and the greatest possible security are all simultaneously preserved through the operation of such natural laws.

While the attempt to practice this theory has led to a number of important gains in liberty for both consumers and producers, the promise of extreme individualism to produce the maximum freedom for society as a whole has not been redeemed. Instead, the attempt to secure maximum freedom through the processes of anarchy has tended to result in a form of autocracy, or rule of the few. This is most strikingly evident in the growing concentration of control and the tendency toward monopoly in economic life. When, as in 1933, one tenth of one per cent of American corporations owned 53.2 per cent of all corporate assets, or as in 1945, 1.7 per cent of farm operators controlled 40 per cent of our total farmland, economic policy is determined not through universal participation but by the decisions of a decided minority. The continuous referendum in which Ludwig von Mises felt consumers participated through the allocation of

their purchasing power tends to become merely an opportunity to vote "yes" or "yes." The "voters" do not choose the candidates, their action is manipulated through costly advertising, and all men do not have an equal franchise. Voting power is weighted in favor of the wealthy, while the wants of the poor are underrepresented. While this is to be understood as a trend rather than as a universally realized actuality, the control of supply exercised by monopoly fixes economic priorities only roughly in accord with consumers' demand and more precisely at the point of maximum profit to the monopolist.⁵

Attempted anarchy produces a situation in which justice becomes identified with the self-interest of the stronger. In the frontier village, before the advent of "law and order," the political form of *laissez faire* quickly became the rule of those who could most effectively use their "shooting irons." So on the economic scene there develops domination by those who are most efficient, or most unscrupulous, or most fortunate. Even the *mores* and laws of our society tend to become disproportionately influenced by the economically successful class. A number of competent students are seriously questioning whether a continued concentration of economic control may not foreshadow a surrender of many of the political freedoms which we now possess.⁶

Whatever its ultimate consequences may be, it ought to be noted that the trend toward consolidation is a natural product of the activities of acquisitive men in a competitive order. The successful will replace small barns with larger, while the unsuccessful have their mortgages foreclosed. Particularly is this true when our present technology exerts a pressure toward bigness. Because of the investments of capital required for modern machines, owners seek protection from competitive risks. Large-scale enterprise, being frequently more efficient, has a competitive advantage. As Carr has observed, "What is commonly referred to as 'individual enterprise' has been destroyed not, as its advocates sometimes pretend, by 'socialism' or by the interference of grandmotherly governments but by the innate trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly."⁷ The attempt at "trust busting," or "planning for competition," is always therefore difficult, and over a considerable sector of industry it has become increasingly a lost cause.

In theoretical terms, the attempt to perpetuate anarchy actually re-

⁵ For a good discussion of this important point, see Herman Finer, *Road to Reaction*. Little Brown, 1945, p. 162.

⁶ See, for example, Robert A. Brady, *Business as a System of Power*. Columbia University Press, 1943.

⁷ Edward H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace*. The Macmillan Company, 1942, p. 73.

sults in autocracy so long as the motivations of men remain incompletely socialized. Spencer pointed out that "government might be dispensed with, were the world peopled with the unselfish, the conscientious, the philanthropic." So long, however, as there remain men who are self-regarding or unscrupulous, they imperil the liberty of others, unless they are restrained by law. Justice is not an automatic consequence of liberty. Except among completely intelligent, informed, and socialized individuals, the attempt to maintain freedom through unregulated anarchy is self-defeating. The *laissez-faire* or "free enterprise" approach to economic liberty denies the end it seeks through the means it adopts.

Having discovered important limitations in the alternatives of paternalistic domination and of anarchic individualism, there is yet one remaining road to maximum freedom to be explored. This is the path of democracy, which may be defined as a system characterized by practically universal franchise, free discussion, and majority control. Democracy aims to give every man equal participation in the formulation of social policy, and to restrain only those minorities who are considered by the majority to be dangerously antisocial. While democracy therefore still involves the coercion of minorities, it is a method for guaranteeing the maximum freedom possible while men still remain imperfectly righteous and intelligent. In such a world some restraint is a necessity. The liberty of one is conditioned by the liberty of others. The maximum possible freedom is achieved, however, not as minorities coerce majorities, but rather as majorities, within a framework of civil liberties and law, coerce minorities. This "equal freedom in a common life," to use a phrase of Hobhouse, is "the simple meaning of democracy."⁸

IV

The idea that the democratic state is necessarily the foe of the individual is a fallacious anarchist notion. Democratic state action, extended into areas previously controlled autocratically by minorities, actually may become the guarantee of a fuller measure of liberty. This principle is widely accepted when illustrated by the advent of "law and order" to the anarchic frontier community. The principle is becoming more widely accepted as it applies to the establishment of world government in place of anarchic national sovereignty. There is, however, a strange "stop" in our minds, which hinders our acceptance of the same principle as it applies

⁸ Leonard T. Hobhouse, *Elements of Social Justice*. Henry Holt & Co., 1922, p. 218.

to the extension of economic democracy, or social planning, to replace the *laissez-faire* type of anarchy.

It is necessary, therefore, to examine the chief arguments of those who fear that an extension of democratic control in economic life would lead to increased regimentation rather than to greater freedom.

Some, like Hayek,⁹ argue that because of the multiplicity of possible choices, it is impossible for a society to agree upon economic ends. The attempt to plan, therefore, would require the arbitrary choice of a goal desired by one minority and its imposition upon all other minorities. Planning, therefore, it is argued, would lead to dictatorship, as the most effective instrument for such coercion. Or, to put the argument in a slightly different form, no group will abandon its plan. When its proposed goals meet difficulty or opposition, it will seek new powers to deal with the new hindrances before it will consent to an alteration of the plan.

This argument overlooks the possibilities of planning for variety, as we do, for example, in public recreational facilities. Co-ordination does not necessarily mean uniformity or *Gleichschaltung*; it may also mean the harmonization of a rich diversity.¹⁰ The chief objection to the theory just presented, however, is to be found in its implications for political life. If it is impossible to agree upon economic ends, so must it also be impossible to agree upon complex political ends. Democracy, therefore, becomes an illusion; the only form of government possible becomes the arbitrary dictatorship of one minority over all others. This, however, contradicts the data of political experience. While adjustments are not always immediate or perfect, we are constantly arriving at a reasonable consensus of opinion on exceedingly complex political issues.

A second argument to support the thesis that democratic economic planning is impossible, is the assertion that comprehensive planning necessitates holding certain variables constant—notably consumers' demand and the mobility of the labor force. This involves technical economic questions which are beyond the scope of this discussion. Suffice it here to say that there are good reasons for maintaining that, while a democratically adopted plan might ration commodities and draft workers, such measures are not necessarily inherent in effective planning. Past experience or current consumers' demand might be made the basis for production goals, and workers might be attracted to understaffed industries by the lure of in-

⁹ Friedrich A. Hayek, *Road to Serfdom*. University of Chicago Press, 1944, pp. 56-79.

¹⁰ On this point see Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948, pp. 262-263.

creased wage rates. While the details of this may be left to professional economists, the matter becomes important here because it suggests that certain safeguards to democratic planning might become desirable. Some of these will be referred to later.

A third, and perhaps the most serious, objection to the possibilities of maintaining democratic freedom in a planned economy grows out of the fear of unduly concentrating power. As the area to be controlled becomes more inclusive and more complex, it is argued, the controlling agency becomes less responsive to the desires of those whom it affects. In reply to the argument that the state is not "wholly other," set over against its citizens, but rather it is in a democracy the servant of its citizens, Hutchinson writes, "As a state grows in size and complexity, it escapes more and more from any genuine democratic controls. As its administrative bureaucracy proliferates, the process of administration takes on more and more a life of its own, with its own vested interests, which sets it off by itself, apart from the citizens, indeed over the citizens."¹¹

Furthermore, it is argued, planning would consolidate both economic and political power in a single agency. This would eliminate one of the important checks and balances of a pluralistic society. Many are alarmed at the prospect of centralized economic power backed by the sovereign power of the state. Political authorities might then deny employment to any objecting citizen, dooming him to slow starvation. Such a combination of powers, it is feared, could give the state totalitarian control over its citizens.

Several observations may be made in reply to this position. Much of what has preceded is an argument against large-scale organization as such. It is an argument for an extreme form of decentralism which opposes both traditional capitalism and extensions of social control. However, such an extreme decentralism is open to grave objections. As the area of interaction in a society is enlarged, the complexity of its organization must inevitably be increased. This is evident both in the multiplication of vice-presidents on a large railway system and in the increasing number of employees of the welfare state. In the former case we commonly call the process "efficiency" and "system"; in the latter case we refer to it as "bureaucracy" or "red tape." As long as we desire increasing services, co-ordinated over larger areas, so long will centralized decisions remain inevitable. Those who fear bigness must also be prepared to surrender

¹¹ Paul Hutchinson, *The New Leviathan*. Willett, Clark & Co., 1946, p. 223.

regular access to the musical compositions of the Russians and the medical discoveries of the Japanese, attendance at professional conferences, and salt for their food. If values such as those just illustrated are to be maintained, rights of self-determination must, to a certain extent, be surrendered for the sake of co-operation with established forms of procedure. If we insist upon using automobiles, some authority must decide on which side of the road we are to drive; if we insist upon driving these cars to Alaska, some international authority must be available to co-ordinate the road systems of nations. Stuart Chase has well put the matter. "It is not misguided men who fasten these controls upon us; it is the imperative of the power age. . . . *Plan, or retreat to a handicraft culture, like that of pre-war India or China.* To my mind the choice is as simple as that."¹²

V

The basic question is: Who shall determine the forms of procedure for organized interaction? At this point the issue is commonly misstated. As we have pointed out, it is not a matter of centralized versus decentralized decisions. Our choice is rather between responsible centralization and irresponsible centralization. Basic economic decisions are already being made by concentrations of power. These monopolistic combines are not, however, effectively controlled by nor responsible to the people. They involve centralized control of centralized decision. Exponents of planning insist that by making comprehensive authority democratically responsible to all citizens, sovereignty would be effectively dispersed and the evils of concentrated power would be sufficiently limited by decentralized control over centralized decision.¹³

In addition to such theoretical considerations, it is possible to appeal to the argument of experience. We have, as a matter of fact, planned democratically over an increasingly comprehensive area. Laws covering social security, wages and hours, conservation, or tariffs illustrate the regulatory type of planning. School systems, road networks, or publicly owned utilities illustrate the possibilities in public management. To maintain that it is necessary to avoid planning if we are to preserve freedom is to argue that we must abolish all of these services. Why is rent control any more oppressive than public education? Why should government management of coal mines be more totalitarian than government management of water

¹² Stuart Chase, *Men at Work*. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1945, p. 5.

¹³ It might also be noted that there are still powerful checks and balances available to combined economic and political power, as between executive, legislative, and judicial branches; federal, state, and local authorities; or functional representatives of producers, consumers, and citizens.

or power companies? As Lauterbach has pointed out, "In exerting a broad control over productive, distributive, or financial activities, organized society *per se* need not be any more dictatorial than it is in setting up traffic signals, in building flood-preventing dams, or in trying to keep epidemics in check."¹⁴

There are, however, three requirements to be met if maximum freedom is to be realized in a planned economy. Planning, while it is not an alternative to be feared, is nevertheless a possibility to be guided. For one thing, we have assumed that it will be carried on within the framework of political democracy. Planning becomes a menace to freedom when it goes beyond consent. Free discussion and elections, and the other provisions of our Bill of Rights must be maintained. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty in any social institution yet devised by man.

In the second place, it is desirable that decision as well as control be decentralized as much as may be compatible with majority determination of basic policy. The London *Economist* recently observed, "The state should seek its ends by trying to influence the economic weather, not by trying to ration raindrops. . . . To centralize decisions on matters of detail is to choke the system with paper and the citizen with frustrated rage."¹⁵ Matters of purely local concern should be settled on the local level; issues affecting only particular functional groups should be decided by those groups. The Tennessee Valley Authority illustrates the possibilities here.¹⁶ Increased participation through trade unions, co-operative societies, professional associations, and educational or cultural organizations might contribute to the same end. All of these contribute to those "centres of initiative in economic life" which the Amsterdam Assembly felt to be necessary in order "to avoid placing too great a burden upon centralised judgment and decision," and to "escape the perils of tyranny while avoiding the dangers of anarchy."¹⁷

A third consideration, already suggested in our earlier discussion, is that an extension of the economic functions of government might well lead to appropriate constitutional provisions analogous to the first ten amendments. Our national Constitution defines certain basic policies considered by the people to be of such importance that they are not to be lightly

¹⁴ Albert T. Lauterbach, *Economic Security and Individual Freedom*. Cornell University Press, 1948, p. 87.

¹⁵ Quoted in *The Christian Century*, 64:1605, December 31, 1947.

¹⁶ See David E. Lilienthal, *TVA—Democracy on the March*. Harper & Brothers, 1944.

¹⁷ *Man's Disorder and God's Design*, Volume III, p. 192. See also the stimulating essay by J. H. Oldham in the same volume, especially pp. 127-130.

repealed by a mere majority, acting perhaps on the impulse of the moment. At least two economic freedoms, those of consumers' choice and vocational choice, ought to become part of the framework within which, except in cases of grave national emergency, planning takes place.¹⁸

Providing that such conditions are met, economic planning, instead of restricting individual freedom, can actually expand the area of uncoerced action. In a society in which the motivations of men are incompletely socialized, the attempt to secure maximum freedom through *laissez-faire* or anarchic procedures has led to such concentrations of autocratic power that increasing measures of democratic planning are a necessary guarantee of liberty. It is through the democratization of economic decision that we must now escape the extremes of individualism and collectivism, of tyranny and anarchy, of atomism and organicism. Assuming that such extensions of democratic planning could relieve the most glaring deficiencies of our present economy—a conclusion which another article might support—there is now no such rigid dichotomy between freedom and security as many have supposed. Both values may be achieved in greater measure by the wise utilization of democratic planning. The personality-stunting evils of poverty and depression are no longer defensible as either acts of God or as the necessary price of liberty. Rather must they be attributed to the ethical and sociological immaturity of men.

¹⁸ Additional provisions, guaranteeing freedom of scientific enquiry, freedom of access to the means of mass communication, and freedom for objecting minorities to work and to buy as well as to speak, might be considered.

An Approach to Preaching Through Classical Rhetoric

THOMAS H. MARSH

PREACHING CAN BE ANALYZED more objectively when it is viewed as a part of the wider field of public address. This is true because preaching is inherently one of several specialized types of public speaking and, furthermore, it is at least in part the result of much that has been taught in this larger area. This article, therefore, opens a discussion on the philosophies of four major schools of classical rhetorical thought, and will indicate how preaching is concerned with some of the same principles.

If one sets out today to answer the question, "Just what is a good public address?" he would benefit by knowing, first of all, what the measuring rods of the past have been. Historically speaking, there are four major philosophies which have been the guideposts in measuring the effectiveness of a public address. It should be made clear that no attempt to explain the complete systems of ancient rhetoricians is intended here. Only the core of their philosophies for judging speeches is presented, and even this, it should be understood, is greatly simplified for the purpose at hand. The earliest of these philosophies may well be called the philosophy of results.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RESULTS

This philosophy of public speaking was promoted by the early Greek rhetoricians, known as the Sophists, who held that the result is all that really matters. It is easier to win a decision if the truth is on your side, and you can state the case as it is; it is less difficult to win a law case if the evidence points in your favor, and it is unnecessary to lie and twist evidence; but these things are of secondary importance. The way to judge whether a speech is good or poor is to judge it by the decision. Use any method available in order to win a decision, but, above all, the decision must be won. "If you cannot *twist the law around*, point out that it cannot mean anything but what you say it means," wrote the early Greek Sophists in *De Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum*. This early manuscript gives a fairly complete exposition of the sophistic system for training a man in public address.

THOMAS H. MARSH, B.D., Ph.D., is Professor of Speech at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. He approaches preaching from the rather unusual angle of the canons of ancient rhetorical schools.

The dangers of such a philosophy become immediately evident, for it represents "indifference to truth, aversion to all patient, sincere research, great fondness for the jingle of words, anxiety for persuasion rather than knowledge"¹ One can recognize why this emphasis was taught by the Sophists when it is remembered that the early art of rhetoric was developed partly as a result of the demand for speakers who could win decisions in law courts. Citizens whose homes and other property had been taken from them by revolutionary armies were not capable of arguing their own cases in court when order was again restored, but their primary interest was in getting control of their property again. On the other hand, individuals who had illegally gained possession of a valuable piece of property were not going to give it up if they could help it. Hence there was, in this early system of training, an emphasis on winning decisions in any way possible. This rhetorical philosophy, of course, sprang in part from the general social mores of the day.

If one could only say that, of course, the "results" philosophy of speaking is not a part of our American public life today, the whole idea could well be forgotten. However, anyone familiar with court decisions and political maneuvers must admit that such a philosophy is still very much in our midst. When a political candidate promises to cut taxes on the one hand and increase expenditures for the public good on the other, he cannot have any intention of carrying out his promises, but he also knows that such extravagant statements get votes; so, election after election, such contradictory promises are made. It was the exception of the century, one which drew attention all over the world, when a man stood before a group of people and said, "I have nothing to offer you but blood, sweat, and tears."

In direct opposition to the early Sophist "results" philosophy, Plato directed an attack which may be called the "truth" philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRUTH

Plato was violently opposed to anything sophistic in nature. He held that a speaker's real judgment comes from a mind higher than the mind of man, and that this higher mind passes judgment on the basis of truth. Therefore, taught Plato, a man must be able to judge between what is good and what is evil and must always be willing to choose the good. Being able to convince an audience or to win a decision in court is no sign of possessing real power, for while it is true that these abilities give the

¹ Lester Thonsen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism*, p. 36.

for
ch,
an
ght
was
win
had
ng
ary
nd,
of
ere
in
art
of
de
ns
ery
on
er,
so
on,
n-
pe-
d,
to
ld
nd
h.
is
d.
gn
ne

appearance of power, real power comes only from a knowledge of truth. It is not even necessary for a speaker to know the truth in order to win his case, said Plato; the power that comes to a speaker from the winning of decisions is therefore merely an appearance. In the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*,² both of which Plato wrote in an attempt to defeat the prevailing philosophy of the Sophists, he gave to the world his own philosophy of truth.

The weakness of the philosophy of this great thinker was one which has invaded the thinking of many an intellectual; Plato had only contempt for the common man. The masses, he was sure, could not possibly know anything about truth, therefore they should be throttled and told what to do. Only the philosopher, who had spent his life in study, was capable of knowing what was true and what was false. The fact that a workingman might know a fragment of truth about life that an intellectual could not be aware of never occurred to Plato. Is it any wonder that the Sophists gained converts to their philosophy, while Plato became embittered because the whole world was so stupid and so uninterested in learning the "truth" from him?

A third philosophy of public speaking found in ancient rhetoric concerns itself mainly with a high moral purpose, and may be described as the ethical philosophy.

THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

This philosophy is supported by Quintilian in his *Institutes of Oratory*,³ a four-volume work which outlines in twelve books the education necessary for the proper training of an orator. Quintilian pointed out that a speaker with the truth on his side is most likely to win, and that it is important for a speaker to try to find out the truth of the matter when he is to make a speech. However, even though a speaker should know the truth, it is not always necessary that he defend it. In fact, there are times, he believed, when a speaker should misrepresent facts or even tell lies, if he has a high ethical purpose in so doing. "If any of my readers are surprised at my making such a statement," said Quintilian, "I would have him reflect that there are many things which are made honorable or the reverse, not by the nature of the facts, but by the causes from which they spring." He explained further: "Judges are not always enlightened and often have to be tricked to prevent them from falling into error," and then, "there are

² See both of these works with an introduction and translation by Lane Cooper, Oxford University Press, 1938.

³ Translated by H. E. Butler. From the Loeb Classical Library. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921.

occasions when the public interest demands that he (the orator) defend what is untrue."

Quintilian defined an orator in the words of Marcus Cato, "a good man trained in speaking," and believed a man to be good when he had a high ethical purpose for what he did, and when he worked for what he believed to be the public welfare.

Does a high ethical purpose justify a procedure which uses low ethical standards in an attempt to attain the high purpose? This is a question few ministers can avoid meeting several times during their careers.

A fourth philosophy of public speaking taught by the ancients is that of Aristotle, which he sets forth in his *Rhetoric*.⁴

THE METHOD PHILOSOPHY

The core of Aristotle's philosophy of public speaking is found in his interpretation of the importance of method. The important thing was that a speaker should always "use all of the available means of persuasion." In other words, Aristotle believed a speaker should use every means at his disposal in his particular situation, then not worry about the decision. However, decisions were important, and any speaker who lost a decision when he had truth on his side, Aristotle felt, needed training in public speaking; he just did not know the proper method for overcoming falsehood with truth. As he put it: "When decisions are not made as they should be, the speaker with right on his side has only himself to thank for the outcome. His neglect of the art (of public speaking) needs correction."

From sophistic tradition, then, comes the idea that a public address should be judged by looking only at the results. Also from Greek culture is Plato's opposing idea that results are not a test for effective speaking, but rather, truth is the only basis for judgment.

From Roman rhetoricians, particularly Cicero in his *De Oratore*,⁵ but more specifically from Quintilian in his *Institutes of Oratory*, emerges the philosophy that an address should be judged by the intent of the speaker.

Finally, from Greek culture again, Aristotle presents the belief that method is the basis for judging a public address.

As a means of illustrating the basic differences in these four philosophies for judging a public address, someone has suggested what each would mean if it were used as a measure for the success of a medical operation. Says the doctor who believes in the "results" philosophy, if the

⁴ *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, translated by Lane Cooper. D. Appleton-Century Company, 1932.

⁵ Translation by E. W. Sutton. From the Loeb Classical Library. Harvard University Press, 1942.

patient gets well and goes on about his work, the operation is a successful one. It makes no difference to this doctor that he had to use a rusty pocket knife and had no antiseptic available, the patient is alive, therefore the operation is a success.

A surgeon who believes in Plato's "truth" theory would probably never get around to operating, because he must know all there is to know about operations before he would have a right to operate.

A surgeon who follows Quintilian's teaching could be considered successful if his intentions are good, no matter what the outcome.

A surgeon believing as Aristotle did would say there is only one correct way to operate, and if this method is followed in every detail the operation is a success. The patient is likely to live when the correct method is used, but even if he dies, the operation is still successful.

Is a sermon a good sermon if it gets results? A minister may use clever devices such as public pressures and class prejudice in order to raise a certain amount of money. His membership may leave the church grumbling or even cursing, but the preacher raises the money. Was his sermon a good one? Or, the minister takes a biblical phrase out of its context and says it means exactly what it doesn't mean in its proper context. He gets someone to join the church because of that sermon. Was it a good sermon even though the minister was proclaiming an untruth? If we believe in the "results" philosophy, both of these sermons should be approved.

A good sermon is one that contains "truth," says the preacher who believes in Plato. This sermon may make the congregation angry, reasons the preacher, for it is the truth that hurts; nevertheless, I'm going to give it to them whether they like it or not. Is a sermon that contains "truth," regardless of the method used in presenting the truth, sufficient?

Is a sermon a good one if the preacher has good intentions? Perhaps the minister gives a nonsensical interpretation to Scripture, and out of disgust for the preacher's ignorance, an individual vows he will never go inside a church again. The minister had the best of intentions; was his sermon good? Quintilian would have answered yes, forgetting for the moment that hell itself is paved with good intentions.

If a preacher uses "all of the available means of persuasion," even though he does not accomplish his purpose, his sermon may still be considered a success according to Aristotle's philosophy, for there may be times when the "means of persuasion" available are insufficient for the purpose. Jesus told his disciples to do their best, then shake the dust of a town from their feet if the people refused to harken to the good news.

AUGUSTINE AND PUBLIC ADDRESS

More than any other early Christian, St. Augustine represents an understanding of the tie-up between the principles of classical rhetoric and the art of preaching. Augustine recognized this potential kinship because of his thorough acquaintance with the whole field of classical rhetoric. His education was in rhetoric, and for twelve years he was a teacher in this field. Augustine had a private school of his own, and later secured a professorship in rhetoric at the State University at Milan.

After Augustine's conversion, and following his appointment as bishop of Hippo, he established a monastery for the training of ministers. Augustine set down his ideas about homiletics for his students in a work titled *De Doctrina Christiana*,⁶ which he completed during the year 397. Of this work Augustine wrote in his *Retractations*, "I completed the work in four books. The first three of these help to an understanding of the Scriptures, while the fourth instructs us how to present the facts which we have comprehended."⁷

Father Gavigan points out in the Introduction of his translation that Book 4 "is substantially a manual of homiletics."⁸

In Chapter 1 of Book 4, Augustine wants it made clear that he does not intend to present in this work "the rhetorical rules which I have learned and taught in the secular schools . . . not because they have no utility, but because they must be learned somewhere else."⁹ After making the above statement, Augustine immediately launches into an application of classical rhetorical principles to preaching. His indebtedness to the classical rhetoricians is so obvious that numerous Latin scholars have cited parallel statements from the ancients which match Augustine's teaching throughout Book 4. As Father Gavigan states: "Had the rhetorical writings of Cicero . . . and Quintilian been lost—to mention only a few of the pagan authors upon whom St. Augustine certainly or probably drew—a large part of their doctrinal content could be recovered from Book 4 of *De Doctrina Christiana*."¹⁰ As proof of this statement, 107 parallel statements from Cicero are noted; eleven statements from *Ad Herenium* are pointed out, and thirty-five parallel statements from Quintilian are indicated by the translator.

⁶ Translated by John J. Gavigan. New York: Cima Publishing Co., 1947.

⁷ *Retractations*. 2. 4. 30.

⁸ *De Doctrina Christiana*, p. 6.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6. See also especially *De Doctrina Christiana*, liber quartus, Patristic studies number 23 of the Catholic University by Sister M. Therese Sullivan.

In Chapter 2, Augustine makes a pointed plea for ministers to study the art of persuasion. He writes a paragraph which concludes with a question that is difficult for a minister to answer if he has neglected this art.

Since persuasion both to truths and falsehoods is urged by means of the art of rhetoric, who would venture to say that truth, in the person of its defenders, ought to stand its ground, unarmed, against falsehood, so that those who are trying to convince us of falsehoods should know how to induce their listeners to be favorably inclined, attentive, and docile, by means of their preface, while the defenders of truth do not know how to do this? Should the former proclaim their falsehoods briefly, explicitly, and plausibly, while the latter tell the truth in such a way that it is tedious to listen to, difficult to understand, and, finally, disagreeable to believe? Should the former attack truth and defend falsehood with specious arguments, and the latter be unable either to vindicate truth or disprove falsehood? Should the former, influencing and urging the minds of their listeners to error by their eloquence, terrify, sadden, gladden, and passionately encourage them, while the latter, indifferent and cold in behalf of truth, sleep on? Who is so foolish as to claim this? The power of eloquence—so very effective in convincing us of either wrong or right—lies open to all. Why, then, do not the good zealously procure it that it may serve truth, if the wicked, in order to gain unjustifiable and groundless cases, apply it to the advantages of injustice and error? ¹¹

Here are a few representative principles of rhetoric which Augustine learned from "pagan" writers that he presented to his ministerial students. He thought adults should not spend much time learning the rules of rhetoric, and in this instance as he not infrequently does, substantiates his position by reference to classical writers. In this regard, he states: "For even the masters of Roman eloquence themselves did not hesitate to say that, unless a person could master this art quickly, he could never master it at all." ¹²

Augustine believed that ministers should learn to be eloquent by reading eloquent speeches, by imitating eloquent speakers, and by practice in writing. As he states it: "Eloquence grows upon those who read and listen eagerly and intelligently to the eloquent. . . . This is especially true if he joins to his reading a practice in writing, dictating, and finally even in expressing what he thinks." ¹³

Mr. Gavigan thinks this idea came from Cicero's *De Oratore*, Book II, Chapter XXII, line 96:

Let him then, who hopes by imitation to attain this likeness, carry out his purpose by frequent and large practice, and if possible, by written composition; if our friend Sulpicius here were to do so, his diction would be far more condensed; at

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 170.

¹³ *Ibid.*

present, as countrymen are wont to say of grass in times of extreme productiveness, it occasionally has a certain luxuriance about it, which should be grazed off by the pen.

In Chapter 4, Augustine states there are three things a minister must do when he speaks: "This work in speaking obliges him (the minister) to *win over* opponents, to *arouse* the negligent, and to *inform* the ignorant."¹⁴

Cicero states the same three points: "from which may be drawn a speech such as to attain those three things which alone can carry convictions; I mean the *winning over*, the *instructing*, and the *stirring* of men's minds."¹⁵

A minister should study diligently so he can speak with wisdom, for it is wisdom and not eloquence that benefits an audience, taught Augustine. A wise speaker is less useful if he is not also eloquent, "But the one to guard against is the man whose eloquence is no more than an abundant flow of empty words."¹⁶

The same position is held by Cicero when he states in regard to a polished style of speaking, "if the underlying subject-matter be not comprehended and mastered by the speaker, (the style) must inevitably be of no account or even become the sport of universal derision. For what so effectually proclaims the madman as the hollow thundering of words—be they ever so choice and resplendent—which have no thought or knowledge behind them?"¹⁷

If such a philosophy is presented by pagan teachers, argued Augustine, how much more important it is for ministers to speak with wisdom. Furthermore, Augustine added, a minister speaks more or less wisely in proportion as he has made more or less progress in his understanding of the Holy Scriptures. By understanding the Scripture, Augustine did not mean extensive reading, or even memorizing passages, but rather a "careful searching into their meanings." Some ministers recite eloquently, but do not understand what they are saying; others have less grasp of the words, but "see with the eyes of their heart the soul of the Scripture. But, better than either of these is the man, who when he wishes, both cites Scripture and understands it as he should."¹⁸

These few examples of statements made by Augustine parallel to those found in classical rhetoric are sufficient to illustrate the point that Augustine's philosophy of preaching was, in quite a large measure, influenced by his

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

¹⁵ *De Oratore*, II. XXVII, p. 121.

¹⁶ *De Doctrina Christiana*, p. 174.

¹⁷ *De Oratore*, I. XII, p. 50-51.

¹⁸ *De Doctrina Christiana*, p. 174.

early studies in rhetoric. There is no particular merit in continuing to show the sources of Augustine's statements, but it is of interest to present-day ministers to know some of the other ideas Augustine taught about preaching. A few of these ideas follow.

Some useful suggestions about grouping and phrasing passages of Scripture for study and for oral reading are presented by Augustine. He states that, of course, the Bible is not written according to the rules of the art of rhetoric, but that there is an eloquence of the Scriptures which needs to be studied. He illustrates this idea by comparing the Latin and Greek terms for "clauses" and "phrases" and explains how certain clauses should be held suspended by the voice of the speaker until the last one has been completed. This idea is illustrated by dividing several Scripture passages into their logical groupings.¹⁹

The first paragraph of Chapter 12 is so pertinent to preaching that it is given here in Augustine's own phraseology:

Accordingly, a certain orator has said, and said truly, that an eloquent man should speak in such a way that he "teaches, pleases, and persuades." Then he added: "To teach is a necessity, to please is a satisfaction, and to persuade is a triumph." Of these three, the one mentioned first, that is, the necessity of teaching, depends upon what we say; the other two depend upon the manner in which we say it. Therefore, a man who speaks with the intention of teaching should not think that he has said what he intended to the person he is trying to instruct, so long as he is not understood. Although he has said what he himself understands, he thus is not to be regarded as having yet spoken to the man who has not understood him. However, if he has been understood, he has spoken, no matter how he expressed himself. But, if he is also trying to please or persuade the person to whom he is speaking, he will not succeed by speaking in any way whatsoever, for the manner in which he speaks is important in order that he may produce this effect. Just as the listener must be pleased in order that he may be kept listening, so he must be persuaded in order that he may be influenced to act. And, just as he is pleased if you speak attractively, so he is moved if he finds pleasure in what you promise, dreads what you threaten, hates what you condemn, embraces what you praise, grieves over what you emphasize as deplorable, rejoices when you say something he should rejoice at, pities those whom in your discourses you set before his eyes as objects of pity, avoids those whom you by awakening a fear point out should be avoided. Whatever else can be accomplished through grand eloquence to influence the hearts of one's listeners, they must be persuaded not that they may know what should be done, but *to do what they already know they should do.*²⁰

In Chapter 17, Augustine explains just how the three main aims of speaking apply specifically to preaching. He states that a man who is endeavoring through speech to convince of what is good rejects neither the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-192.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

aim to teach, to please, nor to persuade, but must add to his duties the task of prayer. In other words, Augustine places all the responsibilities on the Christian orator that a pagan speaker has, then adds to this list the discipline of prayer. "When he does this properly and suitably, he can justly be called eloquent, even though he does not obtain the agreement of his listener."²¹

Style, as it relates to both materials and delivery, is the main topic which concerned Augustine as he wrote Chapters 18 through 30. If a pagan speaker wishes to be eloquent, he must speak about trivial subjects in a subdued style, ordinary subjects in a moderate style, and noble subjects in a grand style. The pagan orator uses the subdued style to persuade his listeners that what he says is true; the grand style is used to persuade them to do what they know they should do but they are not doing; and the moderate style he may use for the sake of beauty or elegance.

The minister's concept of eloquence must differ from the pagan's in that the minister never speaks on trivial subjects; rather he is always upholding justice and righteousness and these subjects can never be trivial. Neither should a minister ever use the moderate style for the sake of beauty or elegance alone, as pagans do. The Christian speaker must always be striving to use his speech to move his listeners toward the good which he is trying to persuade them to accept. In other words, a minister should never use beauty of expression for the sake of beauty alone.

The three styles discussed by Augustine are illustrated by numerous Scripture passages and by a number of quotations from such scholars as Cyprian and Ambrose.

Delivery should be varied with every kind of style, insofar as this can be done "gracefully." The vehemence of a speech should ebb and flow like the waves of the sea. If a speaker is unable to vary his style of delivery, "the unrelieved subdued style can be more easily tolerated for a longer time than the unvaried grand style."²²

The unexpected explanation is a characteristic of the subdued style when used effectively. One displays sharp opinions from sources from which nothing was expected. This is the style to use when proving false that which seems to be true but is not. No matter what the style used, however, an ecclesiastical orator must speak with understanding and in such a way as to give his hearers pleasure, for, if not, what he says cannot be persuasive.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 222.

The life of the minister, Augustine believed, has greater persuasive influence than any sublimity of eloquence. There are those who speak the "Truth" with eloquence, but whose lives are an abomination, for they live not as they preach. Even these men may do good, because, as Augustine puts it, "what is virtuous and true may be preached from a vicious and deceitful heart." However, when a man's true nature is discovered as a deceitful one, people will not listen to him with submission, but will despise the preacher. If a minister wishes to be truly persuasive he must remember the words of the Apostle which were written to Timothy, "but be thou an example to the faithful in speech, in conduct, in charity, in faith, in chastity."²³

Finally, Augustine states, "there are some who can preach well, but they are unable to think of anything to preach. If they take what has been written eloquently and wisely by others, memorize it, and deliver it to the people, they are not acting dishonestly as long as they cling to their part."²⁴ This reasoning is based on the idea that all preaching is repeating what the one true Teacher has already said, and therefore no preacher is wholly original. Those who are going to preach what they have received from others should pray for those from whom they are obtaining their message, should pray for those who are to receive it, and pray that they themselves may preach well, not for their own glory, but for the glory of their Lord.

Thus Augustine brings out point after point which has been suggested to him by his study of classical rhetoric and applies the same ideas to preaching. He also adds his own interpretation as to what he believes should be peculiar to the art of preaching alone. Through his *De Doctrina Christiana*, St. Augustine pointed his own students toward the study of classical rhetoric, believing this procedure would result in the improvement of their preaching. If the modern minister drinks wisely but not too deeply from the well of wisdom offered by the ancients, perhaps he, too, will find his own understanding of preaching to be a growing process.

²³ I Timothy 4:12.

²⁴ *De Doctrina Christiana*, p. 232.

Ecumenical Prospects in the Local Church

WINSTON L. KING

THE PAST TWO YEARS have seen some of the most dramatic and significant steps taken toward the achievement of a Protestant ecumenical community of faith that it will ever be the privilege of any generation to witness.

First in importance was the initial Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948. One hundred forty church groups separated by centuries of theological and ecclesiastical differences met in united effort and planned for the future! Not less significant in its own area was the formation of the new United Church of South India from four widely differing Protestant denominations. In general, one might say that the ecclesiastical woods are full of church federations and mergers—proposed, pending, and progressing—even in America, that home of the brave new sect and land of the fancy-free faith. And the tremendous popular response to church union proposals of all kinds indicates that the high ecumenical talk in official circles has genuine rootage in the minds and hearts of religious people.

Yet with all the significance of these official steps and these trends of popular sentiment, the fundamental uncertainty with regard to the degree and kind of Protestant church unity which is desired has not been resolved. Those people who in the final analysis must give the real answer to the basic questions involved in Protestant ecumenicity have not yet spoken with convincing clarity or enthusiasm. For the basic questions relating to church unity will not be solved in the high councils of denominational officials or by the lofty pronouncements of interfaith bodies concerning the *Una Sancta*, but in the hearts and minds of the rank-and-file membership of local churches.

I

Now much of our difficulty in matters ecumenical is to be found in the specific nature and ecclesiastical context of Protestant church leader-

WINSTON L. KING, B.D., S.T.M., Ph.D., is Dean of the Chapel, Grinnell College, Grinnell, Iowa, and Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion. His thesis is that the chief obstacle to church union is the layman's unwillingness to pay its cost and face its implications.

ship. And I do not refer primarily to the general relationship which is to be found in any organization of some size—a certain difference in outlook between executives and the main body of members. This is inevitable, even desirable. Leaders are to lead. They are the brain, the imaginative intuition of the organizational being. Their indispensable function is to see visions and dream dreams—and to inspire the body corporate to undertake their realization.

But we need also to recognize that our Protestant church leadership finds itself in a uniquely difficult position. The general situation is that Protestant leadership cannot speak with forthright authority, but only in the hope of having sensed the mind of the group it represents; and, perchance, even speak persuasively thereto as befits a popularly chosen leadership which must commend itself to its constituents in its every utterance. It cannot state emphatically, as can the Roman Catholic hierarchy: this *is* the mind of the church—by virtue of our deciding that it is. Protestant leadership is rather a leadership of consent or representation. Its power does not rest upon priestly prerogative but upon personal influence and the correct sensing of popular opinion.

The neglected specific corollary of this general proposition is that even on a representative basis Protestant leadership is too often little more than a figment of wishful thinking. In actual fact, it can seldom truthfully represent itself as resting upon genuine opinion or widespread support, either financial or political. When some leader in a convention or public statement speaks for "two million members of X denomination," what does it really mean? It means that he speaks only for as many as agree with him—if *they are aware that he spoke at all*. The commonest thing in all Protestantism is for councils and conventions to pass deplored resolutions, which those whom they "represent" read about in the newspaper—maybe. If they do read "their" delegates' pronouncements, they have no sense of being bound by them.

This situation is caused in part, and still further aggravated, by the type of lay-clerical division which is peculiar to Protestantism at all levels. It grows directly out of the radical Protestant theory of church life. According to this theory, the church is essentially a lay organization in which every man is his own and his fellow's priest, and whose clergy have a leadership of function conferred upon them by their spiritual peers, but possess no superior sacramental status. In small homogeneous groups and local congregations this works well enough. But the complications of organizational structure and the continuing and increasing default of lay

leadership in the religious sphere have largely nullified this democratic theory in the actual practice of major Protestant denominations.

This default has been going on so long that neither clergy nor laity are aware of what has happened. Both accept it as natural and right. Aside from some executive and secretarial positions in the denominations, and organizational and financial responsibility in local congregations, the laity by and large have vacated all positions of ecclesiastical responsibility. They have become, for the most part, mere sitters, listeners, payers, and secular workers in the Lord's house. All the "spiritual" functions of the church have been delegated to the professional cleric; church leadership, both local and denominational, is almost solidly professional.

This leadership, therefore, is vitiated by a double liability: it is leadership by default and has had its professionalism forced upon it. As *default leadership*, it has the weakness of negativity. It is no result of power-hungry clerics grasping authority—which would, in some respects, have its values. Protestant leadership is undertaken essentially because someone else is not performing his supposed function. Rather than a positive principle of administrative or hierarchical value it represents, so to speak, an extension of lay evasion or apathy into executive leadership. As an *enforced professionalism*, clerical leadership in Protestantism has all the weakness and none of the strength of Roman clericalism. For though the layman has defaulted his presumptive responsibility to the clergy, he does not thoroughly trust the latter's guidance. Unwilling to set up as a spiritual leader himself, he is also unwilling to grant the clergy any real authority. There remains in him from his Protestant heritage only the conviction of his private capacity for spiritual judgments, none of its confidence for leadership.

This chasm between laity and clergy is not entirely the fault of either party to it. Perhaps the word "fault" has no place here at all, except in instances of individual discord. For it is not that either pew or pulpit is unintelligent, unspiritual, or unsympathetic with the viewpoint of the other. In fact, one often has the impression that the minister is seeking rather desperately to make some significant spiritual contact with his people, and that, in turn, his faithful flock are trying with patience and perseverance to understand what he is talking about and to apply it to their daily lives.

What keeps them apart is chiefly vocational specialization. The minister is shielded from the rougher contacts of business and labor relations. He may, indeed, live in genteel poverty; he may well learn at firsthand the inside story of many human situations; he may be no stranger in his

sympathetic imagination to human vicissitude—but, in common with many other professional people who do “nice clean” work, he misses out on the wear and tear of heavy physical labor or the dog-eat-dog intensity of business competition. So, too, his thinking is on a different pattern. Ordinarily he does not need to concern himself with monotonous attention to material details, or immerse himself in practical concerns; his thought and planning tend to be in the realm of principles, his *métier* is observational and meditative rather than practical and active.

Hence when laity and clergy seek to make spiritual contact they find it difficult. Their difficulty becomes most acute when they seek unitedly to grapple with common social, moral, or economic problems. The clergy find a spiritual stodginess or unimaginativeness characteristic of the laity, an incapacity for ideas and ideals along with an often ill-informed but strong opinionation on religious matters. And laymen find their minister inclined to be naïve about practical concerns, prone to oversimplifications and unrealistic black-and-white moral contrasts. All too often the cleric speaks with the tremendous enthusiasm of inexperience. So it is that though the layman may trust his leadership in the realms of “personal” religion, he is reluctant to follow him much beyond.

We must add a further complication at the local level, one which has especial relevance for practical ecumenics. It is this: the local minister is the key man in all things ecumenical. As executive head and public representative of his particular church organization, he can almost single-handedly make or, especially, break the cause of unity in any of its forms in his local group. And thus, though the layman may distrust all higher church leadership because it is almost solidly clerical, he is, nevertheless, largely bound willy-nilly to the opinions of his own minister in all matters concerning united or uniting efforts. For the pipe line of information and inspiration from levels of high ecumenical strategy to the local churchman is actually no wider than its narrowest point, namely, the minister's mail box. (And even that strait gate discharges most of its meager traffic into Wastebasket Alley. The reams of promotional suggestions that find their way there!) Thus the mighty tides of ecumenical movement may stir scarcely a ripple in many local churches, simply because they must finally filter through the local minister's resistance, or be shaped after his chosen pattern.

There is a lesson in all this for all ecumenical leaders. Let them realize the width of the gulf that divides clergy and laity in all our church organizations. Let them realize their own strategical dependence upon the good

will and co-operation of the local clergy. Above all, let them be keenly aware of the many weary ecclesiastical and mental miles between the top levels and the local congregations. And then, perhaps, it will happen less often, that without quite realizing how they got there, they find themselves leading a charge far out into the no man's land of interchurch relations with only a handful of professionals following.

II

Having considered somewhat the nature and context of the leadership by which Protestantism must achieve any measure of increased unity within itself, we must go on to ask the plain-sounding but important question: In what ways *can* the local church sense or effectualize its awareness, if any, of the Church Universal?

Now, we must be exceedingly broad-minded and full of Christian charity in defining ecumenicity for local churchmanship. We must make our definition of ecumenicity broad enough to include in good and regular standing even the faintest or most irregular movement in the direction of the Church Universal. To this end, we shall disregard the finer shades of meaning, and lumping "ecumenical," "universal," and "united" all together, define them as meaning *anything* in attitude or action which tends to produce, express, or make effective the consciousness of the unity of the Christian churches in *any* of their relationships. That is, whatever in thought or practice takes into account more than the local church or single denomination, whatever is acted upon jointly with others because they also are Christian, will be considered to have the divine image of the Church Universal stamped upon it. With this exceedingly capacious and fine-meshed net we shall attempt to dredge up all the evidences of ecumenical spirit and activity to be found within the local church.

Two broad types of ecumenical thought and action are open to the local church. One we may term simply *co-operation*. By co-operation we mean some degree of unity of effort with other already existing churches and denominations in the religious task as such, with no ulterior designs upon their spiritual or ecclesiastical independence. Such co-operation on the local level is most significant, for it means actual flesh-and-blood integration of effort with the church across the street. Not only is this kind of ecumenical effort of the most real and vital quality, it is often the most difficult. Two existent Christian fellowships already too familiar with each other as persons and organization, competing for the allegiance of the same unchurched, and perhaps already churched, people, seek to achieve a de-

gree of unity. Church contacts here are *total* contacts, so to speak, along the full front of personal and organizational life; success or failure here is the acid test of ecumenical capacity.

If we should ask what kinds of local co-operation can be (and are) practiced, the range is almost infinite. They range from the occasional kindly thought directed toward the member of another communion; through the vast midlands of co-ordination of bazaar dates, patronage of each other's suppers, occasional union services or exchange of pulpits; up to and including the rarer heights of thoroughly cordial working relationships and significant joint efforts in educational and evangelistic tasks. What actually takes place here depends largely upon local situations and leadership; what *might* be achieved together has hardly been explored.

Nor should we forget co-operation in its wider reaches. Co-operative endeavors of denominations on regional, state, and even international levels are of genuine possibility and worth to the local church. Personal interest and support, participation by the congregation as such in these efforts, may well bind the local church even to a World Council with strands of genuine spiritual community. Yet we must never forget that usually both quantitative and qualitative participation by the local church in these wider reaches of church life varies inversely with the square of the organizational distances involved.

The second general type of ecumenical activity open to the local church is *organizational federation or union*. Here, too, we must note that any type of union entered into achieves its most absolute quality on the local level. Because unity in a local community is organic in the fullest sense, because personal life is so intimate and group life so completely merged, a local union involves a far greater degree of oneness than can be experienced on any "higher" level of church life. It is, so to speak, a chemical blend of the ingredient elements on the atomic level rather than a solution of suspended particles or a mere mechanical articulation of members.

It should be emphasized that locally the practical matters of the church as a body, not merely the spirit, of Christ come to be of greatest concern. For at the grass-roots level, from which the material sustenance of the church organizations on all levels is drawn and its personnel recruited, matters of finance, buildings, organization, and resources are of vital importance. Here words about church union and ecumenicity must have not merely the aura of sanctity, they must have also the substance of solid accomplishment and genuine will to unity. Here we must actually

solve the problem of uniting organizations. Here there can be no honest talk of church unity "in the spirit" without facing the practical problems of divisions in the body and the ugly facts of competition. Here the church invisible dare not be completely so.

III

In the light of the foregoing perspectives, we may now ask some leading questions. What *is* the status of the Church Universal among our local churches? What *are* the ecumenical prospects at the grass roots?

These questions will not be asked and answered on the basis of statistics, for statistics here are peculiarly misleading. No denominational yearbook, national religious census, or religious opinion poll can arrive at the essential facts, namely, the prevailing attitudes of local clergy and laity with regard to ecumenical efforts; nor are publicized opinions of selected individuals of conclusive weight, for the more articulate are not always the most representative. Only the kind of insight one gets from working with church people and ministers in local situations, year in and year out, can give the correct answers.

What, then, is the attitude of the local *clergy* by and large in this matter? I will not presume to answer this question in terms of percentages. Every Protestant clergyman is a law unto himself. All one can say in general is that in the parish ministry attitudes toward the question of church unity and co-operation vary through all shades of possible opinion.

In fact, the position of the minister, as such, is paradoxical with regard to all questions concerning unity. He is, by calling, the apostle both of unity and separation. He is trained in the practices and traditions of his own sect; he is presumably familiar with its history and theology. He is, so to speak, the chosen instrument for the perpetuation of sectarianism; as a minister or priest of his version of the Christian faith he is pledged to strive for its propagation. He is the means by which sectarian views are communicated to a new generation of laity and around whom a group of the faithful forms.

Nor must local and personal factors be forgotten in this connection. A religious faith needs the "grit of the particular," to borrow a phrase from Hocking. Religion has to form itself into local fellowships to exist. To achieve organizational vitality the local group must work for its own particular ends, such as cultivation of a sense of group solidarity within itself, an emphasis upon its own peculiar merits and values, efforts to enhance the beauty of its physical properties, the maintenance of a full-scale program,

and like measures. To succeed as a church it must prosper as a local unit; its inclusions imply exclusions. And last, but not always least, the cleric's own professional fortune and success rest in a very real fashion upon these local successes in "building up the church."

Yet there is another side. The gospel which the minister preaches and the sacraments which he administers are couched in the language of unity. Even the most sectarian clerics read scriptures and liturgies which speak longingly and lovingly of the oneness of the people of God. They cannot help but be aware of the strong pulse of desire for unity which has always beat in the veins of the living Christian community. And it must be said in all fairness, I think, that the most consistent and intelligent work for Christian unity at the grass-roots level is being carried on by rank-and-file parish clergymen.

IV

We come, finally, to the basic question: What is the disposition of the *laity* with regard to the Church Universal?

On the surface, the first thing one senses among Protestant laity today is a strong and growing enthusiasm for full church unity. The layman is for it! His enthusiasm is composed of two parts of impatience with the obvious evils of Protestant division and one part of generous enthusiasm for peace and concord. E. Stanley Jones is "persuaded that 90 per cent of the Protestant churches of America are prepared to give the right hand of fellowship to each other."¹

While undoubtedly genuine, the terms in which such enthusiasm expresses itself are as vague as they are enthusiastic. "Since we are all going to the same place anyway," "all worship the same God," and "there isn't much difference between Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians," we all ought to "get together in one big Protestant church." And having said such daring things—especially to a *minister*—the average layman stands back, a little amazed and awed at the sweep of his own idealism and the breadth of his liberality. He is not a little impatient toward those who cannot see how obvious and easy the whole thing is.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that most of this enthusiasm takes itself out in facile talk and is, in fact, an ecumenicity born of ignorance. Such enthusiasm is large and generous mostly because it is unaware of the difficulties and issues involved. It knows little, as a rule, of the complexities of organizational procedure involved in a successful federation or

¹ "Is Federal Union a Half-Way House?" in *The Christian Century*, July 14, 1948, p. 706.

union of differing systems of church government and administration. It knows little or nothing of the history of its own denomination, of its basic tenets of faith, or its fundamental distinctiveness. Nor does it appreciate the kind of difficulty involved in joining together varying rituals, creeds, and church usages. Seldom does such opinion appreciate the fact that an order of worship is often the distillation of centuries of religious experience or insight, that it may be an organic unity having its own internal integrity and character as truly as a biological organism. Differing ways of worshiping cannot be forced together by shotgun weddings! And the insipid pabulum which comes out of union services, and is called worship, sometimes makes one wonder whether there is any other alternative for merged worship patterns than the adoption of one existent pattern or an invertebrate ritualism composed of lowest common denominators. If he will forgive the comparison, the layman in this sphere is a bit of a barbarian who does not appreciate the finer things of the superior civilization and culture which he proposes to overrun, even though he proposes to overrun it for its own good.

Yet if the channeling of this inept but widespread desire for unity were the only problem involved, and only theologians' and ecclesiastics' narrow prejudices stood in the way of union, the solution would be relatively simple. Obstructionists could and would be purged. *The truth is that deep down in their hearts the laity are not sure whether they really want church unity where it hurts, that is, in their local churches.* This is why, despite all the magnificent talk about it, the movement toward greater co-operation or unity does not proceed more rapidly. To date, the efforts of church leaders to bring large church groupings together have foundered on the fundamental obstacle of the *laity's* unwillingness to move. Church councils and pronouncements have been like the wind swaying the tops of the grass together, while the separate roots remain solidly anchored just where they are.

Indeed, the layman turns out to be the ultimate sectarian. He takes his sectarianism more seriously than his minister, notwithstanding that clerical words and actions may have produced his frame of mind and heart. The cleric, by profession a dealer in words, probably never takes them with such absolute literalness as his hearers. He may mean them just as fully in his way as the layman in his, but they are different ways. Living as he does in communion with abstract ideas and far-flung ideals, the meaning of the "universal church of Christ" is richer and more real to him than to his flock. But for the average layman the "church" is his local church, or,

at most, his sect. Frequently the most deeply religious are the most firmly sectarian.

The truth of this observation is evident whenever an actual proposal for local (or denominational) union is brought forward. When church union costs him something, directly and personally, the average layman is not quite ready for it. He is unconvinced that his glowing enthusiasm for "one big Protestant Church" means the sacrifice, perchance, of his church building or position of local leadership. And more than once in proposed denominational mergers, though various theologians and ministers furnish the words in the mouths of the opposition, the sheet anchor of obstruction is the layman's fear that his local church may lose some of its independence, need to modify its habits or doctrines, change its name, or jeopardize its properties.

When a local merger does receive strong lay support, it is frequently on grossly inadequate and unchristian grounds. As a matter of fact, such support comes as the rule only when competing church groups are faced with extinction as the only alternative to union. The new union is consummated in an atmosphere of mounting debt and falling attendance; its diverse elements are lured together by the prospective financial savings to be had by maintaining only one minister and one building, seldom by the prospect of a larger Christian work.

Perhaps the laity may be somewhat excused for this state of things. As the permanent residents and down-to-earth workers for the Kingdom in Smithville, they know by personal experience the sacrifices it takes to maintain a local church program. A new church building, an added parish house, and booming attendance represent real and tangible evidences of the successful struggle of faith with unbelief and indifference. Then, too, their personal roots in the community are deeper than those of the transient clergyman. The social groupings within and about the church fellowship represent fundamental social realities for them, not to be lightly esteemed. They instinctively know how important is this "grit of the particular" and local to the Church Universal. It is their main article of evidence that the Church Universal exists at all.

V

The present situation, then, faces all ecumenically minded churchmen, lay or clerical, with serious considerations. For church leaders it poses a major problem. Granted that lay enthusiasm for one big Protestant church may be ill-informed and talkative, it nevertheless represents the groundswell

of a rising tide of a will to unity. The layman is equally oppressed (1) by the sense of mighty social currents and world situations which affect him at every turn, (2) by the conviction that the Christian church *must* have something to say and do commensurate to the world situation, and (3) that in its divided state it is not doing so. The nice theological and denominational distinctions which divide Christendom may be interesting for antiquarians, but seem to have little relevance for the present crisis. (The layman feels a bit as though each church is insisting upon the Kingdom's coming according to the last and least detail of its own elaborate ritual orders rather than another's, while the very house that shelters them all is being violently shaken by an earthquake.) Unless the church leaders can find a way to harness this lay enthusiasm for Christian unity to present church programs, it will soon be dissipated or be turned into other and nonreligious forms.

As for the laity, two questions, even more fundamental than these in their importance for the ecumenical church, demand an immediate answer. First, what kind of unity do they really desire—co-operative, federative, organic? And, second, how much do they really want it? How much of apathy, pride and prejudice, social distinction, local leadership, names, and folkways are they willing to surrender for the sake of greater church unity?

The answer which the rank and file of our church laymen make, or do *not* make, to these questions will decide whether the cause of Protestant church unity is to grow healthily to commanding proportions in our lifetime; to run to the top-heavy brushwood of organization and ideals without real roots; or else, worst of all, dissipate itself into thin air, leaving behind it the destroying acids of futility and disillusion.

An Experiment on the Recall of Religious Material

GEORGE K. MORLAN

NO MINISTER OR RELIGIOUS LEADER can ignore the way people feel and respond to his message. He needs to know their reactions in order to direct his sermons effectively to their problems and interests. He must reach the minds of his listeners if he is to succeed in influencing their attitudes and behavior, and it occurred to me some years ago that an analysis of what people remember of sermons might give a clue for reaching more effectively the thinking of laymen.

It was not assumed that what people remembered was the sole criterion of what they had learned. They may have been influenced in a significant way by sermons they no longer can recall, but what they can recall is one measure, at least, of what they have learned.

To get at this remembered material, I asked 191 people from various walks of life to tell me as much as they could recall of the sermon that stood out most vividly in their minds which they had heard more than two weeks previously. An analysis of this data revealed that word pictures were best retained; next, those that concerned the problems and interests of people; third, those that shocked, and, least of all, sermons that "stuck to religion."

There was overlapping between these categories, as can be found in the teachings of Jesus, but this evidence indicated that ideas expressed in vivid pictorial form reach the minds of people and are retained much better than are abstract ideas.

There is a *clue* here for getting at the minds and memories of people, but since there was no control over the character of the sermons that the people heard, any conclusion was somewhat equivocal. The purpose of the following experiment was to subject the four hypotheses derived from the previous investigation to more rigorous scientific test by controlling the character of the sermons that a given group would hear.

GEORGE K. MORLAN, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Psychology at Springfield College, Springfield, Massachusetts. He describes here an experiment that is a refinement and development of the investigation reported in his *Laymen Speaking* (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1938).

Three published sermons and a selection of equivalent length from John Stuart Mill's *The Idea of God in Nature*,¹ were read to two sections of Springfield College students in educational psychology. In one section, the selection from Mill was read first, and the sermons in the following order: Ernest Fremont Tittle's "The Obligation to Be Intelligent,"² Harry Emerson Fosdick's "Winning the War of Nerves,"³ and John Henry Newman's "The Religion of the Day."⁴ In the second section the order was reversed.

There was no structuring to obtain a set to remember. The students were merely told to listen and attend to what followed as they would in a real life situation—as soon as they recognized what the situation was. They were told they would not be graded on the experiment, but that their co-operation would be appreciated. It was necessary that all should hear, and since too much talking would interfere with the results of the experiment, they were asked not to talk. Nevertheless, there was some whispering and talking, but probably little, if any, more than occurs in the average middle-class church where young people attend.

The situation differed from a church setting in a number of significant ways. There was no religious mood cultivated through sacred music, prayer, or devotional atmosphere resulting from church architecture, or the feeling of there being something special because of Sunday clothes. In passing it may be noted that it is an unproved theory that the setting of the sermon in the midst of religious symbols, sacred music, prayer, and the like makes the mind more receptive to the sermon. The quiet of a plain Quaker service may well be far more impressive than any elaborate ritual or theatrical service. It is not only possible, but there is a real probability, that the place of the sermon at the end of the long introductory service of music, Bible reading, offertory, prayer is psychologically unsound. Jesus never drowned his message under a plethora of other things. There should be some experimentation in placing the sermon at the beginning of the service, for it is a reasonable hypothesis that after a long introduction, the people are too worn out, sleepy, or resistant to listen further.

In order to equate the presentation of the material, the experimenter

¹ Mill, John Stuart, *The Idea of God in Nature*. Girard, Kan.: Haldeman-Julius Co., Little Blue Books, No. 211, pp. 27-38.

² Tittle, Ernest Fremont, "The Obligation to Be Intelligent," in *What Can Students Believe?*, edited by Elmore McNeill McKee. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931, pp. 43-57.

³ Fosdick, Harry Emerson, "Winning the War of Nerves," in *Living Under Tension*. Harper & Brothers, 1941, pp. 20-29.

⁴ Newman, John Henry, "The Religion of the Day," in *The Great Sermons of the World*, edited by Clarence Edward Macartney. Boston: The Stratford Co., 1926, pp. 399-411.

read all four selections himself. In each instance he tried to read the material as effectively as possible, but the ideas, words, and sentence structure were that of others, and his presentation was undoubtedly not as effective as the original authors could have made it. On the basis of my experience in this experiment, I am now more dubious of a suggestion made by a Westchester organist that had seemed to me to merit trying out. He had declared that it would be folly to require church organists to play only music of their own composition. Wasn't it equally fallacious to expect ministers to give only their own original thoughts? He advocated that churches should "allow, encourage, or even require that their preachers deliver the best sermons of other preachers, as well as their own best and most inspired ones."⁵

Requiring preachers to produce a stimulating, inspiring sermon every week is unrealistic, but I am sure that my own presentation was uninspired; and until clergymen are trained as thoroughly as organists are in presenting the works of others, reading a great sermon by another hardly seems to be the solution to the difficulty.

Preceding the reading of the first selection, the instructions to each group were as follows: "During this term I wish to perform an experiment that is relevant to this course, and I believe is potentially important for many fields. In order to approximate the conditions of real life, I shall not tell you what my purpose is, nor discuss any aspect of the experiment until it is completed, but when it is completed, the instructor will discuss any aspect of it that you wish discussed. Your only instructions are to listen as carefully as you would under the conditions that you would normally hear the following discourse."

Actually, ministers and teachers often tell the purpose they wish to achieve in their presentations, but they do not usually try to measure what is retained, as I proposed to do. If a congregation were told that the amount that they retained was to be measured, the result would likely differ from what I found in the earlier investigation, as well as in this more recent one.

Two weeks after the final selection had been read, students were asked to tell as much as they could recall of the four selections. The instructions were as follows:

During the first four class periods, your instructor read to you on each day a different selection. Please write out, as completely as you can, what you recall of the four selections. If there is any reason why any particular part stuck in your

⁵ Morlan, George K., *Laymen Speaking*, p. 29.

mind, indicate in the margin your reasons. You may have as much time as you need. (Use the remaining space on this page and the space on the other side if you need it.)

Your name is not wanted, but the following information would be appreciated if you are willing to give it.

Denomination of Church you belong to or prefer—(Check one).

Protestant ()
 Catholic ()
 Jewish ()

You attend—(Check one).

Frequently ()
 Occasionally ()
 Rarely ()
 Never ()

There were 94 returns. Of these, 50 could not retell anything definite enough to be tabulated, and 44 were able to tell something of one or more of the selections.

Could not remember—50

Protestant—36
 Catholic—11
 Jewish—3
 Attend frequently—21
 Attend occasionally—20
 Attend rarely—7
 Never attend—2

Could remember—44

Protestant—33
 Catholic—11
 Jewish—0
 Attend frequently—20
 Attend occasionally—17
 Attend rarely—7
 Never attend—0

SERMONS RECALLED

<i>Section one:</i>	Mill	Tittle	Fosdick	Newman	Total
	19	10	10	2	41
<i>Section two:</i>	Newman	Fosdick	Tittle	Mill	Total
	5	16	2	2	25
<i>Totals for two groups:</i>					
	Mill	Tittle	Fosdick	Newman	Total
	21	12	26	7	66

The selections by Mill and Newman were both concerned with religion itself, but there was a great difference in the character and approach in the two selections. Mill's views generally come as a shock, whereas Newman's views are likely to strike those with inquiring minds as pious, but very nice humbug. Since a fairly high percentage of college students have inquiring minds, Mill made a deeper impression than Newman. There was also a significant difference between the results of the two series where Mill was read first in one and Newman first in the other.

Section one reported recall on a total of 41 sermons. Section two, a little more than half as much, or 25. Fewer students were enrolled in section two, but the difference in enrollment was not great enough to account for the difference in amount recalled. A tentative hypothesis that needs further experimentation is that Mill's essay was so stimulating that the students were more receptive and alert to the sermons that followed. Newman's sermon, on the other hand, was boring (though included in a volume modestly called *Great Sermons of the World*), and the unfavorable mindset created in the beginning of the series affected the attention and interest in the rest.

The number who recalled something of Fosdick's sermon in the second series does not appear to fit this hypothesis. Nevertheless, what many recalled was the shocking language quoted from Walt Whitman. Eight who remembered something from "Winning the War of Nerves" mentioned Walt Whitman's words "God damn war!" Many of the boys had been in the armed services and shared these sentiments about war, but they also frequently commented that the use of this language in the situation was startling, and the eight responses might be totaled with the 21 who recalled something from Mill. Furthermore, psychologically, Tittle's sermon and Fosdick's might be classified together in that they both were related to the thinking and problems of these students. The results would then be totaled as follows:

<i>Shock</i>	<i>Problems</i>	<i>Religion alone</i>
Mill and Whitman	Tittle and Fosdick	Newman
29	30	7

These figures are not quite adequate. So far as subject matter is concerned, Mill and Newman might be classed together. Both concern essentially religious problems. In both there is a minimum of relating religion in a meaningful way to the problems that these students meet in everyday life. Mill was dealing with theology, and the number who recalled something of Mill is strikingly different from the results of the earlier investigation. In the earlier investigation, the number who recalled sermons on distinctively "religious" subjects ran a poor fourth. The earlier conclusion that sermons that "stick to religion" are the least effective in getting at the minds of people must be modified. On the basis of this experimental evidence, it would appear that it is the dullness of the usual sermonic approach that is psychologically unsound. A fresh treatment that can be recognized as honest and courageous thinking did get the attention of this sample of college students, with the result that they were able to

retell more about this selection than from any of the others, if Whitman's quotation is excluded.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Two conclusions of the previous investigation, namely, about the effectiveness of (1) shock, and (2) sermons that deal with the problems and interests of listeners are confirmed in this experiment, but there is marked difference in the data as regards the effectiveness of word pictures.

Are students so different from the average church population? Could it be that they are much less impressed by vivid word imagery? This is doubtful, for out of the 191 interviewed in the previous investigation, a considerable number were students, though they were not as mature as those in the experiment that included many veterans. It is possible that mature students are less impressed by adornment than is the average sample of our population, but a reanalysis of the entire data suggests a different answer. There were some word pictures in all four selections, but none was rich in imagery or word pictures. None was equivalent to Merton S. Rice's dramatic "So What?" lecture, that a number of laymen remembered vividly in the previous investigation. For this reason, we are not justified as yet in drawing any categorical conclusion about the effectiveness of word pictures.

We are justified, however, in concluding that the daring method Jesus used of shocking audiences out of their complacency is still an effective technique for getting at the minds of modern people. Nor can there be any doubt that sermons that deal with the interests and problems of people hit home. Furthermore, theological problems are among the issues that college students are thinking about, and if presented honestly and with courage, students will listen and remember.

Alfred E. Garvie: Theological Exponent of the Nineteenth Century

J. J. BUNTING, JR.

ANY APPRAISAL OF CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY must make note of the fact that a full-scale revolution has taken place in the theological scene since the turn of the century. What with the names and theologies of Kierkegaard, Barth, and Brunner almost completely dominating the scene, it requires an effort of the imagination to conceive that not so many years ago such names as Harnack, Ritschl, and Schleiermacher, occupying a position almost completely opposite to that now prevailing, comprised the shrine before which most of the theological incense was burned.

Although the transition has taken place with comparative swiftness (given its strong impetus, of course, by the cataclysmic events of two world wars), great indeed is the divide which separates these two comparatively close theological eras. Alan Richardson says definitely: "The century of Protestant theology that Schleiermacher inaugurated came to an end with the publication of Karl Barth's *Epistle to the Romans* in 1919."¹ The first half of the twentieth century, now concluded, has therefore contained within its scope an epitome of extremes in Christian thought.

The great popularity of what may generally be called the neo-orthodox position has, of course, been partially due to the contrasting position from which it reacted. The attempt to interpret the phenomena of Christian experience in terms of neo-theological categories; the "Jesus of history" movement (exceedingly strong in its appeal while it was in vogue); and the seemingly devastating impact of new scientific implications upon religious thought—these and other similar factors produced such a highly diluted brand of Christian conviction that thirsty minds and souls turned with delight to the more concentrated and seemingly more "central" presentation of the Barthian and associated schools.

No person better typified nineteenth-century liberalism, while at the

¹ Richardson, Alan, *Christian Apologetics*. Harper & Brothers, 1947, p. 57.

J. J. BUNTING, JR., B.D., Ph.D., is Minister of the First Methodist Church, Chestertown, Maryland. This article is based upon his doctoral dissertation, written at Drew Theological Seminary, the title of which was: "An Examination and Evaluation of the Use by Alfred E. Garvie of Specified Categories (Scientific, Philosophical, and Psychological) in the Construction of a Christian Theology."

same time clinging to evangelical Christianity, than Alfred E. Garvie (1861-1945), minister, theologian, and ecumenical leader of Great Britain. Anyone seeking to familiarize himself with the thought currents of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly as they affected the Christian framework of thought, and seeking also to examine the effort of a sincere evangelical Christian to make those thought-categories an integral part of a Christian theology, can do no better than to study the theology of Alfred E. Garvie.

I. GARVIE THE PERSON

Alfred E. Garvie, who was rugged of figure and spoke with a broad Scottish accent, was born in 1861 in Poland of a Scotch family. As a resident of Poland under Russian rule, he had his first taste of tyranny, which became a strong factor in forming his suspicion of too much emphasis upon the sovereignty of God. This anti-Calvinistic bias, produced by that early experience, served to make Garvie from the very beginning a child of his age.

In 1874, Alfred returned with the family to Scotland. But those early years plus continual contact with relatives on the Continent and occasional visits throughout his life (as well as the knowledge in language gained thereby) caused him to have a broad sympathy and genuinely international outlook in his approach to political and ecclesiastical problems which he later faced. After his preliminary schooling and four years at George Watson's College, in 1880 he entered a four years' apprenticeship to the drapery trade in Glasgow. At this time he also engaged in mission work in Glasgow. This contact and its impact upon Garvie brought to a focus his consideration of the ministry as a career.

The decision for the ministry was in the direction of the Congregational rather than the Presbyterian Church. This was because of Garvie's dislike of creed-subscription as well as his specific disagreement with certain aspects of Presbyterian theology.

During his theological course at the University of Glasgow he came under the spell of Edward Caird, of whom he wrote: ". . . he taught me the need of 'thinking things together' . . . and gave me the confidence that man's reason is not an exile, but a native, in a rational universe."²

After taking the M.A. in Glasgow, Garvie went on to Mansfield College, Oxford, for a three years' theological course. Here he came under the influence of A. M. Fairbairn, who was "one of the earliest Chris-

² Garvie, Alfred E., *Memories and Meanings of My Life*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1938, p. 77.

tian theologians to accept frankly the theory of evolution, and to allow his theistic philosophy to take due account of the changed thought involved.”⁸

These contacts with Caird and Fairbairn, with their respective contributions, complete the list of important influences which played upon the young Garvie. Every one of them, as indicated, well typified the age in which he lived, and later caused their impact to be felt in the framework of theology which Garvie erected.

II. GARVIE THE ECCLESIASTICAL LEADER

At the conclusion of his work at Mansfield in 1893, Garvie accepted a call to a church in Macduff, Banffshire, thus beginning his active ministry. At this time he also married Miss Agnes Gordon, a worker in the Moncur Street Mission in Glasgow, whom he had met while working there. He was at Macduff for two years. From there he moved to Montrose, where he stayed until 1903.

In 1893, Garvie was invited by A. M. Fairbairn to deliver a course of lectures at Mansfield during the latter's absence in India. The series bore the title, *The Ritschlian Theology*, was published in book form the next year, and thus established Garvie's reputation as a theologian early in his career.

The impression made by these lectures, as well as the academic qualifications already displayed by Garvie, caused him to receive an invitation to fill the chair of Philosophy, History of Religions, and Christian Ethics in the joint classes of New College and Hackney College at London. He assumed his new duties in the fall of 1903.

This professorship was exchanged for the principalship of New College in 1907. In 1922, Hackney and New Colleges were merged under one administration with Garvie at its head. He occupied this position until his retirement on June 30, 1933, at the age of seventy-two.

From the time he assumed the principalship of New College in 1907, in addition to his duties as administrator, teacher, writer, and preacher, Garvie was increasingly engaged in the ecumenical activities which became so central in his thinking and planning. He was not present at the epoch-making Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910, but was on the Commission which prepared the Report on the Religions of the World. In 1919, he was elected Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales. He also served as President of the National Free Church Council. In 1924, in Birmingham, at the Conference on

⁸ Garvie, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship (*Copec*), Garvie was Vice-Chairman. He was active also at the Stockholm Conference in 1925. In 1927, at the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order, he frequently presided; and an address by him on "The Necessity of Christian Unity for the Social Function of the Church," delivered on August 17 to the Conference, appears in the volume containing the proceedings.

One of Garvie's unpublished manuscripts, written during his retirement, and made available to the writer by Miss Catherine Garvie, bears the title, *The Ecumenical Movement: Record and Interpretation*. In this and other writings Garvie tells of the various conflicts in interests and points of view which arose in these early conferences of the ecumenical movement, as well as the smaller areas of friction which were often created by the failure of one national group to understand the language and mores of another. It was in this area that Garvie played so significant a role. His conciliatory spirit, and especially his knowledge of Continental languages and customs, made him an almost indispensable man at many critical junctures.

III. GARVIE THE THEOLOGIAN

The same broad sympathy, built into Garvie's character by virtue of his early experience and used to such good advantage in his ecumenical activities, is everywhere reflected in his theological framework. Living in the day when the theory of evolution appeared to shake the structure of Christian belief at its very foundations, and when the sciences of psychology, sociology, and historical criticism were beginning to make themselves felt, Garvie became a very real part of what seemed to be a struggle between intellect and religion. The solution which Garvie offered to this conflict was to discontinue the conflict, and to make the two "opponents" bedfellows.

The influence of Edward Caird upon Garvie in teaching him to "think things together" has already been noted. The influence of A. M. Fairbairn in making Christianity and evolution congenial has also been indicated. A third and very potent factor in molding Garvie's point of view was the impact which the theology of Albrecht Ritschl made upon him. The great amount of time he spent with the mind of Ritschl in preparing and delivering the lectures on *The Ritschlian Theology* left an impress upon Garvie's point of view which is apparent in many places in his writing. Garvie describes Ritschl as "a missionary to the modern mind." In this respect, Garvie followed closely in Ritschl's train. And he sought to be a missionary to the modern mind by finding as much common ground with the modern mind as possible.

The best principle by which to understand and evaluate the procedure of Garvie is the relationship between the permanent and the changing, between "substance" and "form," in Christian theology. The permanent (substance) consists of what is conceived to be the essential core of the faith. The changing (form) is the medium of expression, the framework of thought, the instrument of the intellect and imagination which is employed to set forth the permanent substance.

In our time two trends concerning the relationship between form and substance have been strongly felt. On the one hand, there has been a continuation of the age-old process (begun by Jesus and Paul and well exemplified in the Thomistic theology) of employing the prevailing thought-form to set forth the permanent elements in the Christian religion. The theory of evolution, for example, has now for the most part been accepted in Christian circles and indeed fitted into the theological scheme. The value of psychology for religion is now recognized, as a book like W. E. Hocking's *Human Nature and Its Remaking* so clearly shows.

Over against this trend has been the well-known Christian "existentialist" school of thought, crystallized in the work of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, a movement which has taken great pains to lay bare the dangers of linking in theology the permanent and the changing. The thinkers of this group have taken their stand upon Brunner's declaration: "Salvation . . . is the entrance into history of something entirely new. . . ."⁴ Because this is so, Christianity always compromises itself when it pays homage to the thought-forms of a philosophy or science or uses any but the purely self-originating Christian categories.

Alfred E. Garvie aligned himself squarely with the first group. He was convinced that the thought-forms of his day could be used to the fullest in expressing the meanings of Christianity. Always seeking to be true to evangelical Christianity, he set about the task of using the categories from five different areas of thought in the process of building a Christian theology.

1. *Scientific Category: Evolution—Its Use in Garvie's Anthropology.* The first significant feature of evolution as used by Garvie is that he attaches to his use of the word three adjectives which give it important philosophical import. He thinks of evolution as *teleological*, therefore involving purpose, opposed to "chance" in natural selection as being the determinative factor; as *emergent*, indicating that "something new does emerge, or is

⁴ Brunner, Emil, *The Theology of Crisis*. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931, p. 13.

created at each stage";⁵ and as *variable*, agreeing with Lloyd Morgan that in the process "we find not only progress, but regress."⁶ Thus Garvie adds to a purely scientific category philosophical interpretations, which reveal at the outset the inadequacy of the category to stand on its own feet.

Using the now-qualified category of evolution, Garvie proceeds to portray man as the consummation of the evolutionary process. Data indicating the anticipation of man in the animal world are offered, and evidence of traces of animal ancestry in man is introduced. But man is not only the consummation of the process; he is also superior to the process. There are characteristics which definitely distinguish man from brute. And these characteristics, discoverable by science, are confirmed in the biblical doctrine of man.

The weakness of this treatment of man from the viewpoint of evolution may be summarized by saying that the process of evolution appears to be more at stake than man's distinctiveness. The great gulf which separates man and brute does not seem sufficiently realized. Once it is fully comprehended, the seeming points of similarity are lost to view in the light of the supreme differences; and the use of the theory of evolution for studying the mysteries of man's moral and spiritual nature becomes negligible if not nil.

Living in the theological age that he did, Garvie was intent upon erasing from the minds of his readers any vestige of belief in a historical fall, as based upon a literal reading of the Genesis story. He uses the evolutionary approach in this process, drawing upon the writings of F. R. Tennant, and presenting the so-called Fall not as the performance of some act unknown before, but the continuation of practices already in operation, seen now from the level of a higher ethic, and thus viewed as sin.

The theological battle concerning the literal approach to Genesis is for the most part completed, but the total theology of sin presented by Garvie is still of interest. It is particularly fascinating because it leads him much closer to the basic truth involved in the doctrine of original sin than would at first appear. Echoing the words of Tennant, who wrote, "The moral life is a race in which every child starts handicapped"⁷ he declares: ". . . . we must admit that man's physical heredity and his social inheritance in his environment incline him downward rather than

⁵ Garvie, Alfred E., *Revelation Through History and Experience*. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1934, p. 143.

⁶ Morgan, Lloyd, *Emergent Evolution*. London: Williams and Norgate, 1923, p. 344.

⁷ Tennant, F. R., *The Child and Religion*, p. 178.

. . . . upward. . . . The race is a sinful race; each individual shares that common sin; there is a universal need of redemption."⁸

This is as far as the scientific category can take Garvie (or anyone) in his consideration of sin. At this juncture in his thought, Garvie breaks sharply away from the evolutionary category, and employs the biblical point of view to consider sin in its full implications. Evolution's point of view is purely *sub specie historiae*. It cannot climb up to *sub specie aeternitatis*—without importing exclusively Christian categories. Thus the category of evolution, as an aid to understanding man, breaks down. One must leave it and pursue the Christian categories. Garvie's realization of this fact is made dramatic in his final rejection of Tennant, upon whom he so freely drew. He writes concerning Tennant's conception of sin: "His method is wrong: he thinks that the ethical estimate must be determinative, whereas for Christian theology there is an estimate involved in the gospel of the grace of God."⁹

2. *Philosophical Category: Immanence—Its Use in Garvie's Theism.* Garvie is obviously familiar with Lotze's conception of efficient causation, and its underlying requirement that all individual things are substantially one. He sympathizes also with Pringle-Pattison, who wrote that he "finds it impossible to take God and the world as two separate and independently existing facts."¹⁰ He also believes that there are points of affinity between Indian and Christian thought, sharing this viewpoint, among others, with T. E. Slater (see Slater's *The Higher Hinduism in Relation to Christianity*).

The type of immanence indicated by these sources is fully employed in setting forth the method of God's creation and his subsequent relation to the world and man. The two key words are *kenosis* (Phil. 2:7) and *plerosis* (Eph. 1:23), although Garvie used them in his own way. Just as human love needs and shows self-limitation (*kenosis*) for the sake of self-expression and self-communication (*plerosis*), so physical forces and natural laws are God's infinite wisdom and power in exercise preparatory to and active in the advent of that for which they were made—the creature man.

Allowance is made for transcendence as well as immanence in Garvie's conception of God, but the latter seems to prevail. He suggests the term *generation* as fitly describing the procedure in creation. The use of such

⁸ Garvie, Alfred E., *The Christian Belief in God*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932, p. 430.

⁹ Garvie, Alfred E., *The Purpose of God in Christ*. Hodder and Stoughton, 1918, p. 32.

¹⁰ Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*. Oxford University Press, 1920, p. 432.

a term, practically synonymous with emanation, entirely pantheistic in its implications, and sharply distinguished from creation, is surely untrue to the distinctiveness and individuality of the human personality, to say nothing of its effect upon the transcendent aspect of God's personality.

But there are reservations in the mind of Garvie as he employs the category of immanence. In the case of Lotze's conception, he is not entirely convinced that personality is quite adequate to the total reality of God, and raises the question "whether, even if we attained perfect personality, there would not be vast reaches of reality and ranges of activity in God that could not be included."¹¹ And although he is sympathetic toward Pringle-Pattison's attempt to link God and the world, he expresses a desire to "distinguish without separating the world from God."¹² Thus, as in the case of evolution, the original category of immanence must be qualified (by the addition of thought-forms from the theological realm) before it can be put to its best use in Christian theology.

But the phenomenon of God's revelation to man cannot be ignored. When Garvie introduces it into the discussion, the category of immanence is obviously shattered. An attempt is made to present evolution and immanence as the channels through which revelation operates. Nature, history, and conscience are offered as the three general media of revelation. An "evolutionary-immanent" type of revelation is therefore posed, and the progressive character of biblical revelation is adduced as support for this philosophy of God's Word to man.

The weakness in the position is that the content and the process are contradictory. It is highly doubtful if at all likely that revolutionary principles can make their impact by evolutionary means. The process must be true to the content, and if the content is revolutionary, it would appear that the process at its critical points ought also to be, allowing of course for a steady expansion in influence once the original impact has been made.

Here, once more, Garvie begins with a non-Christian category (immanence) to explain an area of experience (in this instance, God's relation to the world), but ends by introducing a purely Christian category (revelation), which by its intrinsic dynamic overthrows the original thought-form. Thus confusion will be the inevitable result in any theology which seeks to retain both on an equal level.

3. *Psychological Category: Unity of Personality—Its Use in Garvie's*

¹¹ Garvie, Alfred E., *The Christian Belief in God*, p. 440.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 437.

Christology. Garvie's approach to the person of Jesus Christ can best be understood as a part of the great "Jesus of history" movement which was so dominant at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The adherents of this movement began not with the dogma concerning Christ, but with the life of Jesus, and therefore inevitably stressed the human aspect of Jesus' experience. As Ritschl put it, "The religious estimate of Christ . . . must approve itself in the connection between Christ's visible conduct and his religious convictions and ethical motives . . ."¹³ Garvie's approach to the Incarnation fitted neatly into this general point of view.

Garvie joins Ritschl in accusing traditional Christology of beginning almost exclusively with the divine nature and the divine attributes. The result was that the more recent kenotic doctrines found it necessary to divest the divine nature of its distinctive attributes in order to preserve the historical person. This fact, states Ritschl, "frankly acknowledges that Godhead and manhood cannot be predicated, at the same time and in the same relation, of the Person of Christ—in other words, that the two predicates are mutually exclusive."¹⁴

Seeking to avoid this error, Garvie draws from the modern concept of personality, and defines the personality as "the conscious subject thinking, feeling, willing."¹⁵ Upon this he seeks to build his Christology. And already having defined God in terms of personality, he does not find it difficult to make the perfect personality of God synonymous with the perfect personality of man as revealed in Jesus Christ. He thus stresses the likenesses between God and man rather than the differences, thereby offering what he conceives to be a beginning in the answer to the problem of the Incarnation.

From this point of view, Garvie criticizes the traditional Christologies because they dichotomized the personality of Jesus and conceived it in terms of *substantia* and *natura*, categories now outmoded. The Logos concept, for example, is denied any real importance in the theology of John, and declared to be a hindrance rather than a help in Christian theology. It is interesting to note, however, that Garvie becomes sympathetic toward some of the early Christologies when their position is similar to his own. This is particularly true of Nestorius, whose view was quite similar to that of Garvie.

¹³ Ritschl, Albrecht, *Justification and Reconciliation*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1900, vol. 3, pp. 412-413.

¹⁴ Ritschl, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

¹⁵ Garvie, Alfred E., *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*. Hodder and Stoughton, 1925, p. 151.

The weakness of the "unity of personality" category is that according to Garvie's definition of personality, he makes it synonymous with self-consciousness, thereby equating the personality with the mental process, an error common to much idealistic philosophy. This viewpoint fits snugly into an approach to Jesus from the standpoint of his self-consciousness; but the question remains if such an approach does not have serious limitations, just as the earlier creeds had their limitations also.

The basic matter involved here is that suggested at the outset—the relationship between the permanent and the changing. The early fathers sought to express a permanent truth in terms of the knowledge available to them at that time. This is exactly what Garvie seeks to do in his own time. And if the early Christologies may be criticized for being overcomplicated, Garvie's theory may be questioned for being oversimplified. For in effect he says that Christ, the high watermark of the evolutionary process, was man at his best, and then calls that God, God being already immanent in man throughout the foregoing evolutionary process. Lawton's criticism of this modern Nestorianism is timely: "the two axioms, unity and humanity, tended to heighten the tension between divinity and humanity a thousandfold."¹⁶

4. *Ethico-Esthetical Category: The Value Judgment—Its Use as a Standard of Faith.* It is in his use of the value judgment as a standard for faith that Garvie draws most heavily upon Albrecht Ritschl. The concept comes from Lotze, who affirmed that the value or valuelessness of things cannot belong to things in themselves, but exists only in the form of a feeling of pleasure or pain, experienced by a spirit capable of feeling. Ritschl's exposition of value judgments grows out of his attempt to solve the problem of the relation between religious knowledge on the one hand and scientific and philosophical knowledge on the other. According to Ritschl, the former offers value judgments; the latter, theoretical judgments. The restriction of religious knowledge to value judgments involves the exclusion of metaphysics from theology, the rejection of the theistic proofs of Christ, and the refusal to extend the range of theology beyond what God is for us to what God is in himself.

Garvie seeks first to defend the value judgment as a standard of faith. He attempts to refute the usual criticism that the value judgment is set in contrast with the "existence judgment." ". . . . a judgment of value

¹⁶ Lawton, J. S., *Conflict in Christology*. The Macmillan Company, 1947, p. 43.

is not a judgment about the unreal, the imagined, the invented. It is a judgment about reality. . . .”¹⁷

But after defending the doctrine against such critics as James Denney and James Orr, the latter declaring that Ritschl introduced a “divorce . . . between truths of faith and truths of reason,”¹⁸ Garvie then proceeds to criticize Ritschl himself, and is almost as devastating as these critics. He admits that “by distinguishing theoretical from value judgments, Ritschianism . . . does seem to . . . abandon to irreligious science or philosophy the wider realm of human knowledge.”¹⁹

Recognizing this fact, Garvie offers two protections against the possible subjectivity which the value judgment might bring. The first is the supreme object of Christian faith—God in Christ; and the second is the constant witness of the Christian community throughout the centuries. Garvie does not fully realize, however, that the two “protections” offered overthrow the whole structure upon which the value judgment is based, and throw the entire question into a different area; namely, the realm of biblical revelation and the faith-principle as the way in which to arrive at a Christian philosophy of knowledge.

Yet Garvie goes on to use the value judgment as the basis for rejecting the older proofs of Christ (pre-existence, virgin birth, and miracles) and establishing proofs from his moral character, religious consciousness, and mediatorial efficacy. The latter group of proofs is valuable, of course, but the other doctrines are regrettably rejected because Garvie approaches them in a purely rational fashion (seeing them as “alien” categories) rather than seeing them in terms of the total biblical and theological framework, as they were meant to be seen.

The value judgment as used by Garvie is therefore entirely typical of his theological age; and by his own admission and necessary “patch-work,” moves in the direction of a subjective rather than an objective interpretation of the personality of Christ and the validity of his truth.

5. *Sociological Category: The Organism—Its Use in Garvie’s Social Concepts.* Garvie’s use of the “organism” concept served him better than any of the other categories discussed above, largely because it does not presume to trespass upon the realm rightly belonging to theology, as the other categories do, and because it is in substantial agreement with the

¹⁷ Garvie, Alfred E., *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, p. 10.

¹⁸ Orr, James, *Ritschianism*. A. C. Armstrong and Son, 1903, p. 257.

¹⁹ Garvie, Alfred E., *The Ritschian Theology*. T. & T. Clark, 1902, p. 191.

generally accepted philosophy of Christian social relations. The third volume of his theological trilogy, *The Christian Ideal for Human Society*, is therefore more widely read than the other two, and remains today an excellent historical and general survey of the Christian approach to ethical and cultural problems of individual and group life.

He draws upon Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mackenzie, and R. M. MacIver in building his interpretation of society as "organic," for he sees "society as . . . a greater organism, alike in its structure and its functions, exhibiting the same kind of unity,"²⁰ the individual finding his fulfillment in society just as the cells and separate organs find theirs in the total organism. But he is careful in his application of the category to balance the demands of the individual and those of society, so that the former is not sacrificed for the latter. He was not unaware of the truth involved in MacIver's statement: "The only centers of activity, of feeling, of function, of purpose which we know are individual selves. . . . The group has no fulfillment except that of its members, present or future."²¹ This principle of delicate balance is applied effectively in the light of Christian insights to all areas of personal and social life, and used to good advantage, particularly with reference to the special problems of law enforcement, socialism, and pacifism.

Garvie's reluctance to apply the concept of organism in an absolute manner is perhaps most vividly illustrated in the fact that although no one was more interested in the ecumenical movement than he, he could not bring himself to recommend one uniform Christian organization as the proper goal, saying that "It is very doubtful whether one universal ecclesiastical organization would be a benefit to mankind. . . ."²² And although he was interested in the Established Church and the Free Churches in England coming together in organic unity, he would not for a moment sacrifice the validity of the nonepiscopal ministry.

Here, once more, the chosen category is somewhat qualified, although in this instance without altering it drastically and still leaving it effective for Christian uses.

IV. CONCLUSION

Garvie's use of these five categories—scientific, philosophical, psychological, ethico-esthetical, and sociological—in an attempt to integrate them into an evangelical theology therefore qualifies him as a theological ex-

²⁰ MacIver, R. M., *Society*. Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1937, p. 42.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

²² Garvie, Alfred E., *The Master's Comfort and Hope*. T. & T. Clark, 1917, p. 35.

ponent of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By studying him we become acquainted with the prevailing thought from those areas during that period. But we learn also the inherent weakness involved in attempting to build a Christian theology in terms of essentially non-Christian categories. The "form" of Christian theology must be consistent with the "substance." The "changing," if it is to be used, must be bent to the purpose of the "permanent," or discarded entirely if it is not adaptable.

The inescapable conclusion therefore is that Christian theology depends entirely and exclusively upon the reality and validity of revelation. If there is no Christian revelation, there is no Christian theology and there are no theological categories. The century of theological activity which Schleiermacher opened tried nontheological categories as a means of expressing Christian concepts. This procedure at last revealed its own futility and sterility. Consequently, as Richardson says, the century of Schleiermacher "closed with the confident re-assertion of those (purely theological) categories and the renewed insistence upon the independence of theology."²³

From this point of view, the chief value derived from a study of Garvie is that one may see in him the extreme difficulty of attempting to state the truths of the Christian religion by any means except those which are intrinsic to Christianity itself.

²³ Richardson, Alan, *Christian Apologetics*, p. 57.

A Review of the Quarter's Fiction

JOHN C. SCHROEDER

SURELY IT IS MORE than coincidental that the storytellers are finding their themes in religious and ecclesiastical life. It would not be wise to infer that such interests are indices of a revival of religion. Their concerns seem often to be intellectual rather than functional; but the prevailing naturalism of a generation ago is now being displaced here and there by themes which are concerned with the inner life of men, with conscience rather than with the casual lives of bright sophisticates. There is no reason to be surprised that our time should deeply disturb men of sensitivity, or that they should be led to probe into deeper springs of action. Surely part of this religious interest can be attributed to a revival of Roman Catholic letters. It is to be seen in poetry and drama even more than in fiction. Nevertheless it is surprising to see so many novels about the church and the people who are in it.

The Cardinal heads the best-seller list. Its interest is ecclesiastical more than religious, and one is bound to suspect that it is so popular not merely because of its theme but also because, as a slick, smooth story, it is so American. Stephen Fermoyle is a Horatio Alger hero, the child of a Boston streetcar motorman, who becomes a Cardinal. His rise in preference is as rapid and spectacular as was the rise to riches of a robber baron a generation ago—itself an index of the anachronistic character of the church in our day, in which a man may presumably rise to power even though the mood of the times opposes such success in other realms of endeavor. Steve Fermoyle goes to Holy Cross; starts his ecclesiastical career as a curate in his home church; is disciplined by his Cardinal and sent to serve as a priest in a destitute parish; and after doing a magnificent job there, begins his rapid climb. Father Fermoyle always does the right thing at the right time. He administers the last rites to an Italian laborer caught in a broken pipe, and as a result heals the breach in the church in Boston between the Italians and the Irish. He persecutes an abortion ring of which his sister Mona was a victim. He translates a scholarly book, and as a result gets

JOHN C. SCHROEDER, D.D., LL.D., is Master of Calhoun College and Professor of Religion, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. In this quarter, Roman Catholic novels take the lead.

the attention of his superiors. During the Smith-Hoover campaign, he is sent to the South and is beaten by members of the Klan.

Through Stephen's experiences, the reader comes to see how parishes are run, how the priest autocratically manages everything from finances to morals, how the Vatican's international politics are handled. As a kind of ecclesiastical Lanny Budd, he is in Rome at the election of two Popes and becomes an intimate of the cultured Italian aristocracy which so successfully controls the church's politics. He can charm the learned by quoting Horace at fashionable dinner parties, and be at home with the humble Boston Irish.

When Fermoyle becomes Bishop of Hartford, he runs his diocese wisely and competently. The intimate of Al Smith, he advises him politically. He is the protagonist of his church in its battles on every front from birth control to relations between church and state. In his descriptions of all these conflicts, Mr. Robinson makes a most plausible case for the church's dogmatic position. It is interesting to see how Stephen maintains his dogmatic position even when his sister Mona is in the hospital waiting the arrival of her illegitimate child. He refuses to allow the doctor to save her life instead of that of the baby. He will not condone what he calls "murder." This easy ethical oversimplification of moral problems is so characteristic of the church's dogmatic arrogance in so many human dilemmas. It can take so much pride in the Vatican's opposition to Hitler, and can be so quiet about Franco.

The Cardinal is an interesting and revealing account of the Roman Catholic Church in America. One can see the devotion and efficiency of its administrators, the curious paradox of its loyalty to the Vatican and the parochialism of the Irish in America as opposed to Italian domination, the loyalty of the laity to the democratic tradition and their acceptance of a feudal ecclesiastical institution. What most impressed me about the character of Stephen Fermoyle is that Mr. Robinson's ideal ecclesiastic is a man of the renaissance. He is wise, shrewd, a self-disciplined man of the world, who with great versatility administers a complex social organization. In disciplining himself, he disciplines others.

Father Cawdor, in *The Encounter*, is a very different kind of man. As the priest of a parish in Maryland, he lives by an ascetic creed. His intellectual integrity is as sharp and clean as his simple room, with its bare bed and unadorned walls. When a wealthy widow wants to give his church pew cushions, he refuses the gift. "I am obliged to think well of self-denial. Even in small matters we have more reason to seek pain than to avoid it." His curate is very much concerned with the papal encyclicals

dealing with matters of social and economic justice. But to Father Cawdor, even the pronouncements of the Vatican are quite irrelevant to the imperious demands of a life of spiritual self-abnegation. However, Father Cawdor is intellectually keen enough to suspect that his life is tainted by spiritual pride. The purity of his intellectual love of God does not help him love men.

He dreams of an encounter which is fulfilled when he meets a high diver in a carnival passing through town, and the diver's shabby, pathetic young mistress, who asks him to find a place in a convent for her illegitimate child. Father Cawdor realizes that he does not know how to handle these people, how to help them. Feeling impelled to do something about it, he goes out to find them and gets involved in a world of crime and violence. In such a world, the church, its helpless but kind nuns, and the clean austerity of his asceticism are impotent against the forces of human passion and frustration. "I am trivial and abominable. I can envy the joy of those who love God, I who cannot love even another man."

The Encounter is well written. Mr. Power can think in theological terms. He is also observant, and his descriptions of ordinary people are alive and subtle. What is more important, the spiritual conflict in Father Cawdor's soul is genuine. The priest is a truly religious man, and the inner tumult of his life is a struggle authentically delineated.

I enjoyed *No Time to Look Back* as much as I have any novel I've read in a long time. There will be many who will insist that Andros, who is *Christus Redivivus*, is not a successfully portrayed character. I agree that as an essential element in the plot, Andros is not entirely convincing. Nevertheless, the book is not only well written: it is a moving and beautiful story. The setting is a prison camp in Malaya called Panchor. The prisoners are Englishmen whom the Japanese allow to discipline themselves. They have gradually come to get used to the heat, the bugs, the miserable food, and the occasional brutalities and cruelties of their captors. They dream of their memories and hope for their freedom. Padre Choyce, their Anglican chaplain, is responsible for their morale. His Christianity is a hearty, healthy religion, and the men respect and love him. Then one day in the hospital, he meets a patient whose name is Andros; the man presumably suffers from amnesia. He is vague about his father and where he came from. (Curiously enough, his background is Greek rather than Hebraic.) "Do I look as though I had come from anything except happiness?" As Choyce talks with Andros, he feels strengthened and more spiritually secure. He asks Andros, "But what have you left except a future you don't

know? Can you yearn for that?" And Andros replies, "Why not, Padre? Isn't that your work too—to make a future where men will perceive how ugly they make their lives with hatred?" It is after Choyce has come to know Andros that he realizes, "I have too much the habit of giving; perhaps I have lost the ability to receive."

The plot is complex and exciting. The main protagonists are Choyce, who represents a fine, undogmatic Christian humanity; Pendle, the artist, who hopes to find his salvation through beauty; Sato, the Japanese officer, who tries to be kind to the prisoners, only to find his confidence in the tradition of civilization wrecked; the Commander, whose hope lies in sudden victory; Bumble, to whom life is nothing but biology, and the typical British officer for whom military discipline is life's whole answer.

In the background is Andros, whose fearless confidence and peace bring assurance and strength to the men and disquiet and anger to the military. *No Time to Look Back*, which is a quotation from a Japanese marching song, is a moving, exciting story. The life of the camp and the adventures of the men reveal human nature at its worst. Nevertheless, courage and decency and kindness are there even in the midst of atrocities. Choyce, living sympathetically with the miseries of his fellows as well as meeting his own tragedy heroically, comes to know the moment for what it is—eternity.

Great dreams of freedom come from the lives of humble people. *The Plymouth Adventure*, "a chronicle novel of those forgotten people whose spirit brought life to a new world," convincingly demonstrates the fact. It hardly seems accurate to describe the "Mayflower" passengers as forgotten people. Frustrated spinsters are forever pawing through their genealogical remains. Sentimental historians have raised them to mythological stature. Uncritical libertarians have denounced them as perverted bigots. But to Ernest Gébler, the people on the "Mayflower" were a group of decent folk, about whom there was nothing heroic, who started a new civilization simply because they were determined to be free. They differed radically in opinion and in background. They had even to accommodate themselves to different religious points of view—Miles Standish, for instance, was a Roman Catholic; and John Alden, who joined them as a carpenter, was not one of their religious band. When they left England, they were like refugees in our own time. They were cheated by the merchants of Southampton as well as by one of their own party, and they had to sell some of their precious food in order to pay the harbor fees. They endured the hardships of a three-months' trip on the cold Atlantic with fortitude; but so have other people suffered miserably. Mr. Jones, the

Master of the "Mayflower," tricked them and betrayed them. More than half of them died after they had been in the new world a year. They had their human weaknesses. " 'No, my friend,' Jones said, in a quieter voice, 'if you keep life in you in your new country—should you reach it, and should you grow, you will soon see to it, like every other body of men mad with belief in their own ignorance, that only those may live with you who bow to you and your will.' "

Nevertheless, unlike other groups who came to the new world, they had sufficient belief in their God and in human dignity to bind themselves together in a compact which ultimately made for a free government. When they first saw the bleak shore of Cape Cod and were ready to capitulate to despair, Bradford said to them:

These woes let us fairly admit, and, once faced, we need not dwell on them. They will not be remedied by making our faces pictures of misery. Think instead of those things we have done. We are poor men yet have moved ourselves from one side of the world to the other. That thought alone, of what you have done, will sustain you; that thought that you might have died in our England, having made no mark either for yourself or for God's freedom and truth than that which your boot made in the earth upon which you laboured. You have done a mighty thing!

The Plymouth Adventure is a fine novel, as well as being good history. It may help us to understand how the balances of history can be weighted and thrown; not by might but by ideas. It offers no solution for the mystery of history. In terms of cause and effect, one cannot see how such momentous consequences can ensue from such apparently simple powers. The "Mayflower" band were a small group of simple people who had integrity and courage and belief. But as Winslow said to Captain Jones, "Oh, I do not cast blame, in that you do not understand your shipful of simple people; why, simple people are the hardest thing in the world to understand—they mean what they say."

The Town is the last of Mr. Richter's trilogy on the beginnings of Ohio. Sayward Luckett Wheeler is now an old woman. During her childhood, she had feared the trees and had come to love the fields. But now she has become an anachronism. *The Town*, following *The Trees* and *The Fields*, tells the story of her life as the settlement grows, her husband, Porteus, builds his mansion in the town, and they leave the log cabin where the children grew up. The only child left her is Chancey, the delicate one. The tale of his boyhood love for his illegitimate half-sister is a lovely and sensitive story of adolescence. Porteus is witty and amusing and lusty—

like the town which is growing so rapidly. When Sayward moves to the large house, she begins to long for the trees which once she feared.

The Town tells the story of the shift in the American mind as the pioneer gives way to the townsman and new sets of values appear. Sayward's father, who as a pioneer was a hero, is an old wastrel when the town is built. Porteus can accommodate himself to the new demands. Sayward still believes in a hard-working classless society. A religious and a moral woman, she has risen above the drudgery of life in the log cabin because she has had enduring things to believe in. But in the mansion, all these values seem irrelevant. When Chancey rebels, she alone of her generation can understand him, and she supports him, even though he does not know it.

The Town captures all the vitality of American life a hundred years ago, when it must have been wonderful to be alive and watch communities grow. Life was creative and lusty and joyous. But it had its tragedy and misery, too. Whatever was great about it came from women like Sayward. Her virtues, however, were not incomprehensible. They were good legal tender in the moral realm then; and they are good now.

The Cardinal. By HENRY MORTON ROBINSON. New York: Simon and Schuster. pp. 579. \$3.50. Paper bound, \$1.00.

The Encounter. By CRAWFORD POWER. New York: William Sloane Associates. pp. 310. \$3.00.

No Time to Look Back. By LESLIE GREENER. New York: The Viking Press. pp. 281. \$3.00.

The Plymouth Adventure. By ERNEST GÉBLER. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company. pp. 377. \$3.00.

The Town. By CONRAD RICHTER. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 433. \$3.50.

Book Reviews

Christianity and Society. By NELS F. S. FERRÉ. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. 280. \$3.75.

Four years ago Professor Ferré launched what is now his trilogy on *Reason and the Christian Faith*. The first volume made it clear that the human reason is at its best when it is responsible to the eternal process in the universe, the "existential ultimate." The second volume analyzed the factor that is most likely to thwart both one's concern for the ultimate and one's capacity to implement it, the factor of evil in the universe. In this present volume, the Christian reason is set in operation against the evils that arise in society.

The theological foundation for the social relevance of Christianity is expounded, and specific suggestions are advanced as to what social action would be if God were seriously accepted as the "prime mover" in human affairs. As the source of authority and motivation for society, Christianity is world-transcending, i.e., "more than society." As the source of the love (*agape*) that creates love (*philia*), Christianity is "true society." As the source of ethical insight and power, Christianity is world-transforming, i.e., "completely for society."

The basis for such a combination of convictions is, in Ferré, a curious blend of Protestant pietism and scholastic moralism. Unlike other contemporary Protestants who discuss social ethics, Ferré believes the Christian is obliged not simply to secure justice in society, but to introduce love. If he cannot do this, he is "no better than the world" (p. 202). The theological foundation for such a possibility is "the primacy of the Holy Spirit for Christian social action" (p. 177).

Quite in harmony with contemporary Catholic discussions, Ferré believes that specific moral wisdom is available to society in general by way of the moral law in nature. The theological basis for this claim is the primacy not so much of the Holy Spirit as of the Spirit of God. There is a difference. The Holy Spirit represents the unique Christian revelation and obliges the *Christian* socially. The Spirit of God represents the Creator, under whom *all* men are obliged to one another in society. Because both spirits exist in the Godhead, there is a workable continuity in the moral insight that derives from each. The theory is somewhat novel. The practical application in the concluding section on "concrete considerations" is not quite convincing. Pietism and the natural-law ethic are in an ingenious alliance. The relativistic compromises which the natural-law ethic permits in concrete social circumstances protect the pietist's claim that under the given circumstances his action is not simply just but loving.

It is the strength of Ferré's work that it takes the reality and power of God seriously in social matters. It is the limitation of the work that it underestimates the tragedy of the world and the Christian's involvement in the tragedy. Consistent with his pietism, Ferré roots all social problems in the problem of the individual. Thus he does not do justice to the demonic structures which disfigure society *qua* society. There is an attractively heroic quality in the author's conviction that martyrdom is to be preferred to the choice of a lesser of two evils (p. 141), but martyrdom can scarcely classify as social action. In the presence of the unjust use of power by social institutions, Ferré nonetheless believes "all power is from God for a good purpose and does not corrupt, for corruption is in the human soul" (p. 232). In the presence of the

organized malice of contemporary civilization, Ferré says, almost naïvely, "Some fear to apply the word 'Christian' to civilization. Yet 'the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof'" (p. 244). In the presence of the imminent tragedy of war, Ferré reaffirms the optimism that characterized his earlier treatise on *Evil and the Christian Faith*, and in the same terms. "Strife exists in order to differentiate individuals and groups for the sake of preparing them for fuller and better community. Group conflict and war are, thus, part and parcel of growing men and growing history" (p. 190).

CARL MICHALSON

Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.

Our Religious Traditions. By STERLING P. LAMPRECHT. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950. pp. viii-99. \$2.00.

In virtually every age of Western civilization—from Philo to Maritain—men have tried to state the Judeo-Christian faith in terms of Greek philosophy, but this volume by Professor Lamprecht, despite the author's wish to place our historic faiths "on a more truly Hellenic basis," does not represent a similar endeavor. The book was written "to promote understanding of the three great religious traditions of our Western world—Judaism, Catholicism, and Protestantism" and it is irenic in the most disarming sense of the word. It is, however, an attack on prophetic religion, not a philosophic restatement of it. In the first three chapters the author has isolated what he regards as the central principles of each faith, and in a concluding chapter he has presented his solution of the "imperative problem" of synthesis.

"The Heritage of Judaism" is traced from its origins in the Mosaic covenant to the emergence of the concept of the Suffering Servant, and Jesus is depicted in this tradition as one "carrying out the purposes of the Pharisaic movement." The unique biblical view of the nature and relationship of God and man is not stressed. We are told instead that in our own time this "covenant principle" should be broadened to mean "recognition of the mutual involvement of all men in common problems and common interests and common destinies."

"The Genius of Catholicism" is found in its "catholicity," that is, its effort to form a great humane and synthetic tradition which provides "for the nurture of successive generations." Four examples from early Christian history, illustrating the development of the Scriptural Canon, episcopal organization, and the Creeds, are used to show the growth of this idea. Since the principle of catholicism is seen as something "not even necessarily and intrinsically Christian" it is not surprising that the parallel development of "Romanism" in the Church is lamented, or that the doctrine of original sin, for example, is traced to "pathological melancholia."

In his chapter on "The Adventure of Protestantism" the author has found the common element to be the "insistence upon the right to be different." In studying the content of Protestant faiths, four main types are delineated: those who turn to the inner promptings of the Spirit of God, to the Bible, or to the teachings and character of Jesus ("a quite attenuated form of Christianity"), and finally, those who advocate "an amplified Protestantism," incorporating the entire legacy of Western and world culture ("a break with historic Christianity"). The fundamental principle is expressed in Luther's words: "The Christian man is the most free lord of all, and subject to none"; but since Protestantism, like Catholicism, is held to be "only accidentally Christian," the meaning of Luther's Christocentric theology of freedom is lost and Protestantism comes to be merely an assertion of personal freedom, libertarianism.

After Mr. Lamprecht has extracted his three essentially nonreligious "principles" of covenant, catholicity, and freedom, he undertakes the task of "amalgamation." He recommends a humanistic catholicism that recognizes mankind's mutual needs, yet prizes individuality. To this end he introduces the Platonic principle that "*the ultimate [is] a value by which all the powers that there may be, small and great, finite and even infinite, may, indeed must, be judged.*" (Italics mine.) Thus Jews and Christians are to slough off their interest in faith, revelation, and many "noxious," "curious," "archaic," or "insidious" customs and institutions, and affirm as true the one principle which they have continually denounced as presumptuous, arrogant, sinful, and absolutely false!

One's opinion of a book which puts Hellenism to these uses must be formed in accordance with one's relative evaluation of the prophecy of Isaiah and the rationalism of Plato. The reviewer holds no very sanguine hopes for any "philosophy" of religion on the perennial Hellenic basis, but of this attempt in particular he would say with Kierkegaard: "It is as if Christ were a professor, and as if the apostles had founded a little scientific society." (*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 193.) He would suggest, too, that it is before God—not at the feet of Plato—that Jew, Protestant, and Catholic can, and do, stand together—under judgment, not judging.

SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM

Tutor in History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Orientation in Religious Education. Edited by PHILIP HENRY LOTZ. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. pp. 618. \$6.50.

This massive resource volume fills an important need in the literature of the Christian education movement. It should quickly assume its place on the general reference shelf of all those who want to keep up with what is happening in the educational work of the Christian churches.

It will be useful as a basic text in seminary and college survey courses, questions and topics for further discussion and study adding to its effectiveness as a teaching tool. Ministers and professional Christian education workers in local churches will find in it a panorama of the churches' concern for their teaching task. Young people, considering the preparation and later entrance into the profession, will find here an outline of the field. Denominational and interdenominational workers on Christian education staffs will find their eyes lifted to the broader horizons of their task.

The editor will be remembered as the author or editor of sixteen solid volumes in Christian education. Nearly twenty years ago he and L. W. Crawford prepared a similar volume, *Studies in Religious Education*. The two decades have been momentous in the history of our nation and in the life of American Protestantism. They have been just as significant in the circles of the Christian education movement. It was a sound decision to prepare an entirely new volume rather than to attempt a revision of the 1931 book. It is interesting to notice that only three persons contributed to both volumes.

Forty-six persons have each contributed a chapter to this volume, which is divided into six main headings: The Cultural and Religious Setting of Religious Education, Materials and Methods, Agencies and Organizations, Directing Religious Education, Agencies for Co-operation, and Wider Perspectives.

Chapter headings in this last section will be interesting to those who are interested primarily in the broader aspects of the churches' work. They will also suggest the

inclusive contents of each of the preceding sections. The Relation of Church and State, The Relation of Religion and Public Education, Jewish Education in America, Roman Catholic Religious Education, The Development of Religious Education in Other Countries, and Protestantism's Strategy for Religious Education are discussed.

This is a book on general principles and broad backgrounds. The reader who comes to the volume in search of a kit of practical tricks will be disappointed. It will take more than a careful reading of this book to make a successful practitioner in the difficult art of religious teaching. Not even the section on Materials and Methods will accomplish that.

But that is not the purpose of the volume. It was meant to present in outline form the varying aspects of this many-sided movement, and to relate this means of proclaiming and teaching the gospel to the wider task of the Christian church. That achievement has been magnificently realized.

Minor criticisms could be offered. "Christian education" rather than "religious education" is the term being used by many of our denominational bodies and inter-church agencies. It is growing in favor, I wish it might have been used here. The chapter dealing with Jewish educational work could have been retained even so. It is a little difficult to understand why children's work, alone among all the others, is treated without benefit of a separate chapter heading. Protestant parochial school systems might have been discussed by an executive of the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church.

But these small considerations do not detract in any significant way from the usefulness of this book, made doubly useful by the specialized chapter bibliographies, the comprehensive, general bibliography, helpfully classified, the directory of religious education agencies, the biographical notes, and the general index.

The price is high; yes, but you will be using this book for a long time to come.

GERALD E. KNOFF

Associate General Secretary, International Council of Religious Education, Chicago, Illinois.

Christianity and History. By HERBERT BUTTERFIELD. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. pp. vi-146. \$2.75.

Compared to the various works on the meaning of history which have been written recently by both historians and theologians, this book by a Methodist professor of modern history at Cambridge University is small and unpretentious; it contains seven lectures. But the present reviewer finds in it firmer ground to stand on than is offered by such monumental works as those of Toynbee and Sorokin; brilliant and stimulating as these may be, the elaborate speculative superstructure looms so large. Professor Butterfield seems concerned with actuality rather than with system-building, understanding actuality in the light of God, without intervening mental ingenuities. Lest this statement suggest a dogmatic approach, however, one must add that his is a sensitive, flexible, and highly intelligent faith.

Christianity, he points out, is a historical religion in two senses. (1) Each phase of its becoming was intimately related to catastrophic history and the moral paradoxes with which it forced men to grapple—the sort of history to which we have returned in this century; (2) Christianity's central doctrines are historical events or interpretations.

Academic historical study, with its necessary emphasis on concrete fact as determined by careful scientific detective work, cannot meet the need for interpretation

which some students wistfully seek in it. One has to bring to it whatever philosophy or religion he has already found elsewhere; academic history can neither give this nor take it away.

Dr. Butterfield's own affirmation is that the all-important factor, purpose, and end of history is, not the species, race, class, or state, but personality; "every human being is a separate well of life, a separate source of action . . ." (p. 28) He hastens to add that not only practically all great men (as Lord Acton said), but all men, are sinners. The one principal sin that works in history, which "locks people up in all their other sins, and fastens men and nations more tightly than ever in their predicaments," (p. 40), is the sin of self-righteousness. This has affected churchmen almost equally with unbelievers—and yet Christianity is the one solvent which, properly understood, can dissolve self-righteousness. We are warned against seeing any great war between nations or creeds as representing absolute right against wrong. "We are right if we want to see our history in moral terms, but we are not permitted to erect the human drama into a great conflict between good and evil in this particular way." (p. 91)

Discussing "judgment" in history, with particular reference to the history of Europe in the last hundred years, he concludes that if Germany is under judgment, so is our whole civilization. And whether or not these verdicts of history which seem to show a rough kind of justice should be attributed to God, they cannot be taken as God's last word. The preaching of the Hebrew prophets culminated in the picture of the Servant, whose undeserved suffering, "far from being meaningless . . . provides the nearest thing to a clue for those who wish to make anything out of the human drama." (p. 85)

He sees a hint of something providential in the very constitution of things, and also in the operation of the collective wisdom of the human race, which works providentially in the sense of creating good out of evil. Some kind of history-making "goes on over our heads," and he holds that even from a worldly standpoint we deceive ourselves less if we use personal symbols for it than if we do not. There is a special Providence "for those who consciously seek to be in alliance with it," but this does not guarantee any future Utopia or exemption from or victory in war—it guarantees only "a mission in the world and the kind of triumph that may come out of apparent defeat." (p. 112)

In dealing with the historical validity of the Gospels, he maintains that acceptance of what is really there is not a question of scholarship but of our whole personal response. His conclusion is: "avoid being caught in contemporary systems of thought," "Hold to Christ, and for the rest be totally uncommitted." (p. 146)

ERMINIE HUNTRESS LANTERO
Religion in Life, New York City.

The Christian Response to the Atomic Crisis. By EDWARD LEROY LONG, JR. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. pp. 112. \$2.00.

Civil engineer and theologian, Edward LeRoy Long, Jr., brings to the atomic crisis a scientist's keen analysis, probes to the roots of the problem, and insists, "The practical problem of discussing what to do with the bomb is not nearly so basic as the task of making clear the theoretical grounds on which our judgment must be made."

The preface and first two chapters so cogently consider the attitudes and

attempts to respond to the atomic menace that they alone demand that you read this book. With the skill of a surgeon Dr. Long dissects each proposal, puts his finger on the pulsing heart, and shows where the weakness lies. But so concerned is he with seeking the grounds for judgment and a Christian response, that he seems to nullify every practical suggestion. For instance, the scientists' proposal for world government is shown to be rooted in secular quicksand and is therefore almost condemned as stemming from secular ethical grounds. A potent case is made for action after Christian redemption, but we fear the sharp scalpel of Dr. Long which tends to cut the heart out of every alternative.

The same careful reasoning draws one to an almost similar situation at the end of the second section which deals with the ethical implications of the atomic bomb. Chapters four and five are again well worth study, for they are concise statements of the positions of the pacifists, the militarists, and those who propose atomic control. Each suggestion is again challenged. Pacifism, for instance—that is political pacifism (which I do not think can be so neatly separated from pacifism in general)—is rejected because "it cannot be defended as pragmatically realistic." Nevertheless, when we find our ground for a Christian response, it is redeeming love, and Dr. Long says, "Pacifism is perhaps the most sensitive Christian position in the immediate situation, and probably the only Christian position in the ultimate issue." Having arrived at this point we are obliged to return to our choice between calculated alternatives, and I wonder if the lines drawn between secular and religious judgments were possible in the first place. In the end we must live and act with very mixed motives.

Whatever else may be said about this interesting mixture of liberal and neo-orthodox thinking, we can rejoice that action is not completely "sickled o'er with the pale cast of" neo-orthodox thought. In any event this scientist turned theologian has a clear mind and a resounding voice. This book will help us to remember that our actions, if they are to avail, must take God and Christ into account.

WILFRED HANSEN

The Methodist Church, Islip, New York.

Doctors Courageous. By EDWARD H. HUME. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. xiv-297. \$3.50.

Dr. Hume tells a good story. At home in Africa, India and Pakistan, the Near and Middle East, and China, he takes his readers rapidly through space and time to show them the power of the service of self-forgetful healers. Courageous foreign doctors are accompanied in this compact little book by their nurses, students, companions who were native to the lands of the foreigners' choice; and the most casual reader must sense the spirit of supranational and racial brotherhood which animated these Christian physicians.

Missionary enthusiasts will read the book and rejoice in its thumbnail sketches of the medical pioneers whose lives have been the warp and woof of international and interfaith good will for the past century. They will wish that the stories could have been expanded into more detailed accounts of *how* these men came to be what they were and *how* they accomplished the phenomenal things they did, but 297 pages cannot answer all the questions which they can raise. The very brevity of the account of transformations in the culture of those areas of the world makes for readability and whets the curiosity for further inquiry.

The volume as it stands would be good reading for skeptics who are sufficiently out of date in reference to Christian missions to worry lest missionaries are "thrusting religion" upon unwilling people. True, the doctors include those who were persecuted by inhospitable native sons who were as suspicious of foreign influence as we are! Time and again, however, Dr. Hume tells the tale of the ultimate acceptance by an originally hostile society of kindly doctors going about doing good to wracked and painful bodies. One wonders if critics of foreign missions know how sympathetically and intelligently courageous doctors deal with the taboos of cultures other than their own. Dr. Hume's casual references to the practices of Christian physicians emphasize that tact. For instance, "Christian doctors and nurses often had to remind themselves how ritually unclean they were. It would have been a calamity, for example, if they had stepped into any caste person's cook room. All the food there would have had to be thrown away. . . . Everywhere in India Christian nurses and midwives learned to carry every bit of their medical kit with their own hands, for it too was unclean. . . . More than the relief or cure that they sought to effect, they hoped for a change in social attitude." (pp. 159-160)

If it be "thrusting religion" on unwilling people to hope to change social attitudes which degrade some human beings, then all of us who work for fair race relations in America are guilty. This account of men and women whose self-forgetting service in places far from their own homes changed social attitudes makes their work sound normal and healthy, the action of citizens of God's world as well as their own neighborhoods.

One wonders if missionary doctors were not several generations ahead of the rest of us in recognizing that physical ills are inseparably related to spiritual needs. A book like this, read sympathetically, provides numerous illustrations of the progressive, far-sighted wisdom of these professional pioneers.

Too many modern men and women identify missions with pious fanaticism and discredit individual missionaries as visionaries and/or fools, professional "goody-goodies." Those who meet *Doctors Courageous* must realize that these men were of no small stature, nor were they pious practitioners condescending to deal with underprivileged, "backward" peoples. On the contrary they include experts who co-operated freely with friends in their new homes, learning from the ancient wisdom as well as taking their new skills to the old world. Broad-minded men of science, they were also big-hearted men of God.

MILDRED McA. HORTON

President, the United Board for Christian Colleges in China, New York City.

The Gospel in Hymns. By ALBERT EDWARD BAILEY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. pp. xx-600. \$6.00.

The seeds of this graphic account of great hymns of Christendom that are in use today were planted in the heart of an eager boy. He came under the spell of a neighboring minister who was also a hymnic scholar and enthusiast. Occasionally on a Sunday evening he would visit that church and listen to word pictures which introduced him to the "glorious company" of hymnic poets of all ages. Albert Edward Bailey repaid that debt by a lifelong study of our heritage of hymns, which culminated in this capacious volume, dealing with a group of about 300 hymns.

The scheme of arrangement is chronological, according to distinct periods in history. In presenting the hymns, the author writes: "While the experience that

inspired them may have been personal, the form and subject-matter were conditioned in part at least by the author's setting in time and place, by his historical, religious, and social environment."

This plan is carried out with marked success. Each of the nineteen chapters covers a hymnic period; it is headed by a dated summary giving the salient religious and political events, with the names of the contemporary hymn writers. For example, chapter seven covers the Age of Romanticism, ranging from about 1760 to 1830. The historical summary lists the major contemporary events and mentions the founding of pioneer missionary societies, wars with France, industrial advances, riots and agitation for reform, legalizing of trade unions. The democratic movement in England was gathering strength; the rebellion of the American Colonies and the French Revolution had challenged the existing social order. The hymns of this period followed not only these challenging movements but they followed the emotional trend in the lyrics of the day inspired by Wordsworth, Coleridge, Scott, Shelley, and Keats. Among them were Heber's "The Son of God goes forth to war" (1812), "From Greenland's icy mountains" (1819), and "Holy, Holy, Holy" (1827); and Marriott's "Thou whose almighty word" (c. 1813). These are all given spacious treatment. The massive contribution of Montgomery and Keble covers eleven pages, while Lyte, Bowring, and others fare as well. The analysis of "When Wilt Thou Save the People?" reveals its author, Ebenezer Elliott, fighting stoutly for civil reform with his poignant verses.

After the chapter on Hymns of the Oxford Movement, with its provocative essay on the causes of that Movement, comes a group of three chapters on Latin, Greek, and German hymns, totaling nearly a quarter of the whole work. For 130 pages we trace the sources and entry into English hymnody of these hymns through translation. The Bohemian and Moravian contributions appear at the head of the German summary; later it is noted that there were Moravian missions to the West Indies (1732), Georgia (1735), and Pennsylvania (1741).

The author continues with an equally full treatment of the Victorian Era, in four sections—High Church; Evangelical; Broad Church, emphasizing social progress; and Dissenting. In his consideration of the present century, five post-Victorians are mentioned, whose work holds an honored place in our hymnals: Holland, Chesterton, Oxenham, Bax, and Fletcher.

Professor Bailey finally turns to America, reviewing the trends of its hymns under three headings. First comes the Evangelical and Evangelistic period of the nineteenth century, followed by the Revolt against Calvinism, as evidenced by eminent Unitarians and Friends. Here we note the rewarding pages on Whittier, six of whose hymns find a place in the collection. The final chapter is devoted to the New Theology and the Social Gospel, in which he discusses the most recent expressions of consecrated faith and resolve.

This book differs from existing hymnal handbooks and companions in that it selects hymns that occur in the majority of a group of modern hymnals, ten in number, issued between 1918 and 1943. (Seven are American, two Canadian, and one English. Four represent churches of the liturgical type.) Moreover, it places these chosen hymns and their authors in the frame of their times. It does not suffer from the inevitable compressions of the usual handbooks, in which both hymn texts and tunes are included. Our book confines itself entirely to the hymn texts.

A signal addition is the inclusion of 184 illustrations of very high quality, partly

the result of the author's journeyings, which penetrated Palestine and Turkey, as well as England and the Continent. A good instance of their value is in the account given of the monastery at Mar Saba, in the wilderness of Judea, and of the precious hymns that were given birth there. Stephen the Sabait, Andrew of Crete, and John of Damascus with his immortal Easter hymns, were among its bards who enriched our heritage of Greek hymns. Five excellent pictures of the monastery, its wild surroundings and its service book add much to the story.

In this appraisal of the 313 selected hymns, Professor Bailey has brought together in one volume material stemming from a hundred sources, in most readable style. Fascinating stories are found in these pages, told with the skill of a veteran teacher who is entirely at home in the origins and nature of the Christian faith, as is shown by his other books on biblical subjects. He analyzes each hymn, generally stanza by stanza, often with related Scripture passages, adding notes on its imagery and purposes.

This book should have a place in the hymnic library of all those interested in worship.

REGINALD L. MCALL

The Hymn Society of America, 297 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

A Pictorial Gospel. By ELIOT HODGKIN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. pp. 212. \$3.50.

Eliot Hodgkin in this book offers a rich contribution to any library. Mr. Hodgkin neither wrote nor illustrated his book; he compiled it. It was written by the four original biographers of Christ, Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, and is illustrated with 120 pictures, most of them masterpieces from one point of view or another, by sixty-seven different artists.

The Christian drama from the Annunciation to the Resurrection is narrated in consecutive form by selections taken first from one Gospel and then another. Thus the different versions of the same well-known story are presented and the reader has vividly before him the contrast in style and approach of the Gospel writers. Mark's matter-of-fact "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God," for instance, is offered with John's poetically philosophic "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

But if we find a marked difference in style or expression in these early historians, it diminishes in proportion when we look at the pictures, so great is the contrast among them. By tremendous breadth of scope in regard to time, geography, and temperament, Mr. Hodgkin has in his selection emphasized the universality of the Christian theme. His illustrations date from the eleventh to the nineteenth century. It would be difficult to find art expressions more different from each other, for instance, than Rubens' impressive, baroque, sophisticatedly realistic "Priests questioning Christ," and a delightful series of episodes illustrating "The Wicked Husbandmen," from a French *Moralized Bible History* of the thirteenth century, naively realistic but sophisticatedly abstract. Gerard David naturally set his "Adoration of the Kings" in a Flemish village of the fifteenth century, while Tintoretto gave to the "Chastisement of Serpents" the feeling of the rich brocade of the Venice of the Renaissance. The mood ranges from William Blake's dramatically sinister, highly stylized, "Soldiers Casting Lots for Christ's Garment," to the mild, sweet enchantment of Fra Angelico's "Entombment."

Mr. Hodgkin is to be congratulated on the freshness as well as the breadth of his choice. He has sought masterpieces that are not among the most frequently reproduced. The question will undoubtedly be asked, "Why is no modern art included?" The most recently painted picture chosen by Mr. Hodgkin, not one of his most successful choices, is "Jesus Washing Peter's Feet," by Ford Madox Brown (1821-93). Granted that modern artists have concerned themselves in theme more with the social implications of the Christian ethic than with the dramatic episodes from the New Testament so richly treated already. Nevertheless, when we think of the vitality of Van Gogh's "Sowers" and Franklin Watkins' "Entombment" we cannot help wishing that some expression of our own age had not been excluded from this fine book.

HARRIET FITZGERALD

Artist, 246 West 11th Street, New York City.

The Person and Work of Christ. By BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE WARFIELD. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1950. pp. xiii-575. \$4.50.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, to name a contemporary American Calvinist of the stature of B. B. Warfield, who for thirty-five years, until his death in 1921, resolutely carried on the Reformed tradition at Princeton Theological Seminary. He published a number of books during his lifetime, conspicuous among them being *The Lord of Glory* and *Counterfeit Miracles*. The greater part of his literary output, however, took the form of articles contributed to the theological journals and other periodicals, and to the religious and biblical encyclopedias. He was also a famous book reviewer. One may find issues of the old *Princeton Theological Review*, whose chief reason was to provide the medium for an article or book review by Warfield. He was a warrior armed with a trusty Excalibur—nothing less than the Calvinistic "standards." He would fall with devastating effect upon a book which was so unfortunate as to arouse his academic and theological ire. Some of his estimates seem extreme enough from our point of view. For example, James Denney (of all men!) indulged in "rationalism"; Sabatier put the lamb of religion *inside* the lion of science; Reinhold Seeberg had inexcusably abandoned Calvin's biblicism; Sanday had gone back on the Incarnation, and H. R. Mackintosh was no better; Miss Underhill had surrendered Christian supernaturalism; and even H. Wheeler Robinson had "no authoritative standard of Christian doctrine"! Fortunately, one man at least remained—James Orr—who had not bowed himself in the house of Rimmon; and Andrew Lang is allowed to have been not far from the Kingdom of God.

In his will, Warfield provided for the publication of what could be deemed the most important of his essays, articles, shorter treatises, and reviews. They appeared in ten substantial volumes, published 1928-1932 by the Oxford University Press. The Oxford edition is now out of print. The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company has secured the rights of republication. The present volume, edited by Samuel G. Craig, is the second to be issued under the new imprint. It consists of selections taken—with a few exceptions—from different volumes of the Oxford edition, and rearranged under the title indicated.

As would be expected by all who knew Warfield, the articles on the "Person" of Christ are unswervingly loyal to the Nicene-Chalcedonian tradition. "What may very properly be called the Chalcedonian 'settlement' has remained until today the

authoritative statement of the elements of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. It has well deserved to do so. For this 'settlement' does justice at once to the data of Scripture, to the implicates of Incarnation, to the needs of Redemption, to the demands of the religious emotions, and to the logic of a tenable doctrine of our Lord's Person" (p. 189). Similarly, the articles on the "Work" of Christ are no less loyal to the "substitution-satisfaction" tradition. "It was not until the end of the eleventh century that the nature of the Atonement received at the hands of Anselm its first thorough discussion. Representing it, in terms derived from the Roman law, as in its essence a 'satisfaction' to the divine justice, Anselm set it once for all in its true relations to the inherent necessities of the divine nature, and to the magnitude of human guilt; and thus determined the outlines of the doctrine for all subsequent thought" (p. 353).

Warfield buttresses his position with ample biblical and historical resources. Few men of his time had a wider command of theological literature. Nothing seemed to escape his observation. He turned upon an incredibly wide and diversified range the coldly appraising eye of the critic who was so utterly sure of his own ground that he sensed intuitively where the dangers lurked. Like Goethe,

"He struck his finger on the place,
And said: 'Thou ailest here, and here'!"

What is astonishing, and certainly deeply suggestive, is the fact that as one considers the Christology and soteriology so consistently expounded and defended by Warfield, one has a curious feeling that it has contemporary relevance. The theological movement that seemed to leave Warfield high and dry is swinging again toward the position he so valiantly held. The statement must not be misunderstood. Much that Warfield said can never be said again. A pure Calvinism has become as impossible as a pure Thomism. The Thomists are admittedly Neo-Thomists; the Calvinists are admittedly Neo-Calvinists. The analogy is afforded by Platonism and Neo-Platonism. "Neo" is a polite way of saying, "so to speak"! But the concepts of Revelation, Incarnation, and Atonement are again commanding the theological mind. The one certain thing to be said about B. B. Warfield is that *his theological instinct was sound*. He saw where the real issues lay. We can afford to forget much that he wrote, and we can afford to forgive him for a certain harshness in many of his estimates, such as that H. R. Mackintosh wrote "in contradiction to the whole drift of revelation." All of this we can do; and we can do it the more readily because we realize that the breach in which he stood so valiantly is now seen once again to have been the Thermopylae Pass. It is strange that so often Thermopylae is recognized for what it was only in retrospect! The weapons Warfield used may be outmoded. The armor he wore may not have been designed for our day. The ponderous hoplite is giving way to the commando! But if the weaponry changes, the Cause does not—and "the Cause is the thing."

EDWIN LEWIS

Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, New Jersey.

Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History.

By OSCAR CULLMANN, translated from the German by FLOYD V. FILSON.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. pp. 253. \$5.00.

Oscar Cullmann's widely known *Christus und die Zeit*, a study crucial both in biblical theology and philosophy of history, is now made available in English. Though

some of the detail of the German edition's footnoting has been omitted in this translation, the text is intact, and rendered into clear and careful English by Professor Filson.

Cullmann's task is to recover from its later corruption the original conviction of the primitive church about the character of time and the place of Jesus Christ in the time process. The early Christians, he affirms, were typically "Hebrew" in taking time seriously. "Eternity" was conceived not as another plane of existence "over against" time, after the fashion of Greek thought, but as the extension of unilinear time, the arena in which God works his plan of salvation. In the continuous time process, the event of Jesus Christ becomes the pivotal center, by which all the "times" of history are to be understood. From this faith standpoint, the backward look sees the Creation, the Fall, and the promise of redemption in Old Testament thought, as events leading up to Christ. Looking ahead, this faith standpoint sees the age of the church and the *eschaton* as the fulfillment of Jesus Christ's mission. This view of history is Jewish (as opposed to Greek) in making the time line the *real* line of history. But it is a "stumbling block" to the Jews, since the center is regarded as having come in Jesus Christ, and no longer yet to be awaited.

Professor Cullmann develops the implication of this for the meaning of existence for those in the primitive church, who live "between the times" of the crucial victory over the world won in Jesus Christ in the past, and the final "V-Day" of the *eschaton*, when this victory will be consummated. It is only as we comprehend the cosmic centrality of Jesus Christ, and his established lordship over history, that we can fathom the purport of the church's relation to the world, and the meaning of the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and love.

A close reading of the tightly sewn fabric of Cullmann's book is extremely rewarding. It opens up exciting vistas into the mysterious land of the early church thought. It performs a notable service in correcting the kind of arbitrary treatments of the Bible by modern Christian theorists of history who are prone to read back into the New Testament their own preconceptions. Cullmann's treatment, though not without its own preconceptions, rings with the authenticity of a biblical scholar who subdues his preconceptions to the material. The sheer weight of evidence he corrals is overwhelmingly convincing.

There are disturbing elements, too. One cannot avoid the suspicion that the Old Testament material is made quite too neatly to fit the theme of "preparation." Is it quite just to the multifarious trends of Old Testament thought to say that "the entire redemptive history of the Old Testament tends toward the goal of the Incarnation" (p. 135)? One wonders, too, why no comparative reference is made to the "realized eschatology" position of C. H. Dodd, which so closely parallels Cullmann's thesis.

The final query one would like to put to Cullmann is not by way of criticism of his book, but as to the significance of its findings for the contemporary Christian, in his own effort to frame a Christian theory of history. For good or ill, we are inheritors of a "Greek" as well as a Hebrew tradition. Granted that the "Platonic" or de-temporalizing treatment of the New Testament message is alien to its spirit, can the modern Christian erase the Greek, as well as the modern scientific *Weltanschauung*, and confidently reassert the faith of the early church as his own? Is the Christian of today to be committed wholesale to the New Testament angelology, the Parousia, and some of the more difficult peculiarities of a Pauline cosmology? There are hints that Cullman believes he cannot. One is left wondering how much of the mind of

the primitive church can be in us, and how much cannot. The answer implicit in the book is that whereas many of the provincial thought-forms of the early church may be regarded as transient and dispensable, the conviction that Christ is center and Lord of all history is absolutely indispensable for the believer of the twentieth century as of the first.

WALDO BEACH

The Divinity School, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

Goals for American Education: A Symposium. Ed. by LYMAN BRYSON, LOUIS FINKELSTEIN, R. M. MACIVER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. xiv-555. \$5.00.

Goals for American Education contains nineteen papers read at the ninth meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. The volume is edited by Dr. Bryson, Professor of Education, Teachers College, Columbia University; Dr. Finkelstein, president of the Jewish Theological Seminary in America, and Dr. MacIver, Professor of Political Philosophy and Sociology, Columbia University.

From the point of view of serious consideration of educational problems, this meeting may be ranked first among educational conferences. The persons who participated in the conference were outstanding scholars, drawn from the faculties of America's great universities. The roster of the conference warns the reader at the outset that he must prepare to think seriously about some of the most difficult questions challenging higher education in our time. In fact, one who is not familiar with them will find this book to be a helpful introduction to problems of education above the secondary level.

The approach made here to higher education may be defined as kaleidoscopic. Each writer discusses a topic from his special point of view. Differences of opinion or extended comments on the theme are printed along with the papers. Often they reflect sharp differences. It should be noted here that the variegated personnel participating in the conference makes this inevitable. The several Catholic priests present, schooled in medieval scholasticism, have recorded in many footnotes their dissents to views challenging the Catholic philosophy of education. And here it may be expected that the philosophers present, trained in systems of pragmatism or personalism, will present views colored by their own background and training. These comments, unlike tiresome footnotes in books, sustain interest and give a breadth to all of the discussions.

Because of the diversity in subject matter, discussion in this review of contents is limited. Let it be noted here that the reader who wants material to support his conviction about the importance and place of the humanities in modern education will find it here. Also the critic of colleges who *knows* that the curricula and methods now followed are outmoded will be encouraged by such writers as Dean Jones of Harvard. And if one is disturbed about the approval recently given by President Conant of Harvard to American education not having any common denominator or underlying principle, he will be comforted with the words of Professor Ulrich, also of Harvard, who holds that unless there is such a vertical line of thought, a healthy university or a progressive civilization is not possible.

The conference reflects the skill of American scholars in analysis. It leaves one

wishing for equal ability in synthesis. Unless educators can find some definite goals to which particularly universities may give themselves, our educational institutions will not help civilization at the points where it needs help most.

JOHN O. GROSS

Executive Secretary, Board of Education of The Methodist Church, Division of Educational Institutions, Nashville, Tennessee.

Lust for Power. By JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. pp. xi-174. \$3.00.

As we desire the good, we inevitably desire the good to take effect, Dr. Haroutunian tells us, both through us and through others. It follows that we naturally strive after power, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the good to be achieved by it. From this natural and reasonable desire for power, we must distinguish the *lust* for power—a disease of the human soul and the consuming disease especially of our time. One possessed by this lust desires power for its own sake. "Hence it is both absurd and futile to meet lust for power with counsels of prudence." (p. 4) For prudential reasoning must argue with reference to the good. But at the basis of lust for power there is despair, which is the denial of the good. The logic of despair is this: The good is that which fully satisfies the human desire; but no one particular good so satisfies; hence nothing will satisfy man. "Nothing can become a substitute for the good without which no good is good enough." (p. 6) Like the good itself, its substitute releases the passionate intensity with which human life is instinct. Lust is corrupted love. Instead of building up like love, it destroys. "The power with which a being maintains itself according to its nature is turned into a power absurdly indifferent to being, without which there is neither power nor any good. Thus the lust for power emerges as the prime unreason in human life and bedevils the whole existence of man." (pp. 75-76)

No perversion can be understood without reference to the reality which it caricatures. Lust which is love perverted testifies to the power of love. Despair which is the denial of God bears testimony to God. Desperate action, even by its destructiveness, makes it evident that man is unable to live without God. "Human behavior cannot be understood in terms of the pursuit of finite goods." (p. 55) If the truly Infinite is withheld, the finite and relative will claim the rank of the absolute. In the last analysis, the choice for man lies between true worship and idolatry, rather than between belief and unbelief. "One must try to understand this incurable addiction of man to the absolute." (p. 47) Basing his argument on this principle, this writer explains the alchemy which transforms relative objects into the bearers of an absolute. He gives his explanations less in abstract terms than through an analysis of both man's behavior in typical situations and the predicament of modern technological civilization.

In depicting the dominion of technology and mass society as a fertile ground for the growth of the lust for power, he has to say things that have been said often before. But he says them with a vividness of observation and a poignancy of expression which give the reader the sense of immediate encounter. He knows how to observe as a psychologist and to write as a satirist. So, in commenting on the numerical as an instrument of power in modern industrial society, he remarks: "If, as commonly, it becomes unlikely, through no fault of one's own, that one should become a great man, the next best thing is to belong to a great organization." (p. 27) However, irony and witty phrasing are not allowed to divert the reader's attention from the great truth

to convey which is the author's main business—the truth that man is made for God. He concludes the examination of our ailing culture with a final affirmation: "Our very existence depends upon a revival of the Christian faith among us." (p. 160) But he does not conceal the enormous obstacles which hinder the return to an all-but-forgotten truth.

Emerson and Melville mark the hidden polarity of American thought. After a century filled with the echoes of Emerson, the voice of Melville makes itself heard, in this book as elsewhere. Will it be listened to? This is the question.

HELMUT KUHN

University of Erlangen, Bavaria, Germany.

A Firm Faith for Today. By HAROLD A. BOSLEY. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. pp. 283. \$3.00.

A Firm Faith for Today restates in modern idiom eleven credal beliefs of the Christian. To be fully understood, the volume must be read in the context of (1) its origin, and (2) its method.

The manuscript "grew up" in Dr. Bosley's active experience. Its first draft was presented before the Preachers' Meeting of Baltimore and vicinity. The second draft was reworked for discussions before Religious Emphasis Week programs at colleges and universities and ministers' conferences in various sections of the country. Several chapters in the book constituted the James W. Richard Lectures in Christian Religion at the University of Virginia, and the Swander Lectures at the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical and Reformed Church. Portions of Chapter X were used in preparing the study booklet, *Our Faith in the Kingdom of God*. In the context of its origin, therefore, Dr. Bosley's current work is highly practical, and meets the modern mind squarely in the arena of combat between Christian faith and modern paganism.

In the context of its method, the book again gets down to earth and meets the modern mind on its own ground and with its own tools of analysis. Bosley's manner of stating conclusions is that of the liberal. "A rational statement of faith in terms of known facts," he says, "is an humble way of saying that we believe that God knows what he is about, and that, in part, we can know too." The author frankly comes to terms with the method of scientific studies. He seeks, as he says, to help orthodoxy "whether classical or neo" out of its embarrassment "by accepting the validity of science and the legitimacy of the request for proof." "I have," he says, "refused to set science over against religion, or to place emphasis upon those religious claims, however hallowed, that do not square with the nature of reality as seen in or suggested by the conclusions of science."

In the process of writing the book something happened to the author. Dr. Bosley emerged from the ordeal a "confirmed churchman," a member of a glorious fellowship where he is proud to find his place and bear such witness as he can to "Him who is the Light of the world." Here he speaks with a clarity which affirms his completed discovery of the corporate reality.

The test of Dr. Bosley's method, however, comes in Chapter XII when he discusses the belief in immortality. Here he enters an area where it is harder to think clearly, and where projections of arrested desires and anguished hopes introduce confusing and undependable factors in the reasonable effort to get at concrete evidence as the raw material for careful judgment and reasonable conclusions.

How can we give reason for the "hope that is within us"? Dr. Bosley is increasingly impressed by the argument from history, by the argument from logical inference, and by the argument from intuition. But he admits that man is not able to find as clear an answer as he might desire. The author faces this dilemma of the liberal and comes out with the affirmation that "there is reason to believe that relationships through which life unfolds, through which it finds the meaning of its existence, are, in some profound sense, inseparable from it and an external aspect of it: *The God who chose fellowship as the matrix of life, who made us deeply interdependent with each other, is as concerned about our togetherness as our individuality, both here and hereafter.*"

In summarizing what the Christian preacher can speak to the hearts of his people when death comes into their midst, Dr. Bosley quietly slips away from his own method mystically to affirm that open end of life which transcends the limits of both reason and human understanding.

Here is a declaration of Christian belief directed to today's spirit-hungry world. It is intensely practical in its approach, intensely modern in its method, and intensely convincing as reason supports faith in relation to the studied facts of life.

PAUL F. DOUGLASS

President, The American University, Washington, D. C.

The Philosophy of Personalism. By ALBERT C. KNUDSON. Boston: Boston University Press, 1949. pp. 438. \$2.75.

The reissue of Albert C. Knudson's *The Philosophy of Personalism* confirms the prediction of reviewers at the time of its first appearance in 1927 that it would become an authoritative work in its field.

Knudson has done three things superlatively well. First of all, he has at every point set personalism in its historical context with a swift review of the most relevant philosophical thinking on the issue from the Greeks to the present period. Second, he has shown in detail its affinities to, and divergencies from, the rival systems of thought. In the third place, he has given a scholarly explanation of the nature of personalism, characterized by striking clarity and simplicity both of language and of outline. The essence of personalism is, in his own words, "that form of idealism which gives equal recognition to both the pluralistic and monistic aspects of experience and which finds in the conscious unity, identity, and free activity of personality the key to the nature of reality and the solution of the ultimate problems of philosophy." (p. 87) Knudson's method of presenting this *Weltanschauung* is to approach it first as a theory of knowledge, then as a theory of reality, and finally as an ally of religious belief.

No one can read this volume without being impressed anew with the extent of Knudson's acknowledged indebtedness to Borden K. Bowne. It is no derogation of the former to say that he plays the role of an independent and learned Melanchthon to Bowne, who is the real Luther of American personalism.

This is no place to attempt an appraisal of personalistic philosophy. We limit ourselves to one criticism of Knudson's argument, and one general observation. Our criticism is that in order to establish the dualistic epistemology which is essential to personalism, Knudson disposes of epistemological monism by the unwarrantable assumption that it denies the duality of thought and thing, and thus leads either to naturalism or some form of pantheism. What monism denies, at least in its theistic

form, is not the duality of thought and thing, or, to put it otherwise, the distinction between knower and known, but the complete duality between the thing as it is and the thing as perceived. It may be true, as Knudson alleges, that "how such an 'immediate' experience of things is possible cannot be made intelligible" (p. 102), but nevertheless an immediate experience is what the monist asserts and the assertion implies a distinction between the person experiencing and that which he experiences, whether the latter be the physical world or another person. It may also be added that the monist finds the dualistic theory of knowledge no more intelligible than his own and that some monists at least are willing to follow the excellent example Knudson has set in other connections and to acknowledge that there is an ultimate factor in the knowing process which defies analysis.

The general observation we wish to make is that Knudson's book is pre-existentialist. In his preface to this reissue he says that a revision seems unnecessary because "its basic teaching in my opinion meets the needs of the present, as well as it did those of two decades ago, by its critical attitude toward the irrationalism of both extreme naturalists and extreme supernaturalists" (p. 15). That is essentially true, but the vast increase of irrationalism in philosophy and more particularly in theology during the twenty-three years since the first appearance of this book calls for a more extended and vigorous justification of an appeal to reason than Knudson has given. We need an apologetic not only in the name of reason but also in defense of reason, an apologetic such as was attempted last year by Knudson's younger colleague, Harold DeWolf, in *The Religious Revolt Against Reason*.

In this one respect, then, Knudson's book is "dated," but when this has been recognized it is possible still to recommend it as the best single volume on personalism to be had.

JOHN NEWTON THOMAS

Union Theological Seminary, Richmond, Virginia.

Drawing-Room Conversion: a Sociological Account of the Oxford Group Movement. By ALLAN W. EISTER. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1950. pp. xiv-236. \$3.50.

"Am I ignoring a significant religious movement which I ought to be supporting?" This is the question many Christians ask themselves when the Oxford Group is brought to their notice. In Eister's objective and illuminating study, one finds an answer—although the writer's aim is to describe rather than to evaluate.

Eister seems rather sympathetic with the movement in its early days. He sees Buchman as a man of great ability and "rocklike consecration," with an intuitive understanding of people and a genuine interest in those whom he regards as soul-sick. The early emphasis was upon winning individuals to an entire surrender to the will of God. Eister stresses the sense of certainty and peace which converts gained, the joy they experienced in the intimate fellowship, the release that came as a result of confession, and the remarkable way in which the movement grew. His brief criticisms of this period, however, give one pause. The analysis of personal problems made by Buchman and his followers was an oversimplification, since everything, both personal problems and complacency (or lack of personal problems), was said to be due to sin. And the number of sins recognized as important was very small. He states, without however giving his evidence, that most converts remained only a short time in the movement and then drifted away.

In 1934 a great change came upon the Oxford Group Movement. It had

often been criticized for its concentration upon the individual and his relations with other individuals, for its disregard of social and economic problems. But now there began "Moral Rearmament," a crusade to remake the world, abolish war, class conflict, and race conflict. This it proposed to do by getting one hundred million people, including as many key people (statesmen, labor leaders, capitalists, etc.) as possible, to listen to God every day and let him solve all their problems. But the desire to "change" one hundred million in a short time forced the leaders to be satisfied with much less thorough-going conversions. Eister criticizes the publicity methods of the movement in this period as savoring of dishonesty, and says the impression was given that many prominent people were "in the movement" who had merely made general endorsements of God or statements that the world needs better people in it.

The movement still had no clearly formulated social or political philosophy. Its members disapproved of conflict even in a good cause and believed that all disputes could be settled (as undoubtedly they could be) if both sides would pray together and ask God's guidance. They had no interest in institutions or in forms of government. They were uncritical of Nazi dictatorship, feeling that if only they could get to Hitler and "change" him, God through him would "change Germany overnight and solve every last bewildering problem."

During the second World War it became clear that the effort to prevent chaos by ridding the world of sin had not succeeded. Many dropped out, and much adverse feeling was aroused by the attempt of twenty-eight "life changers" to gain deferment from the draft on the ground that their work was contributing to the morale of war workers. Since the war the movement has not regained its vigor, but is slowly dying out, Eister believes.

The conclusion this reviewer reached from reading the book is that the Oxford Movement is unrealistic just where it feels itself strongest, in its attitude toward sin. Sin is here to stay, as Calvinists believe. The Golden Age will not come fully in this world; and laws, governments, labor unions, peace societies, and other institutions will remain important means of preventing or mitigating the harm we can do each other.

KATHARINE McELROY KENT
Burlington, Vermont.

Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man. By DAVID E. ROBERTS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. pp. xiv-161. \$3.00.

Professor Roberts presents a closely-knit thesis that psychotherapy (a broad term which includes psychiatry and psychoanalysis) should accept the basic Christian concepts of God and man, and, in turn, Christian theology should become more sensitive to the healing skills of modern psychotherapy.

The need for such an interpretation becomes increasingly imperative. The emotional difficulties of modern man are increasing at an alarming rate. World environmental pressures plus unresolved inner conflict leave their hurtful mark on the individual. A veneering of culture cannot save him. Someone has described an emotionally confused woman as being "vogue" on the outside and "vague" on the inside. Her number is legion.

Psychotherapists and religious counselors are not working closely together to meet the emotional problems of our age. Each tends to live in a tiny world of his own interests and insights. The psychotherapists, Dr. Roberts insists, must

understand more sympathetically the Christian view of man. On the other hand, religious leaders must try to grasp more fully the dynamic nature of man, how his conflicts arise, and how psychotherapy can assist in resolving his difficulties.

The concluding chapter proposes a working synthesis wherein psychotherapy and theology pool their insights and work together toward man's rehabilitation. The theology of Barth and Brunner, the author holds, has made a contribution in exposing man's false self-sufficiency, but it is too rigid and too inflexible to share constructively with psychotherapy in their common endeavor. "Psychiatry cannot understand its own task aright," Dr. Roberts concludes, "except within the framework of a Christian view of man and God. But the full confirmation of such a standpoint will be reached, if it ever is, only as psychiatrists, and especially Christian psychiatrists, pay more attention than they have thus far to the full range of religious living and faith on the part of strong, healthy people; and it will be reached only as doctrinal theologians take a more direct part in revitalizing the healing ministry of the Church."

LLOYD E. FOSTER

Old First Church, Presbyterian, Newark, New Jersey.

The Gospel and Modern Thought. By ALAN RICHARDSON. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. pp. vi-210. \$2.00.

Practically the whole of Christian theology is contained in this remarkably compact little volume. Sin, salvation, revelation, the Incarnation, the Trinity, eternal life, and the problem of evil—all are here. Naturally the treatment is an abbreviated one in most instances, and a good many objections that have been raised in the course of history do not appear at all. But what is remarkable is that in so few pages so much has been said so well. I liked best the first chapter, where religion is described as essentially a rational experience. Revelation is said to be concerned "with the opening of the eyes of our rational minds to the perception of divine truth." God is known to us as the pressure of truth upon life.

The question the reader asks is, of course, whether this attitude can be maintained as the author makes his way into the mysteries and supernaturalisms of orthodox belief. Great as is my admiration for his scholarship and his skill in exposition, I must confess that I think he tries a little too hard to ride two horses. Either the rationalism or the orthodoxy must suffer, but he seems unwilling to admit, except by implication, that any conflict or any real division is possible. But the net effect on the reader's mind is that of a clear-cut and intelligible presentation of complicated ideas. I have no doubt that this book will be found useful for student discussion groups.

JULIUS SEELEYE BIXLER

President, Colby College, Waterville, Maine.

Chapters In a Life of Paul. By JOHN KNOX. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. pp. 168. \$2.50.

This original study discusses first the nature and use of the sources for the life of Paul. When his letters were collected, a process of selection, textual revision, and interpolation related them to the problems and needs of the later time; Ephesians was added as a kind of preface to the collection; still later, about 150-175, the Pastoral Epistles were added. Furthermore, Acts gave an influential reinterpretation, by freely composed speeches, by arrangement of materials, and by stressing the role of Jerusalem, the authority of the Twelve over the entire church, and the political in-

nousness of the Christian movement. Knox holds (see his *Marcion and the New Testament*) that Acts did not receive its present form until the middle of the second century, and he is more skeptical concerning its worth than I am, although I would agree that his basic principle that the letters are our primary sources must never be ignored.

The most controversial part of the book is the second section, which rejects the chronological scheme of Acts and reconstructs another outline from hints in the letters. In Acts, Paul makes three trips to Jerusalem, and the Jerusalem conference comes early in his ministry. Knox insists that the letters limit the visits to three only (this point seems strained), and he places the conference only two or three years before the ministry ended. Paul took but one collection, organized during those last two or three years, and carried it to Jerusalem on his last visit as a peace offering to bind Jewish and Gentile Christians together.

To get this result Knox has to date the Gallio incident later than the Delphi inscription concerning Gallio would suggest; he has to ignore the Orosius dating of 49 for the expulsion of the Jews from Rome; his view also calls for the earliest possible date (55) for the replacement of Felix by Festus. I doubt that continued critical study will justify the position taken.

The chapter on the temperament, abilities, and working methods of Paul is noteworthy, and the three final chapters on "The Man In Christ" are the most instructive study of Paul's conversion, Christian experience, and basic thinking. In two points I venture to suggest a criticism. Does Knox do full justice to the place of God's righteousness in Paul's teaching concerning the atonement? I am not sure that his deeply Christian intent adequately allows for the truth in the often-misused ideas of satisfaction and justification. Again, why does Knox say that there is no adequate ground for ethical obligation in Paul's view of a man in Christ? Such a man is completely dedicated to Christ; his relation to Christ is that of full commitment to his Lord; he knows he owes obedient response to his Lord in every aspect of his life.

Thus, to me, the book combines two things: first, a brilliant but not convincing reconstruction of the course of Paul's career, a study which throws light on many points, even if the main thesis is rejected; and second, a valuable study of the Christian faith, experience, and thinking of the Apostle.

FLOYD V. FILSON

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

The Christian Perspective. By EDWARD T. RAMSDELL. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. pp. 218. \$2.50.

This volume treats important themes with freshness and vigor, and abounds in penetrating insights. The author indicates his purpose in his preface. Writing as one trained in philosophical theology, he asks what the new movements in theology have to offer as to method and doctrine; his particular concern being neo-orthodoxy.

The theme of the book is inclusive: what is the perspective of our faith as it looks on the world and life? That would suggest a statement of the central doctrines of Christianity. This the author seeks to give in chapters on "Christ the Word Incarnate," "Man and His Sin," "The Cross: Its Background and Meaning." But this discussion is prefixed by three briefer studies on problems of theological method rather than of doctrine, their themes being faith and reason, paradox, and revelation.

The subjects included (and omitted) and the organization of material suggest

the author's interest in neo-orthodoxy as he meets problems of method raised by this movement and discusses doctrines which it has especially stressed.

Dr. Ramsdell is by no means surrendering his liberal and philosophical heritage. Science has for him its definite place. Philosophy is a needed instrument of theology. Revelation is no "one way road." Faith is not a surrender of reason or mere passive acceptance and submission. But what is distinctive in Christianity, he asserts, is not found in "universal truths" reached by reason. The Christian is one who accepts Christ as the crucial fact in man's total experience. He finds in him the answer to the question of life's meanings and values as well as to life's other great problem, that of moral dynamic. What he calls for is a theology which will make more use of the biblical approach and will be definitely Christ-oriented.

In the constructive part, his stress is upon the doctrines of sin and the atonement. The former reflects the influence of the neo-orthodox viewpoint. Sin is primarily pride, self-exaltation, denial of divine authority, putting some "demonic" power in the place of God. The neo-orthodox background for this interpretation is its emphasis on divine transcendence and sovereignty, and this is not wholly consistent with the author's own doctrine of God. In large part, the matter is one of emphasis. Dr. Ramsdell makes *agape* central and determinative for the thought of God, with appreciative reference to Nygren's notable work, though with valid criticism of Nygren's denial of any positive meaning to *eros*. But if love is central in the thought of God, then will not sin be correspondingly the self-centeredness which refuses the love of God and the life of love?

The discussion of the work of Christ and salvation reflects the newer influence in Dr. Ramsdell's thought more by omission than by what is affirmed. The emphasis is on the ideas of atonement and forgiveness. These are vital evangelical conceptions, but only the briefest reference is made to the question of man's remaking (sanctification), or to that pressing problem of today, the idea of salvation in history, with the associated doctrines of the Kingdom of God and the church. Can you give "the Christian perspective" and omit these themes?

Dr. Ramsdell has essayed a needed service, that of inclusive thinking which shall be critical and yet not simply controversial. He has kept to the position represented by the names of Brightman, Knudson, Hocking, and A. E. Taylor. He has sought to incorporate valid contributions from Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr. The book will evoke varying comments. It should stimulate further study in the same spirit.

HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL

Garrett Biblical Institute, Evanston, Illinois.

The First Epistle of Peter. By C. E. B. CRANFIELD. London: S. C. M. Press, Ltd., 1950. pp. 128. 7s 6d.

The author of this little book, evidently a parish minister who has managed to keep abreast of much of the most recent and best theological literature, opens up the meaning of the First Epistle of Peter with directness and lucidity. Depending chiefly upon the excellent commentaries on the Greek text by E. G. Selwyn and F. W. Beare, the author has also read and digested many of the articles in Kittel's great theological dictionary of the New Testament. He weaves together in a connected style all of the words of the Epistle (which are printed in small caps) with his comments. Almost always these comments are penetrating and edifying in the best sense of the word. In date and authorship, Cranfield inclines toward the position of Selwyn; he believes that the Epistle was written in 63 or 64, and holds that it "bears the apostolic testi-

mony and authority of Peter, but that the style and expression are to a large extent due to Silvanus" (p. 10; compare I Peter 5:12).

In the hands of this expositor, First Peter is seen to be an epistle which is surprisingly contemporary. For its conciseness and freshness of treatment, the reviewer knows of no other commentary on First Peter to equal this modest volume.

BRUCE M. METZGER

Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey.

The Old Testament in the Church. By JOSEPH WOODS. London: S.P.C.K. House, 1949. pp. ix-147. 9/6.

This is a British book. The author is not a specialist in biblical criticism or systematic theology, but he is a well-informed man in both fields, and writes lucidly and interestingly. He accepts the current critical view of the development of Old Testament literature, but maintains firmly that this literature contains a divine revelation. He draws a sharp distinction between revelation and religious genius, and endorses without serious question the traditional dualism of the divine and the human. He defends the irrational doctrine of original sin, and in other respects reflects the theological standpoint of neo-Calvinism. But, despite these drawbacks, the book is of distinct value as a historical introduction to the Old Testament's place in the church.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

Dean Emeritus, Boston University School of Theology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Higher Happiness. By RALPH W. SOCKMAN. New York: The Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950. pp. 174. \$2.00.

This distinctly homiletical study of the Beatitudes is fresh, creative, and strong. Just to examine its table of contents or idly to read a random page is to remind the reader that great preachers are no more reluctant to preach from the old, familiar texts than are the most competent critics to wrestle with Shakespeare. While the rest of us resort to remote texts and bizarre homiletical devices, Ralph Sockman stands up to the Beatitudes. The result is this magnificent book.

Every eminent preacher in America today has certain technical characteristics, constantly employed, that are his hallmark. For Dr. Sockman it is, in the first place, clear, concise, and definitive statements, as, for example: "Mercy is compassion based on justice." Or "Man must have more than enough to live *on*. He must have enough to live *for*." These clear, suggestive ideas stop the eye in its headlong flight down the printed page, and set the mind to work. Another of Dr. Sockman's arresting qualities of composition is that of linking striking titles aptly to their texts. For illustration, look at the book's table of contents in the nearest advertisement. But, above all, the illustrations! Beyond argument, Sockman's eye for the illustrative anecdote, the concise quote, the flashing insight from human experience—all these are for this pedestrian preacher both delight and despair.

In brief, the volume is a fine addition to our growing field of popular religious literature in America. Thoughtful ministers will buy it to hold up for judgment upon the best they can produce; and lay readers should find in its pages guidance and profit.

EUGENE M. AUSTIN

The Baptist Temple, Charleston, West Virginia.

Signs of Hope, in a Century of Despair. By Elton Trueblood. Harper. \$1.00. "The Rise of the Horizontal Fellowship," "The Vitality of the New Theology," "The Emergence of Lay Religion," "The Growth of Redemptive Societies." Says Dr. Trueblood, "It is my hope that the very recognition of what is going on may encourage others to try to have a share in it and possibly enlarge it."

Early Christians of the 21st Century. By Chad Walsh. Harper. \$2.00. "This is a book about two things: the deathbed misery of one civilization, and the civilization that may be waiting to take its place." "What would a post-modern Christian civilization be like?"

Science and Christian Faith. By Edward LeRoy Long, Jr. Haddam House (Association Press). \$1.75. "Science is compatible with the basic affirmations of Christianity, and Christianity is compatible with the basic method of science. . . . This book is written by one who would emphasize the distinction between devotion to the scientific method and that complete surrender to science that almost amounts to worship."

From the Bible to the Modern World. World Council of Churches Study Department, Geneva, Switzerland (available at 297 Fourth Avenue, New York). \$1.00 (offset printing). Report of two ecumenical study conferences on the "Biblical Authority for the Church's Social and Political Message Today." Contains addresses by Barth, Dodd, Eichrodt, Horton, Nygren, Richardson, etc.

The Christian Religious Education of Older People. By Paul Benjamin Maves. Federal Council of Churches, 297 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y. \$1.00 (offset printing). A supplementary booklet to *Older People and the Church*.

These My Brethren. By Ralph A. Felton. Rural Church Department, Drew Seminary, Madison, N. J. 40¢. An objective sociological and religious survey of 570 Negro churches and 1,542 Negro families (homes, farms, education) in the rural South; field work done by fifteen teachers in southern colleges.

Self-Deceit. A Comedy on Lies; a Way of Overcoming Them. By Frederick Faber. Pendle Hill, Wallingford, Pa. 35¢ (pap.). "Gilbert Kilpack has edited and introduced (Faber) to moderns through a divinely humorous extract which assaults the reader with very great directness."

Christ in Catastrophe. By Emil Fuchs. Pendle Hill. 35¢ (pap.). A moving testimony by a German minister, once a religious socialist, who joined the Quakers, was imprisoned under the Nazis, and "found serenity through suffering." "The witness of a man who is both saint and prophet."

Psychology and Religion for Everyday Living. By Charles T. Holman. Macmillan. \$2.50. A book for "normal but troubled people," from the standpoint of dynamic psychology.

Achieve
Akstra
Appro
M
Atkins
in
Atkins
Author

Bach:
Bacon:
Birth:
se
Bible
Bible
Bode:
Body
Bow or
Braden
Bunin
N
Burt:

Caillie
Chalm
"Chris
Christ
T
"Chur
M
Comm
Conqu

Dodd:

Eccles
Ecum
Ecum
Esen
Evang
Experi
M

Failey
Faith
10
Fifth L
Fitch:

Garris
Garvie
te
Goethe
Grant

Hazlitt
Hollow
Hom
E
Horion
da
Howar

Immu
Individ
Intima
so

INDEX—VOLUME XIX

A

Achievement of Arminius, The: *Atkinson*, 418
Ahstrom: Mr. Schlesinger's *Vital Center*, 205
 Approach to Preaching Through Classical Rhetoric, An: *Marsh*, 567
Atkins: "Thou Saith the Lord"—The Validity of Preaching, 345
Atkinson: The Achievement of Arminius, 418
 Authorization of the English Bible, The: *Nesbitt*, 70

B

Bach: The Fifth Evangelist, by *Burt*, 431
Bacon: What is Good Church Music?, 264
Barth: "The Mystery and the Miracle of Christmas," selection, 2
Berger: The Immutable Values of a Universal Faith, 536
 Bible in Contemporary Poetry, The: *Braden*, 92
Bode: Lloyd Douglas and America's Largest Parish, 440
 Body of Christ, The: *Stafford*, 389
 Bow of White Ribbon: *Morrill*, 16
Braden: The Bible in Contemporary Poetry, 92
Bunting: Alfred E. Garvie: Theological Exponent of the Nineteenth Century, 395
Burt: The Fifth Evangelist, 431

C

Cailliet: Personal Religious Experiences, 380
Chalmers: The Faith of the United Church of Canada, 106
 "Christ's Victory and Ours," selection: *Grant*, 162
 Christian Education After Ten Years of Ecumenical Thinking: *Homigkhausen*, 176
 "Church's Witness to God's Design, The," selection, *Maury*, 482
 Community of Immortals, The: *Robson*, 186
 Conquest of Pain, The: *Wilson*, 163

D

Dodd: Thirty Years of New Testament Study, 323

E

Ecclesiastical Sculpture: *Miller*, 545
 Ecumenical Prospects in the Local Church: *King*, 578
 Ecumenicity in Worship: *Hasellon*, 40
 Essence of Christianity, The—Brotherhood: *Miller*, 281
 Evangelizing the Whole of Life: *McCollum*, 236
 Experiment on the Recall of Religious Material, An: *Morlas*, 589

F

Fagley: One Place to Hide, 483
 Faith of the United Church of Canada, The: *Chalmers*, 106
 Fifth Evangelist, The: *Burt*, 431
Fitch: Principle or Expediency in Politics, 53

G

Garrison: Problem of "Catholic Power," The, 124
 Garvie, Alfred E.: Theological Exponent of the Nineteenth Century: *Bunting*, 395
 Goethe: Was Goethe a Christian?: *Workman*, 224
 Grant: "Christ's Victory and Ours," selection, 162

H

Hasellon: Ecumenicity in Worship, 40
Holloway: A Review of American Religious Pacifism, 367
Homigkhausen: Christian Education After Ten Years of Ecumenical Thinking, 176
Horton: Progress in Unity from Edinburgh to Amsterdam, 400
Howard: Protestants, Catholics, and Papists, 530

I

Immutable Values of a Universal Faith: *Berger*, 536
 Individual Freedom and Economic Planning: *Seifert*, 555
 Intimate Journal of an Old-Time Humanist, The: *Pater-
son*, 245

J

Jackson: Three Hours Against Eternity, 518

K

King: Ecumenical Prospects in the Local Church, 578

L

Liberty of Christian Praise, The: *McCullum*, 113
 Lights and Shades in Latin-American Missions: *Stock-
well*, 61
 Lloyd Douglas and America's Largest Parish: *Bode*, 440
Lynn: A New Literary Hero, 255

M

Marsh: An Approach to Preaching Through Classical Rhetoric, 567

Marxist Heresy, The: *Polikar*, 356

Maury: "The Church's Witness to God's Design," selection, 482

McCullum: Evangelizing the Whole of Life, 236

McCullum: The Liberty of Christian Praise, 113

Mennonites: The Essence of Christianity—Brotherhood: *Miller*, 281

Miller, A.: Ecclesiastical Sculpture, 545

Miller, J. Q.: The Essence of Christianity—Brotherhood, 281

Moran: An Experiment on the Recall of Religious Material, 589

Morrill: Bow of White Ribbon, 16

"My Ten Best Books," by twenty-five ministers, 495
 Mystery and the Miracle of Christmas, The," selection: *Barth*, 2

N

Nesbitt: The Authorization of the English Bible, 70

New Being, The: *Tillich*, 511

New Literary Hero, A: *Lynn*, 255

Newton: Salvation (selection from *Everyday Religion*), 322

O

Olson: Toward an Adequate Christology, 334

One Place to Hide: *Fagley*, 483

P

Paterson: The Intimate Journal of an Old-Time Humanist, 245

Polikar: The Marxist Heresy, 356

Personal Religious Experiences: *Cailliet*, 380

Pitts: Charles Haddon Spurgeon—An Appreciation, 273

Principle or Expediency in Politics: *Fitch*, 53

Preston: "When Saw We Thee in Prison?" 213

Problem of "Catholic Power," The: *Garrison*, 124
 Progress in Unity from Edinburgh to Amsterdam: *Horton*, 400

Prophets of the Exile, The: *Snaith*, 83

Protestant Piety Today: *Steere*, 3

Protestants, Catholics, and Papists: *Howard*, 530

R

Review of American Religious Pacifism: *Holloway*, 367

Review of the Quarter's Fiction: *Schroeder*, 134, 287, 448, 608

Robson: The Community of Immortals, 186

S

Salvation (selection from *Everyday Religion*): *Newton*, 322

Ahstrom: Schlesinger's *Vital Center*, 205

Schroeder: Review of the Quarter's Fiction, 134, 287, 448, 608

Second Look at Toynbee, A: *Soper*, 192

Seifert: Individual Freedom and Economic Planning, 555

Snaith: The Prophets of the Exile, 83

Social Conscience, The: *Turner*, 408

Soper: A Second Look at Toynbee, 192

Spurgeon, Charles Haddon—An Appreciation: *Pitts*, 273

Stafford: The Body of Christ, 389

Steere: Protestant Piety Today, 3
Stockwell: Lights and Shades in Latin-American Missions, 61

T

Thirty Years of New Testament Study: Dodd, 323
Three Hours Against Eternity: Jackson, 518
"Thus Saith the Lord"—The Validity of Preaching: Atkins, 345
Tillich: The New Being, 511
Toward an Adequate Christology: Olson, 334
Toynbee: A Second Look at Toynbee, by Soper, 192
Turner: The Social Conscience, 408

W

Was Goethe a Christian?: Workman, 224
Webber: Young Men and the Ministry, 29
"When Saw We Thee in Prison?": Preston, 213
Wilson: The Conquest of Pain, 163
Workman: Was Goethe a Christian?: 224
What Is Good Church Music?: Bacon, 264

V

Young Men and the Ministry: Webber, 29

BOOK REVIEWS

A

Adkins: Protestantism Faces Its Educational Task Together, by Bower and Hayward, 148
Ahstrom: Mr. Schlesinger's Vital Center (art.), 205
Ahstrom: Our Religious Traditions, by Lamprecht, 615
American Freedom and Catholic Power, by Blanshard (art.); Garrison, 124
American People's Encyclopedia, ed. Meine, 319
Archer: Hindu View of Christ, by Akhilananda, 306
Aikins: The Small Sects in America, by Clark, 308
Atoning Life, The, by Nash: E.H.L., 318
Austin: The Higher Happiness, by Sockman, 635

B

Baab: The Prophetic Faith, by Buber, 294
Bailey: In Our Image, by Hartie and Rowe, 293
Barnes: Toward a Reborn Church, by Horton, 139
Barnes: The Twentieth Century, by Kohn, 463
Beach: Christ and Time, by Cullmann, 624
Bernhardi: Science and Cosmic Purpose, by Van Nuys, 305
Best Sermons 1949-50, by Butler: Ristow, 310
Bethel: Quaker Education in Theory and Practice, by Brinton, 467
Bethel: The Quaker Story, by Lucas, 467
Bisler: The Gospel and Modern Thought, by Richardson, 632
Bradley, F. H., by Lofthouse: Gray, 303

C

Cannon: Jesus Then and Now, by Sperry, 159
Carlyle: The Purpose of the Gospels, by Scott, 151
Case: The Man Born to Be King, by Sayers, 317
Chapters in a Life of Paul, by Knox: Filsen, 632
Child of Destiny: The Life Story of the First Woman Doctor, by Ross: Hume, 473
Christ and Time, by Cullmann: Beach, 624
Christian Perspective, The, by Ramsdell: Rall, 633
Christian Response to the Atomic Crisis, The, by Long: Hansen, 618
Christianity and Civilization, Part 2, by Brunner: Harounian, 460
Christianity and History, by Butterfield: Lantze, 617
Christianity and Society, by Ferre: Michelson, 614
Christ's Victory and Ours, by Grant: E.H.L., 318
Church and Community in the South, by Blackwell etc.: Shipp, 149
Church's Ministry, The, by Manson: Powell, 314
Clark: These Also Believe, by Braden, 159
Commentary on Romans, by Nygren: Ferri, 141
Contemporary Thinking About Paul, ed. by Kepler: E.H.L., 480

D

DeWolf: The Reality of the Religious Life, by Bett, 311
Doctors Courageous, by Hume: Horton, 619
Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers, The, by Torrance: Grant, 153
Dogmatics in Outline, by Barth: Penner, 458
Drawing-room Conversion, by Eister: Keri, 630
Douglass: A Firm Faith for Today, by Bosley, 628

E

Early American Methodism, Vol. I, by Barclay: Hartman, 470
Early Methodist People, The, by Church: Foder, 309

Education and Living, by Borsodi: Lantze, 146
Einstein, Albert, Philosopher-Scientist, ed. by Schilpp: Frye, 472

F

Ferré: Commentary on Romans, by Nygren, 141
Filson: Chapters in a Life of Paul, by Knox, 632
Firm Faith for Today, A, by Bosley: Douglass, 628
First Epistle of Peter, The, by Cranfield: Metzger, 634
Fitch: Renewing the Mind, by Haselton, 457
Fitzgerald: A Pictorial Gospel, by Hodgkin, 622
Forgotten Religions: A Symposium, by Ferm: Kepler, 469
Foster: Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man, by Roberts, 631
Four Centuries of Scottish Psalmody, by Patrick McCulloch, 477
Free Man's Faith, A, by Evans: Robinson, 304
Freedom and Faith, by Shoemaker: Russin, 479
Frustration: the Study of Behavior Without a Goal, by Maier: Gregory, 468
Frye: Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, ed. by Schilpp, 472

G

Garrison: American Freedom and Catholic Power, by Blanshard (art.), 124
Gesek: Palestine Is Our Business, by Burrows, 454
Gesek: Promise and Fulfillment, by Koester, 454
Glimpses of Mennonite History and Doctrine, by Wenger (art.); Miller, 281
Goals for American Education, ed. by Bryson etc.: Gross, 626
God's Grace and Man's Hope, by Williams: Jeekel, 140
Gospel and Modern Thought, The, by Richardson: Bisler, 632
Gospel in Hymns, The, by Bailey: McAll, 620
Grant, R.: The Doctrine of Grace in the Apostolic Fathers, by Torrance, 153
Gray, F. H.: Bradley, by Lofthouse, 303
Gregory: Frustration: the Study of Behavior Without a Goal, by Maier, 468
Gross: Goals for American Education, ed. by Bryson etc.: 626

H

Handbook to the Mennonite Hymnary, by Hostetler: Harper, 176
Hansen: The Christian Response to the Atomic Crisis, by Long, 618
Harounian: Christianity and Civilization, Part 2, by Brunner, 460
Harper: Handbook to the Mennonite Hymnary, by Hostetler, 176
Harman: Early American Methodism, Vol. I, by Barclay, 470
Harman: The Lord's Supper: Seven Meanings, by Fey, 156
Hedrick: The Ministry, by Spann, 312
Higher Happiness, The, by Sockman: Austin, 635
Hindu View of Christ, by Akhilananda: Archer, 306
History of New Testament Times With Introduction to the Apocryphas, by Pfeiffer: Tushingham, 152
Hough, M.M.: Doctors Courageous, by Hume, 619
Hough: Literary History of the United States, ed. by Spiller etc., 456
Hough: Recovery of Man, by Barry, 300
How Came Our Faith? by Elmslie: Paterson, 145

How to Be Healthy in Hot Climates, by Calverley: *Moffatt*, 157

Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage, by Bertocci: *Trueblood*, 315

Hume: Child of Destiny: The Life Story of the First Woman Doctor, by Ross, 473

Hymnal 1940 Companion, The (Episcopal): *McCutchan*, 474

I

In the Beginning, by Goldman: *Wild*, 464

In Our Image, by Harte and Rowe: *Bailey*, 293

J

Jesus the Preacher, by Handy: *Pruden*, 155

Jesus Then and Now, by Sperry: *Cannon*, 159

Zoekel: God's Grace and Man's Hope, by Williams, 140

K

Kean: The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, by Jaspers, 461

Kean: The Philosophy of Existence, by Marcel, 461

Kenna: When the Lamp Flickers, by Weatherhead, 478

Kent: Drawing-room Conversion, by Eister, 630

Keppler: Forgotten Religions: A Symposium, by Ferm, 469

Kilpack: Theologia Germanica, by Bernhart, 466

Knoff: Orientation in Religious Education, by Lotz, 616

Knox: The Meaning of Christ for Paul, 143

Knudson: The Old Testament in the Church, by Woods, 635

Kuhn: Lust for Power, by Haroutunian, 627

L

Lantero: Christianity and History, by Butterfield, 617

Lantero: Education and Living: Parts I-IV, by Borsdi, 146

Lalouette: The Story of American Protestantism, by Drummond, 292

Lewis: The Person and Work of Christ, by Warfield, 623

Literary History of the United States, ed. by Spiller etc.: *Hough*, 456

Lord's Supper, The: Seven Meanings, by Fey: *Hariman*, 156

Lust for Power, by Haroutunian: *Kuhn*, 627

M

Man Born to Be King, The, by Sayers: *Case*, 317

Man From Nazareth, The, by Fosdick: *Rollins*, 299

McAll: The Gospel in Hymns, by Bailey, 620

McCulloch: Four Centuries of Scottish Psalmody, by Patrick, 477

McCutchan: The Hymnal 1940 Companion (Episcopal), 474

McNeill: The Rise of Christianity, by Barnes, 297

Meaning of Christ for Paul, The: *Knox*, 143

Metzger: The First Epistle of Peter, by Cranfield, 634

Michalson: Christianity and Society, by Ferré, 614

Miller: Glimpses of Mennonite History and Doctrine, by Wenger (art.), 281

Ministry, The, by Spann: *Hedrick*, 312

Moffatt: How to Be Healthy in Hot Climates, by Calverley, 157

More About the Early Methodist People, by Church: *Yoder*, 309

Mr. Jones, Meet the Master, by Marshall: *E.H.L.*, 480

Mullenburg: The Psalms, by Leslie, 143

N

New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 319

No Coward Soul, by MacLennan: *Phillips*, 301

O

Old Testament in the Church, The, by Woods: *Knudson*, 635

Orientation in Religious Education, by Lotz: *Knoff*, 616

Our Religious Traditions, by Lamprecht: *Ahlstrom*, 615

P

Palestine Is Our Business, by Burrows: *Gesork*, 454

Peterson: How Came Our Faith? by Elmalie, 145

Perner: Dogmatics in Outline, by Barth, 458

Perennial Scope of Philosophy, The, by Jaspers: *Kean*, 461

Person and Work of Christ, The, by Warfield: *Lewis*, 623

Phillips: No Coward Soul, by MacLennan, 301

Philosophy of Existence, The, by Marcel: *Kean*, 461

Philosophy of Personalism, The, by Knudson: *Thomas*, 629

Pictorial Gospel, A., by Hodgkin: *Fitzgerald*, 622

Powell: The Church's Ministry, by Manson, 314

Preaching Unashamed, by Sizoo: *Pruden*, 155

Promise and Fulfillment, by Koester: *Gesork*, 454

Prophetic Faith, The, by Buber: *Baab*, 294

Protestantism Faces Its Educational Task Together, by Bower and Hayward: *Adkins*, 148

Pruden: Jesus the Preacher, by Handy, 155

Pruden: Preaching Unashamed, by Sizoo, 155

Pruden: To Fulfill This Ministry, by Martin, 155

Psalms, The, by Leslie: *Mullenburg*, 143

Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man, by Roberts: *Foster*, 631

Punishment Without Crime, by Fineberg: *Swift*, 316

Purpose of the Gospels, by Scott: *Carlyon*, 151

Q

Quaker Education in Theory and Practice, by Brinton: *Bethel*, 467

Quaker Story, The, by Lucas: *Bethel*, 467

R

Rall: The Christian Perspective, by Ramsdell, 633

Reality of the Religious Life, The, by Bett: *DeWolf*, 311

Recovery of Man, by Barry: *Hough*, 300

Religious Revolt Against Reason, The, by DeWolf: *Stokes*, 302

Renewal of the Mind, by Hazelton: *Fitch*, 457

Rise of Christianity, by Barnes: *McNeill*, 297

Ristow: Best Sermons 1949-50, by Butler, 310

Robinson: A Free Man's Faith, by Evans, 304

Rollins: The Man From Nazareth, by Fosdick, 299

Russin: Freedom and Faith, by Shoemaker, 479

S

Sacraments, Signs and Symbols, by Pittenger: *Stafford*, 465

Science and Cosmic Purpose, by Van Nuyts: *Bernhardt*, 305

Shipley: Church and Community in the South, by Blackwell etc., 149

Small Sects in America, The, by Clark: *Atkins*, 308

Stafford: Sacraments, Signs and Symbols, by Pittenger, 465

Stokes: The Religious Revolt Against Reason, by DeWolf, 302

Story of American Protestantism, The, by Drummond: *Lalouette*, 292

Swift: Punishment Without Crime, by Fineberg, 316

T

Theology Germanica, by Bernhart: *Kilpack*, 466

Theology of the Old Testament, The, by Baab: *Tribble*, 296

These Also Believe, by Braden: *Clark*, 159

Thomas: The Philosophy of Personalism, by Knudson, 629

To Fulfill This Ministry, by Martin: *Pruden*, 155

Toward a Reborn Church, by Horton: *Barnes*, 139

Tribble: The Theology of the Old Testament, by Baab, 296

Trueblood: The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage, by Bertocci, 315

Tushingham: History of New Testament Times with Introduction to the Apocrypha, by Pleiter, 152

Twentieth Century, The, by Kohn: *Barton*, 463

V

Vital Center, The, by Schlesinger (art.): *Ahlstrom*, 205

W

When the Lamp Flickers, by Weatherhead: *Kenna*, 478

Wild: In the Beginning, by Goldman, 464

Y

Yoder: The Early Methodist People, by Church, 309

Yoder: More About the Early Methodist People, by Church, 309

RELIGION IN LIFE

FICTION REVIEWS

A

Aldridge: The Diplomat, 451
Asch: Mary, 287

B

Back: The Dream Gate, 135
Bonnel: The Mudlark, 291

C

Cary: The Horse's Mouth, 450
Clark: The Trail of the Cat, 137

D

Dennis: A Sea Change, 137

G

Gebler: The Plymouth Adventure, 612
Green: Loving, 290
Greene: No Time to Look Back, 610

H

Hersey: The Wall, 448

L

Liddell: The Last Enchantments, 288

M

Menen: The Stumbling Stone, 134
Miller: The Sure Thing, 135

O

O'Neill: Morning Time, 290
Orwell: Nineteen Eighty-Four, 136

P

Power: The Encounter, 609

R

Richter: The Town, 612
Robinson: The Cardinal, 608

T

Thompson: The Cry and the Covenant, 452

W

Weller: The Crack in the Column, 289
Wilson: Prince of Egypt, 452

LINE REVIEWS, 160, 319-20, 636

26

51

8

5